6 months to 3 years. You can readily see that these laws affect the administration of State minimum-wage and wage-collection and wage-payment laws as well as the Federal wage-hour law. They set wage legislation apart from statutes of limitations for other types of contract claims which are usually 6 or 7 years.

More recently Wage and Hour Administrator Walling has noted in his annual report:

As last year's annual report shows, several States have attempted nullification of the act by drastically reducing the period of limitation applicable to employee suits under the act. I recommend the addition to the act of a reasonable statute of limitation. If this is done varying State standards which penalize some workers in the collection of wages legally due and give competitive advantage to violators in States with arbitrarily lowered statutes of limitation will no longer prevail. An employee's ability to collect back wages due him should not depend on the accident of geography.

Thus this bill is not only wholly inadequate in the limitation period it sets but we believe it to be extremely dangerous because it balkanizes the enforcement process and places the more liberal States at a competitive disadvantage with their neighbors. Moreover, in those States which provide for longer statutes of limitations for contract claims as against statutory claims, it places the unorganized worker at a disadvantage with respect to the organized worker. Thus employees who have individual contracts or union contracts requiring overtime or premium pay may have a 6-year period of time within which to institute their claims under a great many existing statutes of limitation which apply to oral and written contracts. But employees with no bargaining power, who must rely upon the Fair Labor Standards Act, would be limited only to the 1 year provided for in the bill or a shorter period if a State chooses further to curtail the rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act. This is unjust, unsound, and illogical. Wholly apart from the specific objections to the measure insofar as they affect rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the measure must be condemned because it improperly lumps in one statute all sorts of actions for damages regardless of the nature of the interest involved. It is a commonplace of the law that statutes of limitations must be geared to the character of the interest involved. "No one rule as to the length of time as would be deemed reasonable can be laid down for the governing of all cases alike. This circumstance will often require a different rule" (McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662). The case of Terry v. Anderson (95 U. S. at 635) states: "What is reasonable in a particular case depends on its particular facts." We have already shown that the particular facts relating to the enforcement of claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act require a much longer period of limitation than this bill provides. It seems equally clear that it is unreasonable to group under a single statute all actions for damages arising under Federal statute and all actions for damages arising under a Federal statute where the United States is the real party in interest. Examples of Federal statutes where Congress did not prescribe any period of limitations and which provide for damages are as follows:

(1) Claims for treble damages under the antitrust laws (15 U. S. C., sec. 15; see Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta (1906), 203 U. S. 390, 27 S. Ct. 65, 51 L. Ed. 241).

(2) Actions for deprivation of civil rights or for conspiracy to deprive persons of civil rights (8 U. S. C. A., secs. 43, 47; see O'Sullivan v. Felix (1914), 233 U. S. 318, 34 S. Ct. 596, 58 L. Ed. 980; Mitchell v. Greenough (9th Cir., 1938), 100 F. (2d) 184, certiorari denied 306 U. S. 659, 59 S. Ct. 788, 83 L. Ed. 1056).

(3) Suits against stockholders of national banks (12 U. S. C. A., sec. 64; see Pufahl v. Estate of Parks (1936) 299 U. S. 217, 57 S. Ct. 151, 81 L. Ed. 133). (4) Actions arising out of copyright infringement (17 U. S. C. A., sec. 25; see Brady v. Daly (1899), 175 U. S. 148, 20 S. Ct. 62, 44 L. Ed. 109).

(5) Actions of trustees in bankruptcy under the Chandler Act (11 U. S. C. A., sec. 1 et seq.; see Tuffy v. Nichols (2d Cir., 1941), 120 F. (2d) 906, certiorari denied, 314 U. S. 660, 62 S. Ct. 113, 86 L. Ed. 528; Nairn v. McCarthy (7th Cir., 1941), 120 F. (2d) 910).

(6) Civil penalties for the recovery of the payment of back income taxes. (7) Back wages for seamen in the case of improper discharge and double wages for delay in payment of wages to seamen (46 U. S. C. A., secs. 594, 596).

It seems obvious that before such diverse types of actions are to be made dependent upon one single statute of limitations inquiry should be launched into the relative difficulties of proof, the public interest involved, the wholly different limitations problems raised when administrative action as opposed to a suit in the courts initiates a claim, the social evil presented by the existence of outstanding claims and related considerations; but to toss all these types of claims holus bolus into one bin is unsound.

It may be anticipated that this committee will hear the views of those who will picture the plight of an employer faced with large claims for compensation and liquidated damages. But one thing must be borne in mind even on the most favorable view of the facts for the employer and that is this: That the statute places the burden of compliance upon the employer and that any legislative adjustment which rests upon the theory that the employee should be prompt in asserting his rights will tend to take money away from the lowest paid groups in our community and to permit employers to pocket such money at their expense. In Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel (316 U. S. 572), the Supreme Court specifically held that violations which "resulted from an inability to determine whether the employee was covered by the act" would not justify relieving the employer of the burden and shifting it to the employee. The Court said:

Perplexing as petitioner's problem may have been the difficulty does not warrant shifting the burden to the employee. The wages were specified for him by the statute, and he was no more at fault than the employer. The liquidated damages for failure to pay the minimum wages under sections 6 (a) and (a) are compensation, not a penalty or punishment by the Government.

We are opposed to any attempt, moreover, to divide the compensatory- and liquidated-damages section of the remedy. The courts have repeatedly held that they are a unified whole; that they are both compensatory in character and are not penal. If legislation were to be passed dividing these two remedies for purposes of a statute of limitations, it would in effect be an amendment to the statute, a reversal of the judgment of Congress and the courts in the vital field of remedy and would seriously alter the scheme of the statute. Moreover, if the double-damage provision were to be treated as a penalty, actions for the recovery of such damages could not be brought in State courts, since the Judicial Code now provides that the Federal courts have "exclusive jurisdiction of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States" (18 U. S. C. A., sec. 471). Similarly, any proposed statute of limitations which sought to penalize an employee where the violation is willful would import into the statute a wholly new concept and would make fault under the statute depend upon considerations wholly alien to the congressional intent.

The statute now contains a criminal provision, section 16 (a), which is specifically addressed to willful violations. If the concept of willfulness were now to be introduced into the civil portion of the remedy provided for in section 16 (b), the whole scheme of the statute would be distorted. Moreover, it hardly needs to be pointed out that very few employers are innocent victims of ambiguities in the law.

The cases abound with instances where employees are deliberately deceived as to their rights by the law departments of corporate lawyers (e. g., Smith v. Continental Oil Co. (8 W. H. R. 152)), where employers have launched criminal schemes involving fraudulent bookkeeping (e. g., Butler v. Carter (8 W. H. R. 92), Georgia Supreme Court; Gosinski v. Eclipse Glass Co. (8.W. H. R. 587)), where even after the entry of a court decree employers have extracted fraudulent releases from their employees, where powerful employers have terrorized their employees for years into a surrender of their statutory rights, these employers and thousands like them are certainly entitled to no procedural relief. If the act is to be meaningful, it must be uniformly enforced, it must be rigidly enforced, and it must be enforced with a view to the realities of the situation so that employees received by their employers as to their rights and without benefit of counsel, frequently subjected to strong economic coercion, may receive and enjoy the rights accorded to them by their Federal Government.

I have a statement from our seamen's union that I would like to have inserted in the record.

Mr. FEIGHAN. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

NATIONAL OFFICE, NATIONAL MARITIME UNION,

New York, N. Y.

JUNE 21, 1945.

DEAR SIRS AND BROTHERS: There is now pending before the House Committee on the Judiciary H. R. 2788, a bill which should be strenuously opposed because one of its effects might be to drastically delimit the time within which many important types of suits by maritime workers may be instituted to merely 1 year. The bill does not make specific reference to seamen, but provides, in general language, that in cases wherein the law is now silent as to the time within which a suit may be commenced, “no action under the laws of the United States shall be maintained unless the same is commenced within 1 year after such cause of action accrued, unless a shorter time be fixed in any applicable State statute." Suits by seamen fall particularly within the classification of cases arising "under the laws of the United States." The Jones Act (46 U. S. C. 688), on which the overwhelming majority of seamen's personal injury cases is predicated, contains no specific reference as to the time within which a suit under it may be commenced. It is true that the courts have so construed that act as to apply to it the 3-year limitation contained in the statute covering accidents to railway employees. However, enactment of H. R. 2788 would immediately open the door for shipowners to claim that in the absence of an express provision in the Jones Act, the new 1-year statute of limitation would now be applicable and available as a complete defense and bar as to Jones Act suits instituted by seamen after the expiration of that period.

With reference to seamen's claims to recover damages under the general maritime law for personal injuries caused by unseaworthiness of the vessel or its equipment, or to recover maintenance, cure, return transportation, wages, etc., there now exists no statute which is the basis of the right or which sets up a time limit for commencing suit. The primary consideration which has guided courts in permitting the tardy filing of suits of this type has been whether the mariner has been guilty of such laches as unreasonably prejudiced the shipowner; and, following the doctrine of laches, seamen's suits under the general maritime law would even be permitted at times to be filed as much as 6 years after the occurrence. If H. R. 2788 is enacted, the shipowners would immediately contend that it applies to cases arising under the general maritime law.

