In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes.

eign, was the state religion, as well as article 225, defining a crime against all others than that religion, have necessarily become inoperative." (U. S. vs. Balcorta, 25 Phil. Rep., 273.)

The birth of the child Vicente Atanasio Enriquez occurring in 1905, several years subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the consequent revocation of the impediment of priesthood to marriage, it results that the child's parents could have consummated a legal marriage at the time of its conception, and, hence, that the child is a natural child within the terms of article 119 of the Civil Code.

Before leaving this branch of the case, we deem it expedient to discuss the competency of evidence tending to show the parentage of a natural child (a) in an action by the child to enforce its recognition, and (b) in an action brought by persons who are prejudiced by such acknowledgment to have such acknowledgment annulled. The case at bar presents both phases of the question, for the child Vicente instituted a proceeding in the lower court to establish his right to inherit the property of Aurea Enriquez as her natural child; and other relatives of hers-Rafael and Josefa Aquino-instituted another proceeding contesting his acknowledgment as such natural child, both of these cases have been consolidated in the court below and thus appealed to this court.

First let us consider the action brought by a child to enforce its recognition as a natural child. Article 129 provides that the father and mother may recognize a natural child jointly or individually. Article 132 prohibits disclosure of the name of the other parent when the recognition is by one parent alone. Article 130 provides that in such a case the child shall be presumed to be a natural child if the parent who acknowledged it had legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of its conception. Articles 135 and 136 specify the cases in which the father and mother, respectively, must recognize a natural child.

Articles 135 and 136 both provide that certain voluntary

In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes.

acts of the father or mother entitle the child to a judgment establishing its status as a natural child of the defendant parent. These voluntary acts are of two kinds: Either a writing by the parent expressly acknowledging the child, or the fact that the parent has permitted it to enjoy the status of his or her natural child. The basic reason for allowing this kind of evidence to be used against the parent is, we presume, one of estoppel. At least we think it may now be so classified under section 333 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides:

"The following presumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive:

"1. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it."

Upon well-founded principles respecting the conclusiveness of judgments, article 135 of the Civil Code provides that the father may not deny the status of the offspring in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction, when the judgment against him decrees that he acknowledge the child born of his crime. In the case of the mother, the Code goes one step further and provides that proof of birth and identity of the child is sufficient to compel her to acknowledge it. In this instance only is the parentage of the parent sufficient to compel acknowledgment. Whichever of the methods adopted by the child to prove his right to the status of an acknowledged natural child, it will be observed that the presumption created by article 130 dispenses with the necessity of investigating the identity of the other parent.

The cases heretofore decided by this court upon the point now being discussed may be divided into those wherein the action was against the father, those wherein the action was against both parents, and those wherein the action was against the mother. In all the cases in which the child sought acknowledgment by the natural father, the proof

In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes.

offered was either of express acknowledgment in writing, or of the father's having permitted the child to enjoy the status of a natural child, both voluntary acts of the father. We have uniformly held in these cases that the fact of the father's parentage is not competent to prove his acknowledgment. (Mendoza vs. Ibañez, 4 Phil. Rep., 666; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Id., 738; Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 4 Id., 746; Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Id., 1; Tengco vs. Sanz, 11 Id., 163; Dizon vs. Ullmann, 13 Id., 88.) And, obviously, such evidence is of no purpose to show either an express acknowledgment in writing or the fact that the child has enjoyed the status of a natural child.

Siguiong vs. Siguiong (8 Phil. Rep., 5), Serrano vs. Aragon (22 Id., 10), and Cosio vs. Pili (10 Id., 72), were all actions brought by children to prove their status as natural children legitimized by subsequent marriage of their, parents. In all these cases it was necessary to establish an acknowledgment on the part of the father, which, as stated above, must be done without reference to his parentage. Hence, the same kind and quantum of proof as to the father's acknowledgment must be produced in such an action as in an action instituted against their father alone to compel acknowledgment. Only in the last case cited was this successfully accomplished.

But one case has arisen in which it was sought to compel the mother to acknowledge a natural child: Capistrano vs. Gabino (8 Phil. Rep., 135). We do not include Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil. Rep., 697), for the reason, as stated in Benedicto vs. De la Rama (4 Phil. Rep., 746, 749), that that case was governed by the laws in force prior to the promulgation of the Civil Code. In the Capistrano case, evidence of the identity of the mother was introduced and duly considered, but was held insufficient for that purpose. An examination of all these cases will show that the presumption as to the capacity of the other parent to marry at the time of conception of the child, when the action was against only one of the parents, was applied in none of them, unless it might be said that it was applicable in the

In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes.

Capistrano case. The evidence in that case was confined wholly to whether the child was born of its alleged mother, the father being referred to in the decision as "an unknown person." It may be inferred that had the evidence of the alleged mother's parenthood been satisfactory, the judgment would have been in favor of the child, regardless of the fact that its father was "an unknown person." In Mijares vs. Nery (3 Phil. Rep., 195), it appeared that the plaintiff, a recognized natural daughter of her father "was born of a woman whose name does not appear." The plaintiff was allowed to participate in the property of her deceased father as an acknowledged natural child, so it is clear that the presumption provided in article 130 was applied in this case. The reason that the presumption has been so sparingly applied is that in most of the cases the admitted evidence was of such a description as to render its application unnecessary.

The result is that were the case at bar confined to an attempt on the part of the natural child, Vicente Atanasio Enriquez, to establish his rights as a natural child of his mother, Aurea Enriquez, that portion of the stipulation of facts, supra, showing the identity of his father, and which is supposed by the appellants to militate against his status as such, would be incompetent, and the child could object to its admission.

But the case involves a protest by third persons, namely, the two children, Rafael and Josefa Aquino, whose rights will be prejudiced by a judgment holding the child to be an acknowledged natural child of Aurea Enriquez. Their protest is not that the child Vicente is not the child of Aurea Enriquez, for they admit that, but that its parents could not have contracted a legal and valid marriage at the time of the child's conception. Hence, it is necessary to determine whether the presumption of article 130 is available to the child in such a case.

No case has heretofore reached this court involving this question. Two cases have, however, been decided by the

In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes.

supreme court of Spain covering the point precisely. The first is that dated June 9, 1893. In that case a child, admittedly a natural child, brought an action to compel the annulment of the acknowledgment of four other children by their father as his natural children. These four children had lived constantly with his father, used his name, and had received support from him as his own children. The only forced heirs of the father were his natural children and in his will the father provided that the two-thirds of his property of which he could freely dispose should be divided equally between the four children. The child admittedly having the status of a natural child contested this division of the property, whereby he only received one-fifth of the one-third of his father's property of which the latter could not freely dispose, claiming that the four children were not in fact natural children and that he was, therefore, entitled to inherit all the property of his father. In support of this contention he alleged that the four children in question were born of a woman who was from 1871 to 1885 (during which time the four children were born) a married woman whom he named, with whom his father had lived openly and notoriously. The guardian of the four children opposed the admission of all evidence tending to prove the identity of their mother, claiming that they must be presumed to be natural children under the terms of article 130. This objection was sustained; but on appeal in cassation to the supreme court it was held that article 130 does not specify who are natural children but is limited to creating a presumption as to who are natural children. This presumption of law, like other presumptions of law, may be rebutted under the provisions of article 1250 of the Civil Code and it was further held that the right to rebut this presumption was expressly granted in article 138, which gives a right of action to those who may be prejudiced by the recognition of a natural child. The prohibition against disclosing the identity of the other parent where the recognition is by one parent only is limited to the act of acknowledgment,