See VOLUNTARY Gift, 1, 2.
Although the bill of exceptions in this case does not state, in so many words, that it contains all the evidence, it sufficiently appears that it does contain all, and this court can inquire on this record whether the Circuit Court erred in giving a peremptory instruction for the defendant. Gunnison County Commissioners v. Rollins, 255.
1. In proceedings taken by a District Attorney of the United States, by order of the Attorney General at the request of the Secretary of War, and conducted under directions of the latter, to secure the condemna- tion of private lands within the limits of his district for the purpose of erecting fortifications thereon for the use of the United States, he is performing his official duties as District Attorney of the United States, and is not entitled to any extra or special compensation for them. United States v. Johnson, 363.
2. The authority conferred upon the Attorney General by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 542, 26 Stat. 985, to offer rewards for the detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States, preliminary to the indictment, empowered him to authorize the Marshal of the Northern District of Florida to offer a reward for the arrest and delivery of a person accused of the committal of a crime against the United States in that district, the reward to be paid upon conviction; and a deputy marshal, who had complied with all the conditions of the offer and of the statute, was entitled to receive the amount of the reward offered. United States v. Matthews, 381.
FOX RIVER WATER POWER.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3.
The facts in this case, as detailed in the statement of the case and the opinion of the court, show that a gross fraud was committed by the plaintiffs in error against the defendants, to dispossess them of the property in question; and in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the fraud, so glaring, the original and persistent intention of McIntire through so many years to make himself the owner of the property, the utter disregard shown of the rights of the plaintiff as well as of the mortgagee, the false personation of Emma Taylor, and the
fact that the decree can do no harm to any innocent person, this court holds that these facts do away with the defence of laches, and demand of the court an affirmance of the action of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, granting the relief prayed for by the plaintiffs below. McIntire v. Pryor, 38.
1. This is one of the cases in which it is proper to issue a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal court under the rule as stated in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, instead of awaiting the slow process of a writ of error from this court to the highest court of the State where the decision could be had. Ohio v. Thomas, 276.
2. Where a court has jurisdiction of an offence and of the accused, and the proceedings are otherwise regular, a conviction is lawful although the judge holding the court may be only an officer de facto; and the validity of the title of such judge to the office, or his right to exer- cise the judicial functions, cannot be determined on a writ of habeas corpus; this rule is well settled, and is applicable to this case. parte Henry Ward, 452.
3. The title of a person acting with color of authority, even if he be not a good officer in point of law, cannot be collaterally attacked. Ib.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 1, 3, 6.
1. With regard to the operation of a voluntary, or common law assign- ment of his property by an insolvent debtor for the benefit of his creditors upon property situated in other States, there is a general consensus of opinion that it will be respected, except so far as it comes in conflict with the rights of local creditors, or with the laws or public policy of the State in which it is sought to be enforced. Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 624.
2. With respect to statutory assignments of the property of an insolvent debtor, the prevailing American doctrine is, that a conveyance under a state insolvent law operates only upon property within the territory of that State, and with respect to property in another State it is given only to such effect as the laws of that State permit, and in general must give way to claims of creditors pursuing their remedies there. Ib. 3. The execution and delivery by Merrill & Company to the Security and Trust Company in Minnesota of an assignment of their property for the benefit of their creditors, made under the insolvent laws of that VOL.. CLXXIII-46
State, and the acceptance thereof by the assignee and its qualification thereunder, and the notice thereof to Mudge & Sons in Massachusetts, who held personal property belonging to the said assignors, did not vest in the assignee such a title to that property that it could not, after such notice, be lawfully seized by attachment in an action instituted in Massachusetts by creditors of the insolvents who were citizens of New York, and who had notice of the assignment, but had not proved their claims against the assigned estate, nor filed a release thereof. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
1. A receiver of a railroad in a State, appointed by a Circuit Court of the United States, is not authorized by the fact of such appointment to bring here for review a judgment in a court of the State against him, when no other cause exists to give this court jurisdiction. Bausman v. Dixon, 113.
2. On the facts stated by the court in its opinion, it declines to hold that it affirmatively appears from the record that a decision could not have been had in the Supreme Court of the State, which is the highest court in the State; and this being so, it holds that the writ of error must be dismissed. Mullen v. Western Union Beef Co., 116.
