state that the whole of northern Mexico, as far south as the mouth of the Rio Grande and the 26th parallel of latitude, was virtually in our possession, comprehending about two thirds of the territory of that republic, and about one tenth of its inhabitants. Our acquisitions have since been augmented by the reduction of Vera Cruz and the Castle of San Juan de Ulua; the capture of Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla; the surrender of the city of Mexico, and the occupation of the three States of Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Mexico, with nearly two millions and a-half of souls. It is true, our forces have not overrun every portion of the territory of those States; but their chief towns have been reduced, the military forces which defended them captured or dispersed, their civil authorities superseded, their capital occupied, and the whole machinery of government within the conquered States virtually transferred to our hands. All this has been achieved with an army at no one period exceeding fifteen thousand men, and against forces from three to five times more numerous than those actually engaged on our side, in every conflict since the fall of Vera Cruz.

I had occasion, on presenting some army petitions a few weeks ago, to refer to the brilliant successes by which these acquisitions were made; and I will not trespass on the attention of the Senate by repeating what I said at that time. But I cannot forbear to say, that there is a moral

1 The reference alluded to is contained in the following extract:

"I will not detain the Senate by entering into any detailed review of these events with a view to enforce the appeal contained in the petition on the attention. I hope, however, I may be indulged in saying, in justice to those who bore a part in them, that the first conquest of Mexico cannot, as it appears to me, be compared with the second, either as to the obstacles overcome, or as to the relative strength of the invaders. The triumphs of Cortez were achieved by policy, and by superiority in discipline and in the implements of warfare. The use of fire

arms, until then unknown to the inhabitants of Mexico, was sufficient in itself to make his force, small as it was, irresistible. In the eyes of that simple and superstitious people, he seemed armed with superhuman power. Other circumstances combined to facilitate his success. The native tribes, by whom the country was possessed, were distinct communities, not always acknowledging the same head, and often divided among themselves by implacable hostility and resentments. Cortez, by his consummate prudence and art, turned these dissensions to his own account; he lured the parties to them into his own service, and when he pre

in the contest, the effect of which is not likely to be lost on ourselves or others. At the call of their country, our people have literally rushed to arms. The emulation has been to be received into the service, not to be excused from it. Individuals from the plough, the counting-house, the lawoffice, and the workshop, have taken the field, braving inclement seasons and inhospitable climates without a murmur, and, though wholly unused to arms, withstanding the most destructive fire, and storming batteries at the point of the bayonet, with the coolness, intrepidity, and spirit of veterans. I believe I may safely say, there has been no parallel to these achievements by undisciplined forces since the French revolution. I am not sure that history can furnish a parallel. As to the regular army, we always expect it to be gallant and heroic, and we are never disappointed. The whole conduct of the war in the field has exhibited the highest evidence of our military capacity. It confirms an opinion I have always held, that a soldier is formidable in ratio of the importance he possesses in the order of the political system of which he is a part. It establishes another position of vital importance to us: that, under the protection of our militia system, the country may, at the

sented himself at the gates of the city of Mexico, he was at the head of four thousand of the most warlike of the natives, as auxiliaries to the band of Spaniards with which he commenced his march from Vera Cruz. Thus his early successes were as much the triumph of policy as of arms. General Scott, and the gallant band he led, had no such advantages. The whole population of the country, from Vera Cruz to Mexico, was united as one man against him, and animated by the fiercest animosity. He was opposed by military forces armed like his own, often better disciplined, occupying positions chosen by themselves, strong by nature, and fortified according to the strictest rules of art. These obstacles were overcome by his skill as a tactician, aided by a corps of officers unsurpassed for their knowledge of the art of attack and defence, and by the

indomitable courage of their followers. With half his force left on the battlefield or in the hospital, and with less than six thousand men, after a series of desperate contests, he took possession of the city of Mexico, containing nearly two hundred thousand inhabitants, and defended by the remnant of an army of more than thirty thousand soldiers. I confess I know nothing in modern warfare which exceeds in brilliancy the movements of the American army from the Gulf to the city of Mexico. I shall not attempt to speak of them in the language of eulogium. They are not a fit theme for such comment. Like the achievements of General Taylor and his brave men on the Rio Grande, at Monterey, and Buena Vista, the highest and most appropriate praise is contained in the simplest statement of facts."

termination of every contest, lay aside the more massive and burdensome parts of its armor, and become prepared, with energies renewed by that very capacity, for succeeding scenes of danger.

