permanency of the laws of nature only inclines us to expect that, when two events always have happened in immediate succession, one of them always will be followed by the other; while the causal judgment affirms of any one event, though seemingly isolated, that it must have a cause. This necessity to suppose a cause for every phenomenon, Dr. Brown keeps cautiously out of view, thus virtually eliminating all that requires explanation in the problem.

7. The next theory is an endeavor to demonstrate the causal judgment by abstract reasoning; in other words, to prove by argument that every event must have a cause. The attempt is vain, because our knowledge of causation is not involved or implied in any higher act of judgment or self-evident proposition, from which it can be deduced by analysis. The reasoning which would trace it to any higher principle is now universally admitted to be inconsequent.

8. Sir William Hamilton's own theory resolves our positive affirmation, that every event must have a cause, into a mere negation, or a result of the incompetency of the human intellect. E nihilo nihil fit; as we cannot imagine something to be created out of nothing, when a new phenomenon appears, we are compelled to believe that it had previously existed under other forms. These "other forms," under which it previously existed, are the causes of the phenomenon. We object to this theory, that it seems to confound being with doing, or existence with causation. It does not say, that the cause produces the effect, but that the cause is the effect; it boldly identifies the two, and thus falsifies the conditions of the problem. If we believe that the phenomenon must have a cause, only in order to avoid believing that the sum of existence is increased, then the cause and the phenomenon are really the same existence, and no change, no event, has taken place. Again, the causal judgment cannot be resolved into the maxim e nihilo nihil fit, for the former is the more comprehensive of the two; it would be less natural to deduce the judgment from the maxim, than the maxim from the judgment. The inference, something cannot be created out of nothing, because every thing must have a cause, is surely more natural and more logical than to say, every event must have a cause, because something cannot be created out of nothing. Still further; the theory shows only the necessity of thinking that the succession of events is continuous -without break before or after-each phenomenon being only a disguised repetition of its predecessor-and no one phenomenon either really beginning to be, or really ceasing to exist. It does not prove or explain (what we are still obliged to believe,) that each event is produced or evolved by some exertion of force-some power in action. Hamilton's theory, indeed, totally overlooks this notion of power, or force, though it is a necessary element in our idea of causation. The theory explains only the succession, or continuity of events.

CHAPTER V.

FATALISM AND FREEWILL.

Summary of the last chapter.-The question respecting the origin and validity of our idea of cause, which formed the topic of the last chapter, has been greatly obscured and perplexed, because it involves several distinct inquiries, which are too frequently confounded with each other. I endeavored to separate them, and to consider each one by itself in the natural order. First, the popular acceptation of the word cause was observed to be also its strict and metaphysical meaning; as efficiency is universally attributed to causation, and a necessary connection is believed to exist between cause and effect. But in opposition to the common belief, it was proved that we can nowhere detect such causes in the material universe; the observation of external nature never has led, and never can lead, to the discovery of any thing beyond the invariable succession of events, or the fixed relation of antecedence and consequence, a relation which differs as widely from that of cause and effect, as any two distinct conceptions, which the mind is capable of forming, do from each other. But our inability to discover such causes in the world of matter, is no proof (1.) that they are not to be found anywhere; for there is clear and indisputable evidence that they exist in the world of consciousness, every act, every volition, of a conscious agent being a true cause. This inability does not even prove (2.) that there are no such causes operating in external nature, as the limits of our faculty of investigation and discovery are not, surely, the limits of the possibility of things; and the general proposition, that every change or event must have a cause, is one that we can no more doubt than we can disbelieve that two and two make four. For a still stronger reason, this inability does not prove (3.) that we have no idea of efficient cause, and therefore no knowledge of what

the word power means; for the very existence of the problem, this very search after real causes, shows that we have a clear idea of some connection between two events which is fundamentally different from mere succession, or contiguity in time. The arguments and illustrations which I adduced, went to disprove these three forms of skepticism, these three unfounded conclusions, or false inferences from the admitted fact, that our feeble powers of observation and analysis cannot discover any efficient cause whatever in the material universe.

