Opinion of the Court.

ways excepted). The said party of the second part doth engage to provide and furnish to the said vessel a full cargo, under deck, of sugar in bags. The bills of lading to be signed without prejudice to this charter."

The Silvia, with the sugar in her lower hold, sailed from Matanzas for Philadelphia on the morning of February 16, 1894. The compartment between decks next the forecastle had been fitted up to carry steerage passengers, but on this voyage contained only spare sails and ropes, and a small quantity of stores. This compartment had four round ports on each side, which were about eight or nine feet above the water line when the vessel was deep laden. Each port was eight inches in diameter, furnished with a cover of glass five eighths of an inch thick, set in a brass frame, as well as with an inner cover or dummy of iron. When the ship sailed, the weather was fair, and the glass covers were tightly closed, but the iron covers were left open in order to light the compartment should it become necessary to get anything from it, and the hatches were battened down, but could have been opened in two minutes by knocking out the wedges. In the afternoon of the day of sailing, the ship encountered rough weather, and the glass cover of one of the ports was broken — whether by the force of the seas or by floating timber or wreckage, was wholly a matter of conjecture—and the water came in through the port, and damaged the sugar.

The decree of the District Court dismissed the libel, and was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 64 Fed. Rep. 607; 35 U. S. App. 395. The libellant applied for and obtained a writ of certiorari from this court.

It was adjudged by this court at the last term that the act of Congress of February 13, 1893, c. 105, known as the Harter Act, has not released the owner of a ship from the duty of making her seaworthy at the beginning of her voyage. Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655.

The

But the contention that the Silvia was unseaworthy when she sailed from Matanzas is unsupported by the facts. The test of seaworthiness is whether the vessel is reasonably fit to carry the cargo which she has undertaken to transport.

Opinion of the Court.

The port holes of the compartment in question were furnished both with the usual glass covers and with the usual iron shutters or deadlights; and there is nothing in the case to justify an inference that there was any defect in the construction of either. When she began her voyage, the weather being fair, the glass covers only were shut, and the iron ones were left open for the purpose of lighting the compartment. Although the hatches were battened down, they could have been taken off in two minutes, and no cargo was stowed against the ports so as to prevent or embarrass access to them in case a change of weather should make it necessary or proper to close the iron shutters. Had the cargo been so stowed as to require much time and labor to shift or remove it in order to get at the ports, the fact that the iron shutters were left open at the beginning of the voyage might have rendered the ship unseaworthy. But as no cargo was so stowed, and the ports were in a place where these shutters would usually be left open for the admission of light, and could be speedily got at and closed if occasion should require, there is no ground for holding that the ship was unseaworthy at the time of sailing. Steel v. State Line Steamship Co., 3 App. Cas. 72, 82, 90, 91; Hedley v. Pinkney Steamship Co., (1892) 1 Q. B. 58, 65, and (1894) App. Cas. 222, 227, 228; Gilroy v. Price, (1893) App. Cas. 56, 64.

The third section of the Harter Act provides that "if the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent or charterers, shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel." 27 Stat. 445.

This provision, in its terms and intent, includes foreign vessels carrying goods to or from a port of the United States. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 30; The Carib Prince, above cited.

Not only had the owners of the Silvia exercised due diligence to make her seaworthy, but, as has been seen, she was actually seaworthy when she began her voyage.

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171 466 173 399 173 429

Syllabus.

This case does not require a comprehensive definition of the words "navigation" and "management" of a vessel, within the meaning of the act of Congress. They might not include stowage of cargo, not affecting the fitness of the ship to carry her cargo. But they do include, at the least, the control, during the voyage, of everything with which the vessel is equipped for the purpose of protecting her and her cargo against the inroad of the seas; and if there was any neglect in not closing the iron covers of the ports, it was a fault or error in the navigation or in the management of the ship. This view accords with the result of the English decisions upon the meaning of these words. Good v. London Steamship Owners' Association, L. R. 6 C. P. 563; The Warkworth, 9 Prob. Div. 20, 145; Carmichael v. Liverpool Shipowners' Association, 19 Q. B. D. 242; Canada Shipping Co. v. British Shipowners' Association, 23 Q. B. D. 342; The Ferro, (1893) Prob. 38; The Glenochil, (1896) Prob. 10.

