thing some times." The whole letter contained an inference that
either defendant or some-one else had some intention of renewing
the prosecution against the son by appearing before the grand
jury, and upon that ground money was requested. Held, that the
trial judge properly submitted the letters to the jury to determine
their meaning and effect; that it was immaterial that the son was
discharged before the justice, that being no bar to an indictment
and conviction, and certainly not to an accusation for the same
crime; that it was immaterial that all the pretenses as to the
probable prosecution of the son were false, it being enough that
the letters on their face conveyed the threat; that evidence of
conversations between defendant and complainant prior to sending
the letters, in which conversation defendant made similar state-
ments and a like request for money to stop proceedings, was com-
petent to characterize the criminal intent of defendant in sending
the letters in question. lb.
BURGLARY.
See EVIDENCE, 19-23.
CERTIORARI.
See APPEAL, 8, 9; HABEAS CORPUS.
CHALLENGES.
See GRAND JURY; PETIT JURY.
An affidavit, subscribed and sworn to by the witness, which alleges
that "
one Annie Holton, a female child actually and apparently
under the age of fourteen years, to wit, the age of twelve years, was
found begging, receiving and soliciting alms in Centre street," is
sufficient, in an uncontested case, to justify a commitment under
section 291 of the Penal Code, to an institution. People ex rel.
Perkersoen v. Sisters of St. Dominick,
CIGAR MAKING.
1. The relator was arrested and held for trial for manufacturing cigars
in rooms in a tenement house in New York City, used for a dwell-
ing-house for the purposes of living, sleeping and doing of house-
hold work, in violation of L. 1883, ch. 93, § 1. Held, that the
prohibition of that section is aimed at the co-existence of cigar-
making and sleeping and living in the same rooms; if they are
kept separate, and in separate and distinct apartments, it is no
offense under this section that the business and use go on together
under the same roof, or in the same house. Matter of Paul, 1
2. Section 2 of this act provides that no part of or section of any floor
in any tenement house in New York City in which the manufac-
ture of cigars or preparation of tobacco is carried on shall be used
for dwelling purposes. Held, that the prohibition and the crime
under this section consists of two things, either in beginning an
occupation for family use of rooms already occupied for cigar-
making, or, in continuing an occupation of rooms already occupied
for cigar-making, or in continuing the use of rooms after they had
become a cigar manufactory. The person guilty of this offense
may or may not be the cigar-maker himself. Ib.
COMMISSION FOR EXAMINATION AS TO SANITY.
See INSANITY.
COMMITMENT.
See WARRANT OF COMMITMENT.
CONSPIRACY.
See PECULATION ACT.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. The title of the act, ch. 93, L. 1883, prohibits the manufacture of
cigars or tobacco "in the tenement houses of said city." Section 1
of the act forbids that manufacture “in any rooms or apartments
used in the city of New York as dwellings for the purpose of
living, sleeping, or doing of any household work therein. Held,
that this section is unconstitutional, being in violation of the pro-
vision of § 16, article 3, of the State Constitution, that no local act
"shall contain more than one subject and that shall be embraced
in the title," because the act is a local one and relates to two
distinct subjects, one of which, the offense set forth in section
one, is not only not described in the title, but by the frame
and phrase of that title is expressly excluded from it. Matter of
Paul,
1
2. The doctrine that if a local act contains a subject which is fully
expressed in the title, it is valid as to that one subject, although
invalid as to a subject not expressed, only applies when there are
two or more subjects, some expressed and some not expressed. Ib.
3. An act cannot be amended by a court by striking out general words
and then after inserting more limited ones, holding the act good
as amended. Ib.
4. A statute must stand or fall just as it is enacted without reference
to extraneous facts developed in cases under it. lb.
5. The provision of Co. Crim. Pro. 718, subd. 5, that "where an intent
defraud constitutes part of a crime, it is not necessary to aver or
prove an intent to defraud any particular person," is constitutional,
People v. Martin,
6. L. 1881, ch. 532, is unconstitutional so far as it relates to the selec-
tion of grand jurors in Albany county (Following People v. Petrea,
92 N. Y. 128; 1 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 233). People v. Hooghkerk, 204
7. The courts take judicial notice of the population of cities within
the state. Therefore an act which by its terms applies only to
cities having such a population as is possessed by only such two
cities, is a local act. Matter of Jacobs,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-continued.
8. The constitutional prohibition against an invasion of property
without due process of law, protects that property-e. g., the right
to labor, as much as it does its accumulations. Ib.
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9. The courts may determine whether or not, any particular act is, or
is not, on its face, passed by the legislature in the exercise of its
police power to improve the public health. Ib.
10. Where the visible aim of a statute is not, as its title alleges, the
improvement of the public health by the prohibition of a certain
form of manufacture, but is on the contrary to restrain and suppress
such manufacture for the purpose of preventing its competition
with other modes of manufacturing the same article, the statute
is unconstitutional. The "Tenement House Cigar Act," L. 1884,
c. 272, is unconstitutional. Ib.
11. A law which interferes with the profitable use of property and the
application of a person's industry, which limits one in his choice
of a trade or profession, or confines him to work in a specified
locality, or excludes him from working in his own home, or restrains
his otherwise lawful movements, except as such law may be passed
in the exercise of the police power, is an infringement upon the
fundamental rights of liberty and property which are constitu-
tionally protected. Matter of Jacobs,
12. In the exercise of the police power the legislature must respect the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution, and cannot
under its guise arbitrarily invade personal rights and private prop-
erty. lb.