3. As the controversy in this case involved the question on what basis dividends in insolvency should have been declared, and therein the enforcement of the trust in accordance with law, this court has jurisdiction of it in equity, Merrill v. National Bank of Jackson- ville, 131.
4. On the facts stated in the opinion, the court holds that the plaintiff in error, a New York corporation, having, of its own motion, sought to litigate its rights in a state court of Louisiana, and having been given the opportunity to do so, no Federal question arises out of the fact that the litigation there resulted unsuccessfully, and without the decision of a Federal question which might give this court jurisdiction; following Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 370, in holding that when a state court has based its decision on a local or state question, the logical course here is to dismiss the writ of error. Remington Paper Company v. Watson, 443.
5. On a writ of error to a state court this court cannot take jurisdiction under the allegation that a contract has been impaired by a decision of that court, when it appears that the state court has done nothing more than construe its own constitution and statutes existing at the time when the bonds were issued, there being no subsequent legisla tion touching the subject. Turner v. Wilkes County, 461. 6. This court is bound by the decision of a state court in regard to the meaning of the constitution and laws of its own State, and its decision upon such a state of facts raises no Federal question; though other principles obtain when the writ of error is to a Federal court. Ib. 7. After the hearing of the former appeal in this case, 170 U. S. 1, and after the decree of this court determining the rights of the parties, and remanding the case to the Court of Claims with instructions to enter a new judgment for the net amount actually received by the Government for the Kansas lands, without interest, less the amount of lands upon the basis of which settlement was made with the Tonawandas, and other just deductions, etc., and after the Court of Claims had complied with this mandate, in accordance with its terms, a motion on the part of the United States to this court to direct the Court of Claims to find further facts comes too late. United States v. New York Indians, 464.
8. As the judgment of the Court of Claims now appealed from was in exact accordance with the mandate of this court, the appeal from it is dismissed. Ib.
9. The sixth section of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, did not change the limit of two years as regards cases which could be taken from Circuit and District Courts of the United States to this court, and that act did not operate to reduce the time in which writs of error could issue from this court to state courts. Allen v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 479.
10. As a reference to the opinion of the Supreme Court of California makes patent the fact that that court rested its decision solely upon the construction of the contract between the parties to this action which forms its, subject, and decided the case wholly independent of the Federal questions now set up; and as the decree of the court below was adequately sustained by such independent, non-Federal question, it follows that no issue is presented on the record which this court has power to review. Ib.
11. In ascertaining the jurisdictional amount on an appeal to this court, it is proper to compute interest as part of the claim. Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 528.
12. The court has the power in the absence of statutory provisions for notice to parties, to make rules regarding it. Ib.
13. This court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the state court in this case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it deprived the defendants of any right, privilege or immunity set up by them
under the Constitution of the United States. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 592.
14. The question raised by the eighth and ninth assignments of error, relating to alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, are not presented by the record, and do not result by necessary intendment therefrom, and are there- fore not considered by the court, under the well-settled rules that the attempt to raise a Federal question for the first time after a decision by the court of last resort of a State is too late; and that where it is disclosed that an asserted Federal question was not presented to the state court or called in any way to its attention, and where it is not necessarily involved in the decision of the state court, such question will not be considered by this court. Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owens- boro, 636.
See ABATEMENT;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 8;
B.. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
A Circuit Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review a decree of a Circuit Court when that decree, as in this case, was not a final one. Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 582.
See JURISDICTION, C, 10, 11.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
1. The Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana has jurisdiction of a suit brought in it by a citizen of New York to recover from the city of New Orleans on a number of cer- tificates, payable to bearer, made by the city, although the petition contains no averment that the suit could have been maintained by the assignors of the claims or certificates sued upon. New Orleans v. Quinlan, 191.
2. Newgass v. New Orleans, 33 Fed. Rep. 196, approved in holding that "A Circuit Court shall have no jurisdiction for the recovery of the contents of proinissory notes or other choses in action brought in favor of assignees or transferees except over, (1) suits upon foreign bills of exchange; (2) suits that might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents, if no assignment or transfer had been made; (3) suits upon choses in action payable to bearer, and made by a corporation." Ib.
3. The instruments sued on in this case being payable to bearer, and having been made by a corporation, are expressly excepted by the Judiciary Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, from the general rule pre- scribed in it that an assignee or subsequent holder of a promissory note or chose in action could not sue in a Circuit or District Court of
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