made-with fifty sets, fifty; but if there be fifty sets of wheels and pinions, and only two springs, there cannot be made fifty watches, but only two. So in the North the supply of one element of strength is disproportionate to the rest. For the immediate purpose of aggressive warfare that superabundance has no value.

But an important consequence results from it. We have seen that the national standard of value in all things, is now magnitude. The people of the North will take as their guide, not the army list, but the census; and aim at a force proportionate, not to military strength, but to the number of heads. The Government, swept along by the popular current, must needs adopt this principle. The result must be an enormously expensive and inefficient force; in other words, a union of two elements, inefficiency and cost, either of them fatal to success. The present rate of expenditure in the North is an enemy more dangerous than any foe in the field. It will decide the contest before it might otherwise terminate; and the more closely we look into the subject, the greater the doubt will become, whether the very excess of the North in numbers will not really prove a source of disaster.

In forming a judgment of the results to be expected, it will be essential to keep in view, the different degree of efficiency required in an army, called upon to invade a country, from that which will suffice to defend it. This was strikingly

exemplified in the war of 1814. The whole of the aggressive operations of the American forces resulted in disastrous failure, yet they defended Baltimore and New Orleans with complete success. It appears the popular impression in the North, that because any man can discharge a gun over a wall, therefore he can be a soldier. But the invader must march right up to that wall, and climb it under the fire of its defenders, and this requires a very special training. In that war of 1814, undisciplined men were well able to stand behind bales of cotton, and shoot down those advancing in the open; but at Bladensburg, an army of the same materials, with the President at its head, was defeated by a force but a third of its numbers, not from any want of individual courage, but because untrained in the degree required for engagements in the open field. Those who wish to form a correct judgment of the elements in this question, will do well to consider that the advantage of the defenders of New Orleans is with the South, whilst the undertaking of the North is to fight a series of battles under the conditions of that of Bladensburg.

Financial power preponderates greatly in favour of the North, but here the inquiry frequently seems to take a wrong direction. The true question is not which may be richer or command the greater credit, but simply whether the South possess financial means that will suffice for effective defence. This none can doubt, for whether as

regards the luxuriance of its crops-the lucrative commerce it has enjoyed for many years-or the resources contained within the country-few are to be found possessing more largely the elements of wealth. If this were not so, history affords ample evidence that the absence of wealth has proved no barrier to the defence of an invaded country. The very scene of the conflict has already illustrated this, for seldom did greater poverty exist, either in resources or credit, than in these States when they successfully defended themselves in the revolutionary war. All but incredible is the extremity that accompanied the whole of that contest, when not only had coin disappeared, but the notes issued by Congress had fallen in value to as low a point as the eightieth part of their nominal amount-nay, at times were so valueless, that Washington was occasionally obliged to resort to forced requisitions, to feed his troops. In spite of all this the war continued, and ended in successful defence. Wealth or credit is indeed essential, to the power that equips great forces for expeditions and aggressive war; but that neither is absolutely necessary for the defence of a country, there can be no clearer proof than these States have already afforded.

The effects of the war will tell financially with far greater severity upon the Northern than the Southern power. This will be obvious on comparing their industrial condition. In the South are two classes, the poor white whose circumstances

may be The majority sell their

Any

nothing can alter for the worse, and the planter with whom the ruling power resides. Were it essential to him to sell his crop of cotton or tobacco, in order to pay wages or provide food for his people, the effect of the blockade might be decisive. But all the necessaries of life obtained on his estate. cotton to reimburse advances previously made to them. If unable to sell it, they cannot repay these advances, which must simply be postponed, and there is nothing in this to prevent the continuance of the contest for an indefinite period. country can exist and sustain a defensive war, without export trade, if possessed of a fertile soil. We blockaded France for wellnigh twenty years, and at one time reduced her to the greatest straits for saltpetre, which her science invented a method of producing artificially. Yet in the midst of that blockade she achieved her greatest triumphs. Undoubtedly suffering will result to individuals in the South, but speaking generally, the utmost effect it can produce will be a general suspension of certain classes of payments, in other words a system of promissory notes, which so far from precluding the operations of war, has been its usual accompaniment in most countries.

In the North, the small farmers compose a large class of the population, covering the face of the land. With them, the usual routine of daily life will continue with little change. But there are great cities, densely crowded.

These masses,

unlike the poor white of the South, have no land on which to grow their food, nor can they await its growth. The blockade will not starve a negro, but it may stop the mills of Lowell, upon which a white population will be immediately reduced to want. The sufferings of war are felt in the ratio in which large cities exist, that contain great numbers requiring daily bread, and depending for it on trade or manufactures. A commercial crisis that will cause havoc in Manchester or Birmingham, may be unheard of in Hampshire; so the effects of this war will tell on the masses of the North, with a severity altogether unknown to the dispersed agricultural population of the Southern States.

To what financial straits the Southern government may be driven, we cannot estimate, in the entire absence of information as to the rate of its expenditure; but there is ample information to show that under the expenditure now in progress in the North, the war must indeed be short that will not witness there a financial collapse. The peace expenditure of the United States for the year ending 30th June, 1860, was 59 millions of dollars; the income 55 millions, of which 53 accrued from duties on imports. Under the combined effect of the war and the Morrill tariff, imports into New York, from 1st January to 23rd August, 1861, had fallen to 90 millions of dollars as compared with 159 millions for the same period of the past year. Assuming the customs duties to