and others

v.

1819. On the first and principal error assigned — the RAMSBOTTOM uncertainty of the inquisition in addition to the arguments urged on the occasion of the The KING. motion, and the authorities then referred to, the principle laid down in Coke upon Littleton, (a) was made the foundation of the argument now used, that "a count or declaration which anciently, and yet is called narratio, ought to contain two things, viz. certainty and verity, for that is the foundation of the suit whereunto the adverse party must answer, and whereupon the Court is to give his judgment. Certa debet esse intentio & narratio, et certum fundamentum, & certa res quæ deducitur in judicium. must be understood that there be three kinds of certainties, first, to a common intent, and that is sufficient in a barre which is to defend the party, and to excuse him. Secondly, a certain intent in general as in counts, replications, and other pleadings of the plaintiff, that is to convince the defendant, and so in indictments &c. Thirdly, a certain intent in every particular as in estoppels;" and to that doctrine was applied the reasoning of the Lord Chief Justice De Grey, in delivering the opinion of the Judges in the House of Lords, in the case of The King v. Horne (b).

But it

The following cases were also cited on the part of the plaintiffs in error: The Protector v. Cutterel (c), where it was contended, that an inqui

(a) Page 303.

(b) Cowp. 682.

(c) Hardr. 58.

1819.

and others

v.

The KING.

sition ought to be as certain as an indictment or declaration, and that in an inquisition, finding RAMSBOTTOM a lease for sixty years, as the beginning and end of the term were not found, which it was said ought to be, the party grieved could have no remedy, because there was no certainty that he could plead to avoid it-(5 Rep. 120. C. 3. Hen. VII. 11, 12. Plowd. Com. 202. Co. Inst. 303, are there adverted to.)-The Protector v. Cory and another, (a) where cases are mentioned of inquisitions being held ill for uncertainty in not having the particulars more fully set out; an anonymous case in Moore, (b) where the sheriff had returned that he had extended a tenement of twenty shillings value, and it was held, that "tenement" was Bateman v. Elman, (c)

not sufficiently certain ;
where the Court held,
plaintiff had delivered

that a finding that the
divers parcels of plate, was error for uncertainty,
because it could not be helped by intendment;
Fenn v. Dixe, (d) Barnes v. Prudlin, (e) Hunt
v. Jones, (f) in all of which cases the judgment
was reversed, because the words in the declara-
tion were held to be too general; and in Hart
ley v. Herring, (g) Lord Kenyon, when those
cases were cited, observed, in deciding for the
plaintiff there, that he did not wish to shake their
authority. The other cases cited in the Court

(a) Hardr. 59.

(b) Moore, 8. c. 28. (c) Cro. Eliz. 866.

́(d) 1 Rol. Abr. 58.

(e) Siderf. 396. 1 Ventr. 4.

S. C. called Barnes v. Brud-
del.

(f) Cro. Jac. 499.
(g) 8 T. R. 130.

of

1819.

RAMSBOTTOM and others

of Exchequer, in arguing the motion in arrest of Judgment, were now also relied on, and the same

arguments in substance were again urged in supThe KING. port of the objection of the uncertainty of the inquisition.

The other objections were also put on the same grounds, and the same arguments were used; and the authorities † then cited were now again applied in support of the assignment of those errors also.

Denman, in support of the judgment, contended, as to the minor objections, that there was no substantial difference in the distinction which had been taken; and that such a direction to find debts as was given by the writ would authorise the finding, which had been returned: and that the recital of the debt did not controul the mandatory part of the writ, and was not binding on the Sheriff or the Jury.

On the objection of the uncertainty he submitted, that in more modern times, and since

329.

*Rushton's case, 2 Leon. 121. Wiatt v. Essington, 2 Ld. Raym. 1410. S. C. Str. 637; and Fort. 377. Bertie v. Pickering, 4 Burr. 2455. Hovel v. Reynolds, 1 Ventr. 272 and Copleston v. Piper, 1 Ld. Raym. 191. Spalding v. Mure, 6 T. R. 635. The King v. Harrison and Co. 8 T. R. Cook v. Cox, 3 M. & S. 110. The King v. Patrick and Pepper, 1 Leach Cr. L. 287. (3d edit.) The King v. Sherrington and Bulkley, 2 Leach Cr. L. 578.

508.

† 16 Vin. Abr. tit. Office or Inquisition, C. Anon. 1 Ventr. 259. Patten v. Perbeck, Salk, 563. S. C. 1 Ld. Raym.346. 718; and 12 Mod. 355.

the

1819.

RAMSBOTTOM

and others

D.

the old cases which had been cited in support of that error, a more liberal mode of pleading had been allowed, and the ancient strictness no longer prevailed, at least to a further extent The KING. than to require that there should be a sufficiently convenient certainty in the record, so that it may appear to the party and the Court, what the subject-matter of the proceeding is, to enable the one to defend himself, and the other to give judgment. Of the cases which had been cited where judgment had been set aside for want of sufficient particularity, he observed, that none of them were founded on the uncertainty of the parties, except those of The King v. Patrick and Pepper, and The King v. Sherrington and Bulkley, and those he distinguished as being criminal cases, and therefore not applying on a question of convenient certainty in a civil suit; and in this case there was such certainty, or at least as it was matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiffs in error, it lay with them to produce a greater degree of particularity upon the record, by pleading with proper averments as was done in the record of extent, in the case of The King v. Sanderson (a). In this case the plea admits the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The real question he submitted was, whether the Kent Insurance Company were recognizable in law as obligors.

Parke in reply, insisted, that a party seeking to recover a demand was bound to put sufficient

(a) Wightw. 54.

matter upon the record, to enable the defendant to protect himself by the recovery from any future suit for the same debt; and that has not been done here, because, if any of the unknown members of this unincorporated company should hereafter sue the defendant, this recovery could not be pleaded in bar: and that was the true ground upon which the necessity of sufficient certainty was put in the cases of Bertie v. Pickering, and Wiatt v. Essington. In this case the Crown is the actor, and has no right to set up a vicious record, which may be productive of injury to third persons. He denied that the plea (the general issue) admitted a knowledge of the debt on the contrary, it traverses the debt and all the allegations of the charge.

The case stood over for judgment till the first error day of this Term, when

The Lord Chancellor, attended by the Lords Chief Justices of the other Courts, and the Court of Exchequer, pronounced the

Judgment affirmed.