Seneca, as he appears to us, was neither a confessor administering consolation to souls in distress, nor a professing philosopher whose philosophy was artificial, and whose private life was unworthy of his profession. He was a man of learning and letters, pre-eminent in his generation for varied knowledge and ready speech, and sharing with his contemporaries their somewhat florid tastes and their want of interest in antiquity; he was kindly and courteous, sometimes to excess; he loved money, and was a shrewd man of business; but he retained also other qualities even more characteristic of the provincial bourgeois, simplicity of life and strong family affections. Fate, or the good judgment of Agrippina, gave him a colleague, a provincial like himself, Afranius Burrus, bred, as the Vaison inscription has told us, a soldier, then, for at least twenty years, a trusted agent in the household of the Cæsars, and finally promoted to the prefecture of the prætorium. With Burrus his alliance was close and unbroken-'a rare thing,' remarks Tacitus, 'between colleagues in power'—and together for five years they directed the policy of the state and held in some check the wild impulses of Nero.

H. F. PELHAM.

Vol. 202.-No. 403.

2 N

Art. X.-PREFERENCE: THE COLONIAL VIEW.*

1. Papers relating to Resolutions passed by Colonial Legislatures since 1890 in favour of Preferential Trade relations with the United Kingdom, 1905. [Cd. 2326.] 2. Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party. By J. S. Willison. Two vols. Toronto: Morang, 1903.

3. Protection in Canada and Australasia. By C. H. Chomley. London: King, 1904.

4. Canada and the Empire. By Edwin S. Montagu and Bron Herbert. With a preface by Lord Rosebery. London: King, 1904.

I. CANADA.

THE books mentioned above deserve a fuller treatment than we have at present space to give. The life of Sir Wilfrid Laurier is, in effect, an admirably written history of public life in Canada for the last quarter of a century. The commanding position which the Prime Minister has attained in his own country, and the eminence which he enjoys here and abroad, are of themselves evidence of a high personal character and of a great genius for public affairs. Mr Chomley's book, not the least useful of a useful series, gives a concise account of the origin, growth, and consequences of Protection in our great self-governing dependencies, and includes a chapter on preferential trade. The little work by which Mr Montagu and Mr Herbert have enlightened the fiscal controversy contains in a small space a curious and valuable contribution of Canadian opinion, gathered in personal interviews, by correspondence, and by travel. It is with the questions discussed by these authors that we propose to deal.

The mental attitude of Canada towards the scheme of preferential trade is not so easily defined as many public men and many daily papers would have us believe. It is the duty of the newspapers,' said Bishop Creighton, 'to tell us what to do; it is our duty not to do it. If things were as simple as our critics make them out, we should have done what they advise long ago.' If Canadian opinion were so perfectly clear as many people assert, there would be no room for differences of opinion. Such differ

These articles are by residents in Canada and Australia respectively.,

énces do exist, and are stated with some degree of vehemence by people of sufficient character and intelligence to save them from the suspicion of stupidity or falsehood. It will be useful to treat the subject first of all historically, and to show how public opinion has expressed itself at various periods. The popular will is most surely to be found in customs laws, orders-in-council, parliamentary decisions, and the public declarations of ministers. Let us see what opinion these oracles indicate.

The tariff history of Canada began even before the acquisition of responsible government in 1847. The idea of Protection was not absent at even that early period. Each province maintained a tariff against all the others. That of Nova Scotia was called a 10 per cent tariff; that of New Brunswick was 12; that of Prince Edward Island was 11 per cent. There were also different currencies in each; and between the tariffs and the currencies the difficulties in the way of doing business were many and great. These difficulties, indeed, in addition to internal political dead-lock and external pressure in the form of Fenian invasion, combined to bring about federation in 1867. It was the tariff of the united province of Canada (Upper and Lower) which influenced fiscal legislation before that date, and formed the basis of it subsequently. Little interested in manufactures, the maritime provinces were in favour of Free Trade; but little by little manufacturing industry arose; and, in order to conserve the West India trade, to encourage coal production and to promote sugar refining, as well as to foster various small industries, the policy of Protection found favour.

