EVER since the Berlin revolution last November, Herr Carl Kautsky, the well-known German Socialist writer, has been examining these documents at the Wilhelmstrasse with a view to establishing personal and political responsibilities for the war. He has now definitely ascertained the effect of the fateful Potsdam 'Council' on July 5, 1914, when the Kaiser, after receiving an autograph appeal from the Emperor Francis Joseph, committed Germany to the unconditional support of Austria-Hungary in her Balkan adventure and in her challenge to Russia. Herr Kautsky's critical analysis of the documents that he has collated is illuminated by textual quotations, many of which bear striking annotations in the Kaiser's own hand. The Times has published a numerous series of extracts from Herr Kautsky's work, completed and emphasized by the disclosures of the Austrian Red Books, and we are indebted to the courtesy of the editor of that journal for permission to reprint a selection.

It was during the spring of 1914 that, there is little doubt, the Kaiser and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand had come to a complete understanding with regard to their aims in the Balkans, and the murder of the Archduke at Sarajevo on June 28 was skillfully used by

the Austrians to confirm the Kaiser in the project to eliminate Serbia. In his dispatch to the Chancellor in Berlin, Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna, wrote:

I have repeatedly heard expressed here, even among serious people, the view that there must some day be a thorough reckoning with the Serbs. [The Kaiser's note: 'Now or never!'] It is urged that a series of demands ought first of all to be presented to the Serbs, and that if these are not accepted energetic action ought to be taken. I seize every such occasion in order quietly, but very firmly and seriously, to warn against any hasty steps. [The Kaiser's note: 'Who has authorized him to do this? This is very stupid! It is no business of his: it is purely Austria's affair to consider what she ought to do in consequence. If afterwards things go wrong, we shall be told that Germany was not willing! Tschirschky will, please, stop this nonsense! A clearance must be made of the Serbs, and that soon!']

On the receipt, on July 5, of the Emperor Francis Joseph's letter and memorandum dealing with the situation created by the murder of the Archduke, the Kaiser expressed the opinion that any action against Serbia ought to be taken without delay. Russia would certainly be hostile, but he had years ago expected this possibility, and if it should come to war between Austria and Russia, Germany

would loyally take her stand beside the monarchy. The Chancellor added that immediate action against Serbia was the best and most radical solution of Austria's Balkan difficulties. Three days later Von Tschirschky reported to Berlin that 'Count Berchtold intimated that if his Emperor assented to the presentation to begin with of demands to Serbia, he would advise him to formulate these demands in such a way that their acceptance should seem out of the question,' and in a letter to Francis Joseph, Count Tisza urged the expediency of proceeding against Serbia in a manner that would permit, in particular, England to restrain Russia. On July 10, Von Tschirschky reported to Berlin that Francis Joseph concurred in 'our view' that a decision ought to be taken at once, and that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, contemplated fixing a time limit of forty-eight hours, in order that Belgrade might not be able to consult Petersburg. The Kaiser marked the dispatch, showing that he expected the presentation of 'quite unambiguous' terms to Serbia, and to the statement that the Ballplatz was trying to discover a really unacceptable formula he appended the note: "The Sandjak to be evacuated! Then there will be a row at once! It is imperative that Austria should get this back again, in order to prevent both the union of Serbia and Montenegro and Serbian access to the sea.' (The Sandjak of Novi Bazar is a district divided between Serbia and Montenegro after the Balkan War of 1912.)

caré's departure from Petersburg, he commented, "What a pity.' Naturally it was desired, if possible, to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia, and to avoid alarming other countries the North German Gazette was to publish comments couched in a purposely mild tone, but Von Tschirschky was instructed to explain to Vienna that this must not be construed as a German retirement, and the Bavarian Legation reported to Munich that the Berlin Government would point to the absence of the Kaiser (who was cruising in the Hohenzollern) and other personages, and would profess to have been surprised by the Austrian action as much as other Powers.

In a further dispatch Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, adumbrated Sir Edward Grey's probable attitude toward the Austrian demands. Herr von Jagow transmitted this dispatch to the Kaiser with an endorsement to the effect that the German Ambassador in London was being instructed to declare that 'we did not know the Austrian demands, but that we regarded them as an internal Austro-Hungarian question upon which we were not competent to exert influence.' Upon this the Kaiser commented:

Quite right! But Grey must be told this very seriously and plainly, so that he may see that I won't stand any nonsense. Grey makes the mistake of putting Serbia on the same level as Austria and other great Powers! This is unheard of! Serbia is a pack of brigands, who must be brought to book for their crimes! I shall not interfere in anything which the Emperor (Francis

made up his mind to advocate war, and on hearing of his conversion the Kaiser noted on the dispatch: "There now a man for all that'; and on learning that the Austrian note to Serbia was to be delayed till after President Poin

pected this dispatch and it does not surprise me! A typical example of British mentality and of the lordly British way of ordering people about, and I want to have

it repudiated.

Events in Belgrade after the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum were