Statement of the Case. jurisdiction; and complainants further said that sections 671, 672 and 1387 of the Code were in conflict with treaties between the United States and Russia, France, Switzerland and England, and with the Constitution of the United States; and hence that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction "on the ground that the construction and application of the Federal Constitution are involved as well as on the ground of diverse citizenship of the parties, and because said section of said Civil Code violated the Federal Constitution as herein stated." On the same day, December 22, 1897, the final decree was entered in the case, the third paragraph of which was as follows: "That the original 'complaint' of the complainants, John W. Blythe and Henry T. Blythe, filed December 3, 1895, and also the 'amended complaint' of said complainants, filed December 12, 1895, and also the 'second amended and supplemental bill in equity' of said complainants, filed January 14, 1897, and also the complainants' third amended and supplemental bill, filed by leave of court this 22d day of December, 1897, after the rendition of the decision of the court upon the matters determined herein, but before the signing of this decree, be, and the same are each hereby, finally dismissed as against each and all of the parties named therein respectively as defendants, and in all respects and in every particular, for want of either Federal or equity jurisdiction and without prejudice to complainants' right to bring or maintain an action at law." From this decree John W. Blythe and Henry T. Blythe prayed an appeal to this court, which was allowed and bond given March 2, 1898, and on the same day the Circuit Judge filed a certificate, certifying "to the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891," fifteen questions of law, which it was stated arose “upon the face of said third amended and supplemental bill and upon said motion," namely, the motion to dismiss. The first ten of these questions set forth that the Circuit Court sustained the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and ordered it to be dismissed accordingly. The remaining five contained no statement as to their disposition. Opinion of the Court. It appears from the opinion of the Circuit Judge that the various bills were dismissed on the grounds: First, that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court could not " be maintained because the state court, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, determined the eligibility of the defendant Florence to inherit an estate which that court was called upon to distribute under the laws of the State;" and that "the other propositions contended for by complainants are for the same reason deemed insufficient to take this case out of the general rule that after a court of a State, with full jurisdiction over property in its possession, has finally determined all rights to that property, a court of the United States will not entertain jurisdiction to annul such decree and disturb rights once definitely determined." Second, that the remedy of complainants, if any, was at law, and not in equity. A motion was made to dismiss or affirm the appeal. Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, Mr. W. H. H. Hart, Mr. John Garber and Mr. Robert Y. Hayne for the motion. Mr. S. W. Holladay, Mr. E. B. Holladay, Mr. Jefferson Chandler and Mr. L. D. McKisick opposing. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. We have heretofore determined that review by certificate is limited by the act of March 3, 1891, to certificates by the Circuit Courts, made after final judgment, of a question in issue as to their own jurisdiction; and to certificates by the Circuit Courts of Appeal of questions of law in relation to which the advice of this court is sought., United States v. Rider, 163 U. S. 132. Appeals or writs of error may be taken directly from the Circuit Courts to this court in cases in which the jurisdiction of those courts is in issue, that is, their jurisdiction as Federal courts, the question alone of jurisdiction being certified to this . Opinion of the Court. court. The Circuit Court held that the remedy was at law and not in equity. That conclusion was not a decision that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction as a court of the United States. Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355; Blythe Company v. Blythe, 172 U. S. 644. The Circuit Court dismissed the bills on another ground, namely, that the judgments of the state courts could not be reviewed by that court on the reasons put forward. This, also, was not in itself a decision of want of jurisdiction because the Circuit Court was a Federal court, but a decision that the Circuit Court was unable to grant relief because of the judg ments rendered by those other courts. If we were to take jurisdiction on this certificate, we could only determine whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction as a court of the United States, and as the decree rested on no denial of its jurisdiction as such, but was rendered in the exercise of that jurisdiction, it is obvious that this appeal cannot be maintained in that aspect. Nor can we take jurisdiction on the ground that the case involved the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States, or that the validity or construction of a treaty was drawn in question, or that the constitution or law of a State was claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, within the meaning of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. The Circuit Court by its decree passed on none of these matters, unless it might be said that they were indirectly involved in holding the judgments of the state courts to be a bar; and, moreover, the decree rested on the independent ground that the remedy was at law. Even if the decree had been based solely on the binding force of the state judgments, still we cannot hold that an ap peal directly to this court would lie. The Superior Court of San Francisco was a court of general jurisdiction, and authorized to take original jurisdiction "of all matters of probate," and the bill averred that Thomas H. Blythe died a resident of the city and county of San Francisco and left an estate therein; and that court repeatedly decreed Opinion of the Court. that Florence was the heir of Thomas H. Blythe, and its decrees were repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. So far as the construction of the state statutes and state constitution in this behalf by the state courts was concerned, it was not the province of the Circuit Court to reëxamine their conclusions. As to the question of the capacity of an alien to inherit, that was necessarily involved in the determination by the decrees that Florence did inherit, and that judgment covered the various objections in respect of section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, and the tenth section of article one of the Constitution of the United States, and any treaty relating to the subject. We are not to be understood as intimating in the least degree that the provisions of the California Code amounted to an invasion of the treaty-making power, or were in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any treaty with the United States; but it is enough for the present purpose that the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts of the United States, to pass on the Federal questions thus intimated, for the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the laws of every State as its own local laws and constitution, and if the state courts erred in judgment, it was mere error, and not to be corrected through the medium of bills such as those under consideration. Appeal dismissed. Syllabus. NICOL v. AMES. 173 509 L-ed 786 NO. 435. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN 117882 DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. In re NICHOLS. NO. 4. ORIGINAL. SKILLEN v. AMES. NO. 625. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN INGWERSEN v. UNITED STATES. NO. 636. ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DIS- Nos. 485 and 4 Original argued, and Nos. 625 and 636 submitted, December 18, 1898. Decided When an act of Congress is claimed to be unconstitutional, the presumption is in favor of its validity, and it is only when the question is free from any reasonable doubt that this court should hold an act of the law-making power of the nation to be in violation of that fundamental instrument' upon which all the powers of the Government rest. The tax authorized by the act of June 13, 1898, by the board of trade or exchanges upon the sale of property is not a direct tax, nor a tax upon the business itself which is so transacted, but is a duty upon the facilities made use of and actually employed in the transaction of the business, separate and apart from the business itself, and is a constitutional exercise of the powers of taxation granted to Congress. A sale at an exchange forms a proper basis for a classification which excludes all sales made elsewhere from taxation. The means actually adopted by Congress, in the act in question, do not ille- There is no difference, for the purposes of this decision, between the Union |