It was in Upper Canada, united by the Act of 1841, that the first protective and preferential tariff was adopted. In 1842 the legislature passed an Act which has a curious bearing on the Dominion preference legislation of 1897. This Act put a duty of 3s. per quarter on wheat imported into Canada from the United States. It was passed

in the confident belief and expectation that, upon the imposition of a duty upon foreign wheat imported into the province, her Majesty will be graciously pleased to recommend to Parliament the removal or reduction of the duties on wheat and wheat-flour imported into the said United Kingdom from Canada,"

This was the first offer of preference. The Governor reserved the Act for the consideration of the home authorities; and, after due consideration, it was allowed. By chapter 29 of the Imperial Acts of 1843 the duty on wheat from Canada was reduced to 1s. per quarter, and on wheat-flour in due proportion. It was not stipulated that the wheat should be grown in Canada. Had that been done, the subsequent results would not have been so disastrous. The immediate effect of the Act was the investment of a large part of the available capital of Canada in mills, the importation of great quantities of wheat from the United States for grinding, and a large expenditure on improving the means of transport—all on the faith of the continuance of the policy of preference.

In 1846 all this artificial and precarious business was destroyed by the free-trade legislation of the time. The Colonies were not altogether without warning. The official correspondence of the time shows that on January 28, 1846, a remonstrance was sent to Mr Gladstone, then Under-secretary for the Colonies, from the Executive Council of Canada. The evils of a change in the corn laws were set forth. The enlarging of the canals had been undertaken on the good faith of the Act of 1843. The tolls on the canals would now fail, and the St Lawrence route would be ruined. The means of paying the interest on the debt incurred would be taken away; and England would have to pay the interest she had guaranteed. The shipping interest would be injured; the forwarding trade destroyed; the importations of British goods would be lessened. Mr Gladstone exerted his fullest powers in reply to show the Canadian Government that on every point they had raised they were economically wrong. The Canadians were not convinced. They protested and petitioned. Protests were ignored

and petitions were in vain. Mr Gladstone offered cheerful advice and a high strain of lofty consolation, but no Protection and especially no Preference. His despatch of June 3, 1846 (Commons Papers, 1846, vol. 27), was his supreme effort of argumentative reply. Among other things it contained a peremptory rejection of all further preferences such as were offered and accepted in 1842-3. 'It would' (he said) 'be a source of the greatest pain to her Majesty's Government if they could share in the impression

that the connexion between this country and Canada derived its vitality from no other source than from the exchange of commercial preferences. If it were so, it might appear to be a relation consisting in the exchange not of benefits but of burdens; if it were so, it would suggest the idea that the connexion itself had reached, or was about to reach, the legitimate term of its existence. But her Majesty's Government still augur for it a longer duration founded upon a larger and firmer basis,' etc.

There may be something in the advice thus tendered that is worth consideration at present. The high temper of the controversy at the time, and in the years which followed, arose out of the result of an economical experiment which failed. The omen is not obscure.

From 1846 the policy of Canada began to precipitate itself rapidly towards avowed Protection. Meetings were held to advocate it, and resolutions were passed by large majorities. The unfortunate events of 1849 which so disturbed the career of Lord Elgin, following on the bankruptcy and distress caused by the failure of the preferential policy, turned the minds of many men towards the United States, where the benefits of Protection were alleged to be obvious. In 1854, however, another change took place. The Reciprocity treaty of that year, negotiated by Lord Elgin, brought about a new state of things, including discrimination against Great Britain. Reciprocal trade continued with the United States for thirteen years. On the whole, it is now generally admitted that the balance of advantage was with the United States. The prosperity of Canada from 1854 to 1866, when the treaty was petulantly abrogated by the United States, was largely due to the demands created by the war in the Crimea and the American Civil War. Had these events not occurred, the natural operation of the treaty would probably have been observed to be of doubtful commercial value. Politically it might have prevented the formation of the Dominion.

Even the Reciprocity treaty did not prevent a short period of depression. The year 1857 was an unfortunate one for Canada. The harvest failed, alike in Canada and in the United States. Canada was caught by the disaster in a state of extravagant over-expenditure, public and private. A general bankruptcy took place. The public