In Michaelmas Term, 58 Geo. III., Jervis had obtained a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, on the ground that the sheriff, having been proved to have returned the cattle which had been seized, to the premises from which they were taken, the removal was damnum absque injurid, as the landlord might then have distrained them—and that as the declaration had not only not averred that the sheriff had notice before the removal, that any rent was due, but had expressly negatived it, the action was not maintainable.

Taunton now shewed cause," and

Jervis and Puller endeavoured to support the rule.

The Court held, on the first point, that as the goods which had been removed could not be distrained while in the custody of the law, the returning of them to the premises had not exonerated the sheriff.

On the second point, they determined, that the question of the plaintiffs not having brought themselves within the statute, by alleging that the sheriff had notice, could only be raised by motion in arrest of judgment, which—as it had not been made within the first four' days of the next Term after the trial, as it might have been by moving it in the alternative when the rule nisi was granted - could not now be made; and therefore they

PP 3

Discharged the Rule.

The

1819.

LANE

and another

v.

CROCKETT.

The defendant afterwards brought a writ of error on the second point, and being assigned as error, it now came on to be argued-by

Puller, for the plaintiff in error, who contended, that the first count in the declaration not having any allegation that the defendant had notice, was insufficient. That count stated the facts in the usual manner, but assigned the breach as follows:-Yet the defendant, then being sheriff &c. as aforesaid, well knowing the premises, but not regarding the duty of his said office, nor the statute &c. to deceive and defraud the plaintiffs, in this respect, of the said arrears of the said rent so due to them as aforesaid, and the remedy of the said plaintiffs for the recovery thereof, under colour and pretext of the said writ, on &c. wrongfully &c. and without the knowledge of the said plaintiffs, removed, drove, and carried away the said cattle &c. so taken as aforesaid, from and out of the said tenements and premises, immediately after the said goods &c. were seized and taken by the said defendant, the sheriff, in execution, and before the said plaintiffs could give notice to the said defendant of the said rent so being due and in arrear from the said tenant to the said plaintiffs as aforesaid, and without paying and satisfying the said plaintiffs the said arrears &c. contrary &c. (alleging that they had not since been paid any part thereof), . although the said plaintiffs afterwards, and within a reasonable time after the said goods &c. were so seized &c. and before the said defendant had sold

1819.

LANE

sold or disposed of the same, and whilst they were in his possession, to wit, on &c. gave notice to the said defendant of the said rent being due and another and in arrear &c.

Upon this declaration, where there was not only no allegation of the defendant having had notice of the rent being in arrear before the removal of the goods, but an express negative of any notice till after such removal, it was urged, that the verdict could not be supported. Waring v. Dewberry (a).

ABBOTT, Lord Chief Justice. But the declaration also alleges, that he had knowledge of it. The words, "well knowing the premises," will be sufficient for the purpose of that allegation; for it must be remembered, that this is after verdict.

DALLAS, Lord Chief Justice, C. B.-The statute does not in terms require notice to be given, and the sheriff may, and often does make himself a wrong-doer, where no notice has been given.

The case of Palgrave v. Windham (b) being mentioned,

ABBOTT, Lord Chief Justice, observed, that not fully understanding the statement of that case in the report, he had looked into the record,

v.

CROCKETT.

1819.

LANE

บ.

and found that notice was in fact given to the sheriff, and that the want of notice there spoken and another of, meant want of notice to the plaintiff in the CROCKETT. action on which the execution was sued out. But (observed his Lordship) the allegation of "the defendant well knowing the premises," is sufficient in this case; for it must refer to the whole subject-matter of the declaration. If the present objection could prevail, the object of the statute might often be entirely defeated.

The Court of Error now affirmed the judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

[Error from the Court of Exchequer.

Tuesday, 22d June.

14th May.

ARGUED AT SERJEANTS' INN.

Coram ABBOTT, Lord Chief Justice, and
DALLAS, Lord Chief Justice, C. B.

RAMSBOTTOM and others v. The KING.

An inquisition THE plaintiffs having brought a writ of error

taken on a writ

of extent find- from the judgment of the Court of Exchequer,

ing A. B. in

debted to C.D. and the other

partners and

discharging

proprietors of a certain society or company called The Kent Insurance Company, is sufficiently certain, without naming the individual members of the company, and although they are not incorporated. Judgment of the Court of Exchequer in the case of The King v. Ramsbottom, (ante, vol. v. p. 447,) affirmed.

discharging the rule to shew cause why the judg ment in the cause of The King in aid of the Kent Insurance Co. against Ramsbottom and others*, should not be arrested upon certain errors assigned, which were in effect the same as the objections formerly taken to the record, and upon which the original motion was founded. The errors now came on for argument.

The inquisition, as far as is material, is already set out in the case of The King v. Ramsbot

tom.

Parke, for the plaintiffs, insisted, that for those errors upon the record, the judgment of the Court of Exchequer ought to be reversed. He contended, as before, 1st. that the inquisition was bad for uncertainty in not stating the names or other sufficient designation of the persons to whom the debt was found to be due.

2dly. That the writ of extent against Larking and Hougham was insufficient; because the recital does not agree with the mandatory part;

and

3dly. That the inquisition was void as not being authorised by the writ, in substance directing such debts to be found as are legally due to Larking and Hougham, as trustees to the company, whereas the inquisition found the debt to be legally due to the company.

*Ante, vol. v. p. 447.

On