In the case, cited by the appellant, of Dobell v. Steamship Rossmore Co., (1895) 2 Q. B. 408, 414, the ship was unseaworthy at the time of sailing, by reason of the cargo having been so stowed against an open port that the port could not be closed without removing a considerable part of the cargo; and Lord Esher, M.R., upon that ground, distinguished that case from the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the present case.

Judgment affirmed.

BRIGGS v. WALKER.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.

No. 260. Submitted April 25, 1898. — - Decided October 17, 1898.

Under an act of Congress, entitled "an act for the relief of the estate" of a certain person deceased, and conferring upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine "the claim of the legal representatives " of that person for the proceeds in the treasury of his property taken by the United States, the executor is the legal representative, and any sum recovered by him by suit in that court is assets of the estate and subject

Statement of the Case.

to the debts of the testator; and a decision of the highest court of a State in favor of creditors against the executor presents a Federal question, as to which it may be reviewed by this court upon a writ of error sued out by the executor.

THE Controversy in this case was between the executor and two creditors of Charles M. Briggs, and arose as follows:

On April 18, 1862, during the war of the rebellion, Charles S. Morehead, of Kentucky, executed and delivered to his nephew, Charles M. Briggs, a bill of sale of cotton in Mississippi, in these terms:

"For and in consideration of money loaned and advanced heretofore by C. M. Briggs, and further valuable consideration by way of suretyship for me by said Briggs, I hereby sell and transfer to said C. M. Briggs all the cotton on my two plantations in Mississippi near Eggspoint and Greenville. Said cotton so sold embraces all I have, baled and unbaled, gathered and ungathered. This is intended to cover all cotton that I have now or may have this year on said two plantations, supposed to be about 2000 bales."

At the same time, Briggs executed and delivered to Samuel J. Walker, Morehead's son in law, a writing in these terms: "In consideration of the sale and transfer this day made to me by C. S. Morehead of all the cotton on his two plantations near Eggspoint in the State of Mississippi, as specified in said sale and transfer in writing, I hereby assume and agree to pay to Samuel J. Walker the sum of forty thousand dollars due and owing to said Walker by said C. S. Morehead, upon condition, however, that I realize sufficient amount from any cotton on or from said plantations or proceeds of same, together with about twenty-five thousand dollars due me from said C. S. Morehead for moneys advanced and liability for him as surety; also about ten thousand dollars, more or less, being a claim of A. S. Shotwell as he may hereafter establish against said C. S. Morehead; but in case I should not realize sufficient to pay all of said claims or amounts above named in full, then I am to pay or divide the amount that may be realized from said cotton, proportionately or pro rata according to the respective amounts named, to the parties above named, first,

Statement of the Case.

however, paying and refunding any moneys paid by the respective parties for or on account of expenses pertaining to same; and in case more should be realized than sufficient to pay said amounts, with interest thereon to the time of realization and payment, then any surplus to be divided, one half to said Shotwell and C. M. Briggs jointly for any services, and the remaining one half to said Samuel J. Walker, but no other consideration to be paid to said Shotwell and Briggs for their service."

Briggs at once took steps to get possession of the cotton, but was prevented by the Federal forces and the Confederate forces in the vicinity. This cotton, amounting to four hundred and fifty bales, was finally seized, together with other cotton, by Captain G. L. Fort, assistant quartermaster general in the United States Army, in behalf of the United States, and was by him sold and the proceeds paid into the Treasury of the United States.

Briggs died in 1875, after repeated and unsuccessful efforts, through his attorneys, to obtain the proceeds of the cotton in question; and his executor continued the efforts, and, through the same attorneys, procured the passage of the act of Congress of June 4, 1888, c. 348, copied in the margin.1

1 An act for the relief of the estate of C. M. Briggs, deceased. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Court of Claims is hereby given, subject to the proviso hereinafter mentioned, like jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim of the legal representatives of C. M. Briggs, deceased, for the proceeds of four hundred and fifty-five bales of cotton, now in the Treasury of the United States, alleged to have been owned, in whole or in part, by said Briggs, as is given to said court by the acts of March twelfth, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon petition to be filed in said court at any time within two years from the passage of this act, any statute of limitations to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, however, that unless the said court shall, on a preliminary inquiry, find that said Briggs was in fact loyal to the United States Government, and that the assignment to him hereinafter mentioned was bona fide, the court shall not have jurisdiction of the case, and the same shall, without further proceedings, be dismissed: And provided further, that if the court shall find that the alleged assignment from one Morehead to said Briggs, of date April eighteenth, eighteen