13. A declaration in the title or body of an act of its purpose,-
that it is intended for the improvement of the public health does
not conclude the courts, and they will determine whether or no
such law was passed for such purpose. Ib.
14. The "Tenement House Cigar Act" (L. 1884, c. 272),-forbidding
the preparation of tobacco and the manufacture of cigars in tene-
ment houses in cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants,-is uncon-
stitutional. lb.
See APPEAL, 3; LEGISLATURE.
CONSTRUCTION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECOND OFFENSE.
Power of the legislature to punish for contempt. See Matter of McDonald,
82; People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler,
See ASSAULT, 2; SENTENCE, 9, 10.
CONVICTS.
See EVIDENCE, 21.
CORROBORATION.
See EVIDENCE, 8, 9, 24, 25; PERJURY, 5, 6.
Where the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding in the court of Special
Sessions is charged under section 719 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure with the costs of prosecution, by reason of having
instituted it without probable cause, such determination is not a
judgment upon conviction, and therefore, the prosecutor has no
right of appeal therefrom to the Court of Sessions. Whether such
appeal lies to the County Court under sections 3044, 3045, of the
Code of Civil Procedure, quære, People v. Norton,
322
1. The Court of General Sessions of the City and County of New York
has no jurisdiction to discharge a prisoner committed by a police
magistrate in default of giving the undertaking required by section
89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to keep the peace. People
v. Boyle,
2. The prisoner was sentenced May 3, 1883, by a Court of Oyer and
Terminer, held by a justice of the Supreme Court, and also by two
justices of Sessions, as appears by the caption of the minutes kept
by the clerk, and by the judgment entered by him. The defend-
ant did not object at the time to the constitution of the court, but
clains for the first time on appeal that the judgment and sentence
were void because the court should have been held by a Supreme
Court justice alone, as required by Co. Crim. Pro, § 23. Held, it
may properly be assumed, especially in the absence of objection
by defendant, that when the Court of Oyer and Terminer was
held in the proper place by a justice of this court, as the law
requires, a regular court was held as the law directs; that if the
caption contains a recital not authorized by law, it may be dis-
regarded as surplusage, or as a technical error which does not
affect the rights of defendant (BARKER, J., dissenting); therefore,
under the provisions of Co. Crim. Pro. § 542, that the appellate
court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or
defects, the judgment and sentence must by affirmed. People v.
Bork,
3. The powers of courts of Special Sessions as to inflicting punish-
ment are not enlarged by section 717 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure; a fine not exceeding fifty dollars, or an imprisonment of
six months, or both, is still the extent of the judgment which such
courts can render. People ex rel. Knowlton v. Sadler,
438
See APPEAL; SENTENCE.
DEMURRER.
Se INDICTMENT, 10; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 3, 4.
DISCRETION.
See APPEAL, 4.
DISORDERLY PERSON.
See ABANDONMENT; CHILDREN.
Evidence of proposal or attempt to escape, competent against prisoner.
See People v. Petmecky,
1. Evidence to show violent acts on the part of a witness, at other
times than that in question, is inadmissible on behalf of one ac-
cused of felonious assault, though the theory of the defense is that
defendant was pursuing such witness and accidentally assaulted
the complainant. People v. Kelly,
2. Defendant, a witness in his own behalf, was asked on cross-exami-
nation whether he had not committed other assaults at other times
upon other persons, and the questions were allowed. Held, error;
that cross-examination as to acts of misconduct not involved in the
issues, should be restricted to such as bear directly upon the pres-
ent character and moral principles of the witness. People v. Irv-
ing,
47
3. The answers to such questions were in the negative, except in two
instances, and as to those, the defendant explained the assaults
made by him, showing that he was excusable therefor. Held, that
as the error worked no prejudice to defendant, it must, under
§ 542, Code Crim. Pro., be disregarded on appeal. Ib.
4. Where upon cross-examination, for the purpose of discrediting him,
disparaging questions are put to a defendant who has been sworn
on his own behalf, the prosecution is bound by his denials, and
said defendant cannot be held prejudiced by the allowance of ques-
tions so answered by him in the negative. Ib.
171
5. Where such a defendant is asked on cross-examination if he did not
gouge out "a certain person's eye, and he denies that he did so,
voluntarily adding that he struck him, and explaining the circum-
stances of said act in such way as to show that he acted entirely
on the defensive, he will not be deemed prejudiced by the allow-
ance of the question. Ib.
6. Upon the trial of an indictment for assault with a dangerous weapon;
where the defendant had been sworn on his own behalf, the court
may, in its discretion, permit him to be asked on cross-examina-
tion for the purpose of discrediting him as a witness, whether
or not he had committed a prior assault, e. g., upon a fellow-mem-
ber of the legislature. Proof of such an act unjustified or unex-
plained, tends to impeach the moral character, and affect the
credit of the witness. lb.
7. Such a line of questions must be confined to specific acts which
tend to discredit the witness or impair his moral character, and
not extended to mere accusations made against him, e. g., an in-
dictment. Ib.
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