Another statute which contains no time limit for filing suit is Public Law 17, which seeks to give seamen employed on certain American and foreign flag WSA vessels the same benefits with reference to accidents, sickness, wages, war-risk insurance, etc., as they would have if they were employed aboard privately owned merchant vessels. H. R. 2788 might also become applicable to this class of cases. I need hardly point out to you that almost every one of seamen's personal injury, wage, repatriation, and other claims are constantly arising under the Jones Act, or the general maritime law, or Public Law 17, or under various Federal statutes, such as the wrongful discharge section (extra month's wages for discharge without fault, 46 U. S. C. 594); the penalty section (double wages against shipowners for unreasonable delay in wage payments, 46 U. S. C. 596); etc. Enactment of H. R. 2788 might forever preclude seamen from asserting their claims arising under those provisions if they delay filing suit within 1 year because of illness or ignorance of their rights or even if they merely happen to be at sea for a long period and have no opportunity to file suit within that time limit-or if they are in such mental or physical condition that they cannot invoke their remedies in that short period of time.

I would suggest that the House Committee on the Judiciary be advised at once of the union's opposition to this proposed legislation.

Fraternally yours,

WILLIAM L. STANDARD.

Mr. GWYNNE. In regard to State legislation, as I understand it, 10 States have legislated specifically on this subject, and of the 10 five have fixed the 1-year period; one has fixed 6 months; two, 2 years, and one, 3 years; is that correct?

Mr. DONNER. I think that is about right.

Mr. FEIGHAN. We thank you.

The committee will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

AFTER RECESS

The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p. m., upon the expiration of

the recess.

Mr. FEIGHAN. The subcommittee will come to order. We shall have the pleasure of hearing from our distinguished colleague from New Hampshire, Mr. Adams.

STATEMENT OF HON. SHERMAN ADAMS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, I appear here in support of the Gwynne bill, H. R. 2788, and the principle which is incorporated in the bill, because, in my judgment, it is of extreme importance to small industry in New Hampshire. Small business enterprises in New Hampshire were of their very nature affected by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the rulings and regulations that were promulgated with respect thereto. Small business since 1938 acquired obligations under that statute of which it had no knowledge. The people of New Hampshire, Mr. Chairman, have no wish to evade any responsibilities. In appearing here, I have no wish to advocate legislation for the relief of any business that has legitimate obligations. However, in cases which come within the purview of this law, I am perfectly willing that there should be incorporated in the bill a savings clause that will guarantee to any workman in New Hampshire anything that might be his rightful due either under the law or the regulations pertaining thereto. On the other hand, it appears to me only fair and reasonable that some limitation should be placed on the obligations of those in small busi

ness in my State with respect to the obligations that accrue to them under the rules and regulation of this act.

In 1938, when this act was passed, we had a statute of limitations. on private actions of 6 years, after the cause of action accrued. This provision has not changed and appears in chapter 385 of the Revised Laws of my State.

Mr. SPRINGER. Did that apply both to private and public actions alike?

Mr. ADAMS. That is right; but I might add that actions of trespass to the person, actions for malpractice, and actions for defamatory words must be brought within 2 years, but all other personal actions within 6 years. Actions of debt upon judgments, recognizances, and contract under seal may be brought within 20 years and this applies also to the actions for recovery of real estate.

It so happens that due to the nature of small industry in New Hampshire, many interpretative rulings were required under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In New Hampshire we have a great deal of outdoor industry, including, among other activities, logging, lumbering, cutting of pulpwood, and ice harvesting. We have, also, a great deal of seasonal industry which is conducted pretty much by small business with limited resources.

I shall not take up over 15 minutes of the committee's time, but I should like to give in a very few minutes two or three examples that are indicative of what New Hampshire small business is assuming in the way of responsibilities under the interpretations that have been made under this statute.

There is no definition, as the committee knows, of "time worked” in the Fair Labor Standards Act. In the logging industry, for instance, it was difficult to determine the intent of the act with respect to "time worked" for employees who were domiciled in the camp of the employer. The industry inquired of the Administrator concerning the intent of the act and his interpretation of what constituted "time worked." The interpretation was issued to the effect that, with respect to certain occupations, "time worked" included all time which elapsed between leaving the camp and returning, less time for lunch. With respect to other occupations "time worked" included only the time elapsed after arrival at the job until completion of work at night, less the luncheon period, "Time worked" for teamsters, and teamsters' helpers, was considered to be all time elapsed from the time of leaving camp until the return. On the other hand, it was ruled by the Administrator, in the case of a chopper, that "time worked" for a chopper or an ice harvester included only the time after arrival at his job until the time he laid down his tools at night. That interpretation, as time has gone on, has changed. At the present time all "time worked" includes the elapsed time from leaving camp to the return provided the employer requires his employee to stay at his own camp. The time of an employee who is domiciled at his own home commences as soon as he reaches his employer's premises and ends when he leaves the premises.

Mr. FEIGHAN. May I interrupt you there? Would you give us an idea of what the geographical set-up was with reference to the ice cutters and the loggers; that is, whether those employees were

78034-45-ser. 9- -9