Statement of the Case. not drawn as the laws required, and hence did not convey the legal title to the invention in question." The opinion of the Supreme Court of Maryland, 83 Maryland, 456, is quite long, necessarily so, as it passes upon all the points which were raised by plaintiffs. The parts of it which concern the case are as follows: "We think there can be no doubt that the defendant's two prayers were properly granted. By the first the court declared as matter of law that upon the pleadings the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove the delivery of the sealed instrument sued on, and that if the court, sitting as a jury, should find that said paper never was delivered the verdict must be for the defendant. The second prayer recites the evidence more at length, but asserts the same proposition of law, which appears to be well settled in this State. Edelen v. Saunders, 8 Md. 129. We discover no inconsistency between the two prayers. The plaintiff specially excepted to the second on the ground that there was no evidence in the cause legally sufficient to prove the facts therein set forth. It is clear, however, that the testimony of the witnesses, Morton and Coale, support the facts set forth in the prayer, and we have already held it to be competent and admissible under the issue made by the plea of non est factum. "We will now consider the prayers of the plaintiff. He offered five, the second having been conceded and the fifth granted. "The controlling proposition in this part of the case is that contended for by the plaintiff in his first, third and fourth prayers, namely, that there is no legally sufficient evidence in the case to show that he had any knowledge or notice of the agreement between the inventor, Campbell, and the Campbell Barrel Company. "The correctness of this contention of the plaintiff depends, first, upon the legal effect of the assignments from Campbell to the plaintiff, and, secondly, upon the effect of the contract of Campbell with the Campbell Barrel Company — that is to say, whether said Campbell thereby assigned to said company an equitable title to his invention prior in date to the title he Statement of the Case. claims to have assigned to the defendant, which latter title the plaintiff claims to be an absolute legal title; and the defendant's contention, on the contrary, is that it is a mere equitable title, subsequent in date, and therefore inferior to the title of the Barrel Company. The plaintiff claims title through two assignments from Campbell, each being for one half interest in a certain application filed in the Patent Office of the United States, at Washington, D.C., which application is for letters patent covering the invention of a machine for forming and making barrels and kegs. "It will be found upon an examination of these instruments that they do not contain a request to the Commissioner of Patents to issue letters patent to the plaintiff. Notwithstanding they were recorded in the Patent Office, letters patent were issued in the name of Henry Campbell, the inventor, and the defendant contends that the legal effect of such an assignment, in which the inventor fails to embody a request to the Commissioner of Patents to issue letters to the assignee, is to convey to such assignee only an equitable title. It is conceded that by one of the rules of the Patent Office the Commissioner will not and cannot issue the letters patent to an assignee, unless specially requested so to do by the terms of the assignment. One of the witnesses refers to this rule in his testimony. The patent having been issued to Campbell instead of to the defendant, the witness thus explains: 'I ascertained that the probable reason why it (the patent) had not been issued to Mr. Morton was this: The original assignment from Mr. Campbell to Mr. Harrison did not contain the request which the rules of the Patent Office required in order that the patent should be issued in the name of the assignee.' (Rule 26, Rules of Practice in U. S. Patent Office, page 9. Revised April 1, 1892.)" After considering authorities, the opinion decides that "If, therefore, the Campbell Barrel Company acquired an equitable title to the patent, as it undoubtedly did, under its contract with the inventor, before the assignment of the equity to the defendant, the latter took subject to the equitable title in the said company, and the first, third and fourth prayers of Opinion of the Court. the plaintiff were properly refused, for they all asked the court to say that there was no legally sufficient evidence to show that the plaintiff had knowledge or notice of the agreement between the plaintiff and the barrel company; but, as we have seen, knowledge and notice will be imputed to him, as C. J. Gibson said in Chew v. Barnett, supra, 'whether he had notice or not,' holding as he did only an equitable title." The opinion concludes as follows: "Finding no error in the rulings of the learned judge below, the judgment will be affirmed." Mr. William Pinckney Whyte and Mr. Frederic D. McKenney for plaintiff in error. Mr. Samuel F. Phillips was on their brief. Mr. Edgar II. Gans and Mr. Bernard Carter for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. It is manifest that the pleadings of the parties presented for decision other questions besides Federal ones, and which could be, independent of the Federal ones, determinative of the controversy. Assuming, therefore, that a Federal question was involved, it does not appear but that the decision was given on the contention of the defendant that the agreement never became operative for want of delivery. This contention was clearly presented by defendant's prayers, and they contained the only rulings urged upon the court in that way, that is, in the nature of instructions. They were given and the verdict was generally for the defendant. It is therefore natural to presume that the verdict was rendered on account of them and on the ground urged by them. The ruling of the court granting them was sustained by the Supreme Court of the State. It affirmed the ruling as correct in law and as supported by competent testimony. The Supreme Court, it is true, passed on other grounds, passed on the one which it is Opinion of the Court. claimed involved a Federal question, and decided it adversely to plaintiff. But the rule in such cases has been repeatedly declared by this court. It is not necessary to review the decisions. That has been done by Mr. Justice Shiras in Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361. It is sufficient to announce the rule pronounced in that case: "It is settled law that, to give this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state court, it must appear affirmatively, not only that a Federal question was presented for decision by the state court, but that its decision was necessary to the determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided adversely to the party claiming a right under the Federal laws or Constitution, or that the judgment as rendered could not have been given without deciding it. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Cook County v. Calumet & Chicago Canal Co., 138 U. S. 635. "It is likewise settled law that, where the record discloses that if a question has been raised and decided adversely to a party claiming the benefit of a provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States, another question, not Federal, has been also raised and decided against such party, and the decision of the latter question is sufficient, notwithstanding the Federal question, to sustain the judgment, this court will not review the judgment." See also Wade v. Lawder, 165 U. S. 624. The writ of error must therefore be dismissed. MR. JUSTICE GRAY did not hear the argument and took no part in the decision. Statement of the Case. 171 48 L-ed 67 DETROIT CITIZENS' STREET RAILWAY COMPANY 177 571 171 48 L-ed 67 v. DETROIT RAILWAY. 180 598 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN. No. 236. Argued April 26, 27, 1898. — Decided May 23, 1898. At the time when the plaintiff in error received from the city of Detroit exclusive authority to construct and operate its railways in that city, the common council of Detroit had no power, either inherent or derived from the legislature, to confer an exclusive privilege thereto. THE plaintiff in error is a street railway company of the State of Michigan, organized for the purpose of owning and operating lines in the city of Detroit, and is the successor in interest of a similar corporation named the Detroit City Railway. The rights asserted by it arise from an ordinance of the common council of that city passed upon November 24, 1862. This provided that the Detroit City Railway was "exclusively authorized to construct and operate railways as herein provided, on and through" (certain specified streets) "and through such other streets and avenues in said city as may from time to time be fixed and determined by vote of the common council of the said city of Detroit and assented to in writing by said corporation. And provided the corporation does not assent in writing, within thirty days after the passage of said resolution of the council ordering the formation of new routes, then the common council may give the privilege to any other company to build such route." The ordinance provided also that "the powers and privileges conferred by the provisions of this ordinance shall be limited to thirty years from and after the date of its passage." Section 2 of the ordinance is only necessary to be quoted, and it is inserted in the margin.1 1 SEC. 2. The said grantees are, by the provisions of this ordinance, exclusively authorized to construct and operate railways as herein provided, on and through Jefferson, Michigan and Woodward avenues, Witherell, Gratiot, Grand River and Brush or Beaubien streets; and from Jefferson |