Mr. President, the political condition of Mexico has been gradually approaching a dissolution of all responsible government, and of the civil order which constitutes her an

independent State. This lamentable situation is not the fruit alone of our military successes. The factions by which that country has been distracted, each in turn gaining and maintaining a temporary ascendency, and often by brute force, lie at the foundation of the social and political disorder which has reigned there for the last twenty years. To most of the abuses of the old colonial system of Spain she has superadded the evils of an unstable and irresponsible government. The military bodies, which have been the instruments of those who have thus in succession gained a brief and precarious control over her affairs, though dispersed, still exist, ready to be reunited and to renew the anarchy which we have superseded, for the time being, by a military government. And this brings me to the first great objection to the proposition of withdrawing our armies from the field.

I have already said that no policy can deserve our support which does not hold out the promise of a durable peace. Nothing seems to me more unlikely to secure so desirable a result than an abandonment of Mexico by us at the present moment without a treaty, leaving behind a strong feeling of animosity towards us, with party-divisions as strongly marked, and political animosities as rancorous, perhaps, as they have been at any former period. Even when her capital had fallen, humbled and powerless as she was, party-leaders, instead of consulting for the common good, were seen struggling with each other for the barren sceptre of her authority. Our retirement as enemies would, in all probability, be the signal for intestine conflicts as desperate and sanguinary as

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those in which they have been engaged with us,— conflicts always the most disastrous for the great body of the Mexican people, for, on what side soever fortune turns, they are certain to be the victims. You know, sir, there are two great parties in Mexico, (I pass by the minor divisions,) the federalistas and centralistas." The former, as their name imports, are in favor of the federative system; they are the true republican party. With us, in former times, the terms "federal" and "republican" designated different parties; in Mexico, they are both employed to designate the friends of the federative system. tralists are in favor of a consolidated government, republican or monarchical in form, and are composed of the army, the clergy, and I suppose a small portion of the population. I believe our only hope of obtaining a durable peace lies in the firm establishment of the federal party in power, - the party represented by Herrera, Anaya, Peña y Peña, Cumplido, and others. I understand Herrera has been elected president of the republic; and this is certainly a favorable indication. But, unfortunately, I fear this party would not succeed in maintaining itself, if Mexico were left to herself at the present moment with an embittered feeling of hostility towards us. The military chiefs, who control the army, and who might rally it again for political uses, if we were to retire without a treaty, are for the most part enemies of the federative system, and conservators of the popular abuses, to which they owe their wealth and importance. Nothing could be more unfortunate for Mexico than the reëstablishment of these men in power. It would bring with it a hopeless perpetuation of the anarchy and oppression which have given a character to their supremacy in past years, a supremacy without a prospect of amelioration in the condition of the Mexican people, -a supremacy of which the chief variation has been an exchange of one military despot for another.

Calamitous as the restoration of this party to their former

ascendency would be for Mexico, it would hardly be less so for us. Relying on military force for their support, their policy would be to continue the war as a pretext for maintaining the army in full strength, or, at least, not to terminate it till peace would ensure their own supremacy. It is believed that these considerations have been leading motives in the resistance they have opposed to us. It is true, the republican party has been equally hostile, so far as external indications show; but the fact is accounted for by their desire to see the war continued until the army and its leaders, the great enemies of the federative system, are overthrown. Undoubtedly the obstinate refusal of Mexico to make peace may be very properly referred to the natural exasperation of every people whose soil is invaded; but there can be little doubt that it has been influenced in no inconsiderable degree by considerations growing out of party divisions, and the jealousy and animosities to which those divisions have given rise. My confidence in our ability to make an amicable arrangement with the federal party, if it were in undisputed possession of the government, arises from the belief that their motives are honest, that they have at heart the public welfare, and that they must see there is no hope for Mexico but in a solid with us. peace My utter distrust of the centralists arises from the belief that their objects are selfish, and that, to accomplish them, they would not hesitate to sacrifice the liberties of the people and the prosperity of the country. But whether I err in these views or not, I feel quite confident I do not err in believing that if our armies were to be withdrawn from Mexico, without a peace, the flames of civil discord would be rekindled in that unhappy country, and burn with redoubled violence. I should greatly fear that the military chiefs would succeed in reëstablishing their ascendency, and that no probable limit could be assigned to the duration of the war. If I am right, our true policy is to stand firm, and, if possible, united, until wiser counsels shall prevail in Mexico, and a disposition shall be