Opinion of the Court.

from that order, which he asserted was abridged or taken away by the decision of the state court. The liability to Dixon depended on principles of general law applicable to the facts, and not in any way on the terms of the order." That was indeed a writ of error to a state court, but the reasoning is applicable here. Pope was appointed receiver by an interlocutory order of the Circuit Court in the exercise of its general equity powers. He did not occupy the position of a receiver of a corporation created under Federal law as in Texas and Pacific Railway v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593; or of a marshal of the United States as in Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U. S. 421; or of a receiver of a national bank as in Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498. Nor did his cause of action originate or depend on the order of appointment, or assignments made to him by the Atlantic Company pursuant to that order. Nor was any right claimed by him by virtue of his order of appointment or of his deeds of assignment denied or alleged to have been denied. The decrees of the Circuit Court and of the Circuit Court of Appeals dealt solely with the alleged rights of the Atlantic Company as against certain Indiana corporations. It is impossible to hold that these orders of appointment were equivalent to laws of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution.

We agree with counsel for appellee that Provident Savings Society v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635, 641, is in point in this aspect of the case. There it was ruled that "the fact that a judgment was recovered in a court of the United States does not, in a suit upon that judgment, raise a question under the laws of the United States within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1875." That was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York to review a judgment of that court denying a motion for the removal of the cause to the United States Circuit Court. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion, and, after pointing out that the alleged grounds of removal were insufficient, remarked: "It is suggested, however, that a suit on a judgment recovered in a United States court is necessarily a suit arising under the laws of the United States, as much so as if the plaintiff or defendant were a cor

Opinion of the Court.

poration of the United States; and hence that such a suit is removable under the act of March 3, 1875. It is observable that the removal of the cause was not claimed on any such broad ground as this; but, so far as the character of the case was concerned, only on the ground that the defendant had a defenee under Rev. Stat. § 739, specifying what the defence was; and we have already shown that that ground of removal, as stated in the petition, was insufficient. But conceding that the defendant is now entitled to take its position on the broader ground referred to, is it tenable and sufficient for the purpose? What is a judgment, but a security of record showing a debt due from one person to another? It is as much a mere security as a Treasury note, or a bond of the United States. If A brings an action against B, trover or otherwise, for the withholding of such securities, it is not. therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States, although the whole value of the securities depends upon the fact of their being the obligations of the United States. So if A have title to land by patent of the United States and brings an action against B for trespass or waste, committed by cutting timber, or by mining and carrying away precious ores, or the like, it is not therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States. It is simply the case of an ordinary right of property sought to be enforced. A suit on a judgment is nothing more, unless some question is raised in the case (as might be raised in any, of the cases specified), distinctly involving the laws of the United States such a question, for example, as was ineffectually attempted to be raised by the defendant in this case. If such a question were raised then it is conceded it would be a case arising under the laws of the United States. Without pursuing the subject further, we conclude with expressing our opinion that this last ground of removal, like those already considered, was insufficient."

In Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, jurisdiction was sustained on the ground that the plaintiff's title was derived through the enforcement of a lien, the validity of which depended on the laws of the United States and the rules of the Circuit

Opinion of the Court.

Court, and their construction and application were directly involved.

Appeal dismissed.

MR. JUSTICE BROWN took no part in the consideration and disposition of this motion.

GUARANTEE COMPANY v. MECHANICS' SAVINGS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

No. 224. Argued March 16, 1899. - Decided April 8, 1899.

A Circuit Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review a decree of a Circuit Court when that decree, as in this case, was not a final one.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. William L. Granbery for the Guarantee Company. Mr. Albert D. Marks was on his brief.

Mr. Edward H. East for Savings Bank & Trust Co.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in this suit-originally brought in the Chancery Court at Nashville, Tennessee, and subsequently removed into.the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee - is the Mechanics' Savings Bank and Trust Company, a Tennessee corporation suing to the use of James J. Prior, assignee, under a general assignment of all the assets, rights and credits of that company in trust for the benefit of creditors.

The principal defendant is the Guarantee Company of North America, a corporation created under the laws of the Dominion of Canada.

From January 16, 1888, to January 1, 1893, Schardt was

Opinion of the Court.

teller and collector and from the latter date until his death was cashier of the plaintiff company.

The object of the present suit is to have an accounting and a decree as to the amount due the plaintiff on two bonds executed by the Guarantee Company of North America to the Mechanics' Savings Bank and Trust Company; cne, insuring the latter corporation against such pecuniary loss as it might sustain on account of the fraudulent acts of Schardt as teller and collecter; the other, insuring the same corporation against pecuniary loss by reason of fraudulent acts by him in his office of cashier.

The bill alleges that while acting as teller and collector of the plaintiff company Schardt fraudulently embezzled of its moneys the sum of $78,956.11, of which $50,856.77 was embezzled during the year ending January 1, 1893; and that during the period covered by the bond insuring his fidelity as cashier he fraudulently appropriated of the plaintiff's moneys the sum of $22,817.30.

The bill also alleged that a few days before his death Schardt assigned to the plaintiff company, as additional indemnity for the losses he had brought upon it, certain policies on his life amounting to $80,000; that upon those policies $20,000 had been collected, and the residue was in dispute; and that Schardt did not give any direction as to which of the bonds insuring his fidelity the insurance moneys when collected should be applied.

The Guarantee Company in its answer insisted that by reason of the violation of the terms and conditions upon which the bonds in question were issued it was not liable to the plaintiff in any sum.

By the decree in the Circuit Court it was adjudged that the amount embezzled by Schardt during the years 1890 and 1891 had been paid out of the assets and collections transferred by him to the bank just before his death; that his embezzlements from and after September 1, 1890, and up to January 1, 1893, amounted, principal and interest, to $52,736.17, while his embezzlements during his term as cashier amounted, principal and interest, to $23,128.69; and that the total amount, princi

Opinion of the Court.

pal and interest, of all his embezzlements while occupying the two positions of teller and cashier, was $107,223.36.

The decree continued:

"It appearing that Schardt had assigned to the bank to indemnify it against loss, two lots of land assigned to J. B. Richardson and life insurance policies amounting to $80,000, some of which policies have been paid to the assignee without suit, and others are now in litigation in this court, or pending on appeal or writ of error to the appellate court of this circuit, held at Cincinnati, the court adjudges upon inspection of said guaranty bonds, their terms and various conditions, and the proof submitted, that the bank has complied with the same and all its undertakings thereunder, substantially; and that said Schardt embezzled and fraudulently appropriated the moneys of the bank while he filled said two positions, to the amounts named; and that interest should be calculated upon said sums from the end of his respective terms.

"The court, after considering the various and numerous defences set up by defendant company, why a recovery should not be had upon either of said bonds, or both, in favor of complainant, is pleased to disallow each and all of said defences, and to order, adjudge and decree that complainant have its decree or judgment against the defendant, the Guar antee Company, upon each of said bonds with interest from the time the same should have been paid according to the terms of said bonds, and for the costs.

"That complainant have judgment on the teller's and collector's bond for the sum of ten thousand dollars principal and the further sum of seven hundred and seventy dollars, being interest at six per cent from 9th of April, 1894, to July 1, 1895; and that complainant have judgment on the cashier's bond against defendant Guarantee Company for the sum of twenty thousand dollars principal and the further sum of $1540.00 interest thereon from April 9, 1894, to July 1, 1895, making in the aggregate of principal and interest on both bonds the sum of thirty-two thousand three hundred and ten dollars ($32,310.00) with interest thereon until paid, and the costs of this suit.