The doctrine of immediate Divine agency. In arguing against these skeptical views, we were led incidentally to state and defend what I believe to be the true doctrine of causation ; -namely, that one particle of matter never acts on another particle; for nearly all philosophers admit that we have no proof of such action, and when we come to look closely into the subject, it appears even inconceivable that inert matter should thus act, or have any real power. In truth, action is never even attributed to matter, except by a metaphor, or figure of speech, as is clearly shown by an examination of the language usually employed. The only real action, of which we have any knowledge or distinct conception, is that of mind or person; and the field of this activity is not only the mind itself, but the material structure, the congeries of bones, muscles, and nerves, which we inhabit, all the voluntary motions of which are produced and governed by the indwelling spirit, the kingly and indivisible will. Thus we came to the conclusion, that spirit alone moves, while matter is moved, and that this union, for a time, of a body with our personality, shadows forth a connection between the material universe and the Infinite One. How else, indeed, can we attach any meaning to the attributes of Omnipresence and Omnipotence? The unity of action, the regularity of antecedence and consequence in outward events, which we commonly designate by the lame metaphor of law, then become the fitting expression of the consistent doings of an all-wise Being, in whom there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. Our bodies, then, are kindred to organic nature, or the external universe, in a double sense; both are fashioned

from the same materials, from particles of brute matter, and both are informed, actuated, and controlled by an indwelling person; every atom in this tenement of clay being really subject to his sovereign will, though in the one case, that will or power (for the two expressions are synonymous) is infinite, and in the other it is finite, or limited, so that the whole result which was contemplated does not always follow. The Creator, then, is no longer banished from his creation, nor is the latter an orphan, or a deserted child. It is not a great machine, that was wound up at the beginning, and has continued to run on ever since, without aid or direction from its artificer. As well might we conceive of the body of a man moving about, and performing all its appropriate functions, without the principle of life, or the indwelling of an immortal soul. The universe is not lifeless or soulless. It is informed by God's spirit, pervaded by his power, moved by his wisdom, directed by his beneficence, controlled by his justice. The harmony of physical and moral laws is not a mere fancy, nor a forced analogy; they are both expressions of the same will, manifestations of the same spirit. The sublime language of the poet, then becomes the simple expression of a philosophical and religious truth:

The admirer of Wordsworth will perceive that I have omitted portions of lines, which deform this sublime conception with the dark and mystical doctrine of pantheism, — a doctrine which no one will confound with the system here developed, who remembers that the complex structure, which is our outward integument for a season, is really foreign to the person, and distinct from the will, or power, by which it is moved and gov

erned. Pantheism is to the Deity what materialism is to man, a mere denial of any spiritual existence, and the extinction of all idea of personality.

Objections to this theory considered. The objection to this theory of causation, that it is beneath the dignity of the Almighty to put his hand to every thing, is founded on a false analogy, as is seen by the form in which Aristotle states it. "If it befit not the state and majesty of Xerxes, the great king of Persia, that he should stoop to do all the meanest offices himself, much less can this be thought suitable for God." The two cases do not correspond in the very feature essential to the argument. An earthly potentate, unable to execute with his own hand all the affairs of which he has control, is obliged to delegate the larger portion of them to his servants; selecting the lightest part for himself, he gratifies his pride by calling it also the noblest; though the distinction is factitious, there being no real difference, in point of honor or dignity, between them. But Omnipotence needs no minister, and is not exhausted or wearied by the care of a universe. Power in action is more truly sublime than power in repose; and surely it is not derogatory to Divine energy to sustain and continue that which it was certainly not beneath Divine wisdom to create and appoint. Rightly considered, to guide the falling of a leaf from a tree is an office as worthy of Omnipotence as the creation of a world. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father."

Equally lame is the oft-repeated comparison of the universe to a machine of man's device, which is considered the more perfect the less mending or interposition it requires. A machine is a labor-saving contrivance, fitted to supply the weakness and deficiencies of him who uses it. Where the want does not exist, it is absurd to suppose the creation of a remedy. Human conceptions of the Deity are for ever at fault in imputing to him the errors and deficiencies which belong to our own limited faculties and dependent condition. Hence the idea of the Epicureans, that sublime indifference and unbroken repose are the