Opinion of the Court. half. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs recover of the said defendants their costs to be taxed by the clerk." The appellants now ask that the decree of the Circuit Court in that case be modified by striking therefrom the words, "and below those now charged by said companies or either of them or their receivers," and the words "and particularly from reducing its present rates of charges for transportation of freight to those prescribed in said act." The decree of the Circuit Court in Smyth v. Smith, No. 50, and the decree in Smyth v. Higginson, No. 51, are substantially the same as the decree in the case of Smyth v. Ames. The appellants in Smyth v. Smith now ask that the words in the decree "and below those now charged by said companies or either of them," and the words "and particularly from reducing its present rates of charges for transportation of freight to those prescribed in said act," be stricken out; and the appellants in Smyth v. Higginson ask that the words "and below those now charged by said company," and the words "and particularly from reducing its present rates of charges for transportation of freight to those prescribed by said act," be stricken from the decree in that case. The court is of opinion that the present application by the appellants in each of the above cases should be granted. The general question argued before us on the original hearing was, whether the rates established by the Nebraska statute, looking at them as an entirety, were so unreasonably low as to prevent the railroad companies from earning such compensation as would be just, having due regard to the rights both of the public and of the companies. In our examination of that question it was appropriate and necessary to inquire as to the earnings of the respective companies under the rates which they had established — looking at those rates, also, as an entirety. In this way we ascertained the probable effect of the statute in question. We did not intend, by an affirmance of the several decrees, to adjudge that the railroad companies should not, at any time in the future, if they saw proper, reduce the rates, or any of them, under which they were con Opinion of the Court. ducting business at the time the final decrees were rendered, nor that the state Board of Transportation should not reduce rates on specific or particular articles below the rates which the companies were charging on such articles when the decrees were entered. It may well be that on some particular article the railroad companies may deem it wise to make a reduction of the rate, and it may be that the public interests will justify the state board of transportation in ordering such reduction. We have not laid down any cast-iron rule covering each and every separate rate. We only adjudged that the enforcement of the schedules of rates established by the state statute, looking at such rates as a whole, would deprive the railroad companies of the compensation they were legally entitled to receive. We did not pass judgment upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rates on any particular article prescribed by the statute or by the railroad companies. If the State should by statute, or through its board of transportation, prescribe a new schedule of rates, covering substantially all articles, and which would materially reduce those charged by the companies respectively, or should by a reduction of rates on a limited number of articles make its schedule of rates, as a whole, produce the same result, the question will arise whether such rates, taking into consideration the rights of the public as well as the rights of carriers, are consistent with the principles announced by this court in the opinion heretofore delivered. Of course, the reasonableness of a schedule of rates must be determined by the facts as they exist when it is sought to put such rates into operation. The decrees in the several cases are hereby modified by striking therefrom the words referred to in the application of the appellants. The decree in each case being thus modified, is affirmed. 171 366 f171 379 171 366 L-ed 199 178 598 Statement of the Case. WHITE v. BERRY. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR No. 539. Argued March 21, 22, 1898. Decided May 31, 1898. A court of equity has no jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of public officers, whether the power of removal is vested, as well as that of appointment, in executive or administrative boards or officers, or is entrusted to a judicial tribunal. The jurisdiction to determine the title to a public office belongs exclusively to the courts of law, and is exercised either by certiorari, error or appeal, or by mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, or information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, according to the circumstances of the case, and the mode of procedure established by common law or by statute. If the assignment of some one to duty as gauger at the Hannis distillery, in the place of the plaintiff, did not work his removal from office, a court of equity ought not to assume to control the discretion which under existing statutes the Executive Department has in all such matters; as interference by the judicial department in such cases would lead to the utmost confusion in the management of executive affairs. THIS suit in equity was brought by H. C. Berry in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of West Virginia against A. B. White, United States collector of internal revenue for that district, A. L. Hoult, John D. Sutton, Anthony Staubley and Franklin T. Thayer. The bill alleged that in 1893, the plaintiff Berry was duly appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to the position of United States gauger, and from that time to the commencement of this suit he had acted in that capacity at the Hannis distillery at Martinsburg, West Virginia; That he was appointed through the recommendation of E. M. Gilkeson, late collector of internal revenue for the abovenamed district; That he was paid at the rate of one hundred dollars per month directly from the Treasury Department, and was an officer of the United States Government, having taken the required oath of office and executed bond as required by law; Statement of the Case. That his oath of office and bond continued good and in force regardless of the personnel of the collector of internal revenue, and he did not hold his position at the discretion of that officer; That he had honestly, faithfully and impartially discharged his duties, being especially well equipped and qualified to discharge all the duties appertaining to his office; That the defendant White, collector of internal revenue, had declared his intention to appoint a gauger and three storekeepers to fill the place of the plaintiff and others employed at the distillery at an early date; That the defendants Hoult, Sutton, Staubley and Thayer had been reinstated, or would be appointed and commissioned, and one of them would be assigned to duty in place of the plaintiff at the Hannis distillery, through White, who had openly declared his intention to reinstate the defendants in place of the plaintiff and others; That the plaintiff is a Democrat in politics, was assigned to said office as a Democrat, and had voted the ticket of that political party, while the defendant White was a Republi can; That White had declared his intention to place one of the other four defendants in plaintiff's position, because of the latter's political affiliation, and for no other reason, and to appoint and recommend Republicans to fill such places for no other reason than that they were of that political faith; That the plaintiff's office is in the classified service, and belongs to what is known as the Civil Service, and as such he could not be removed, except for cause shown and proved; That by a circular issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, it was provided that no removals should be made from any position subject to competitive examination except upon just cause and upon written charges filed with the head of the department or the appointing officer, of which the accused should have full notice and opportunity to make defence; That in department circular No. 119, which was an executive order, the same provisions were made together with others, and were signed by the acting commissioner of Statement of the Case. internal revenue and approved by the Secretary of the Treasury; That the plaintiff was one of the employés of the Treasury Department, was included in the classified service, and was protected from removal for political or religious reasons under the Civil Service laws and rules of the United States, as fully appears from a communication received from the acting president of the Civil Service Commission of date September 10, 1897; That if the defendant White be permitted to remove the plaintiff from his office and position or supplant him by others, the same would be illegal and in violation of law; That rule two of section three of the Civil Service rules. provides that "no person in the executive Civil Service shall dismiss or cause to be dismissed or make any attempt to procure the dismissal of or in any manner change the official rank or position of any other person therein because of his political or religious affiliations;" while section one of those rules provides that any person in the executive Civil Service. of the United States who should wilfully violate any provision of the Civil Service Act or of the rules established by the Civil Service Commission should be dismissed from office; That under the law the plaintiff had a vested interest in his office, and if White should remove him therefrom or assist in so doing it would be in violation not only of the Civil Service rules but of the plaintiff's vested interest in his office, for which he would not have an adequate remedy at law; That he is able, competent and willing to discharge the duties of his office, and is unwilling to be summarily dismissed therefrom for no other reason than that he is of opposite politics to those of the defendant White, collector of internal revenue; That the said collector has no power, right or authority to remove the plaintiff from his office, or to appoint any other to take his place and thereby effect his removal; that the defendants Hoult, Sutton, Staubley and Thayer have no right or authority to take the oath of office and otherwise qualify and appear to take the position, and thereby assist in the |