Opinion of the Court.

maturity, the "appellant, the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company, representing that said mortgage was a first lien, sold, endorsed and delivered the note and mortgage to the appellant, the Northwestern National Bank." It is this note and mortgage that are in controversy and which are claimed as prior liens to the mortgages of appellees. The bank is found to be an innocent purchaser for value. By this is meant that it had no actual notice of the prior mortgages. Did the law impute notice to it? Certainly not by the record of the mortgages to appellees. Did it by the record of the mortgage of January 4, 1893, to the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company? If the bank was charged with notice of that mortgage it was charged with notice of its contents. "Notice of a deed is notice of its whole contents, so far as they affect the transaction in which notice of the deed is acquired." 2 Sch. & Lef. 315, cited and approved in Boggs v. Varner, 6 Watts & Sergeant, 469, 473.

A purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the records, and is presumed to know every other fact which an examination suggested by the records would have disclosed. Secs. 710 and 710a, Devlin on Deeds, and cases cited. The mortgage of January 4, 1893, to the Arizona Lumber and Timber Company was by the same mortgagor as that of August 30, the one sold to the Northwestern National Bank, and covered the same sheep, and hence, under the rule announced, the bank was charged with notice of it and of its recitals. It was not given up or satisfied. It was preserved as an independent lien.

It was not satisfied, appellants say, because it covered other property beside the sheep. This is an insufficient reason. If the debt it secured was paid, there was no reason for retaining the lien on any property. But whatever the reason, it was retained and affected the title. That is the material circumstance, and not in whose name it stood. It was in the chain of the title and affected it. It would have been found if looked for, and would have notified the bank of the transactions which conducted to it and caused it to be made subject to the mortgages of the appellees. We therefore think the

Opinion of the Court.

territorial courts committed no error when they assigned priority to those mortgages. Nor was it error to subordinate the attachment and judgment of the Riordan Mercantile Company to them. That company had, according to the finding of the court, actual notice.

The territorial court found that on the 18th of December, 1893, there were one thousand head of ewes remaining out of all the sheep which existed on July 10, 1890, the date of the mortgages to appellees; that the remainder of the ewes, all of the male sheep, and the lambs had died, been consumed, sold or lost. The findings are absolutely silent as to whether there were or were not other sheep in existence at that time, or at the time the decree was entered. We infer from the briefs of counsel that there were others — the increase of those mortgaged-and there is a contention as to whether these are covered by the lien of the mortgages.

Under the rule that the incident follows the principal, a mortgage of domestic animals covers the increase of such animals, though it is silent as to such increase. This court said in Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, by Mr. Justice Harlan "according to the maxim partus sequitur ventrem, the brood of all tame and domestic animals belong to the owner of the dam or mother." 2 Bl. Com. 390. See also Pyeatt v. Powell, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 10 U. S. App. 200, and cases cited.

But whatever was doubtful or disputable in the mortgages of appellees as to the increase was resolved and settled by agreement between all who had interests, and was expressed in the mortgage of January 4, 1893. There is nothing in the record to show a substitution except by the increase, and therefore we are not called upon to pass upon some of the interesting questions argued by appellants. Nor are we embarrassed by considerations of the increase being in or having passed out of the " period of nurture." Such considerations are only important when a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee has taken without notice, actual or constructive, which we have seen the Northwestern National Bank did not.

Statement of the Case.

The objections to testimony assigned as error in the fourth and seventh assignments of error were not well taken. The testimony showed the transactions and the relations of the parties to them.

Decree affirmed.

ERROR TO THE UNITED STATES COURT IN THE INDIAN TERRITORY.

Nos. 249, 250. Submitted April 25, 1898.-Decided October 24, 1898.

This court has no appellate jurisdiction of capital cases from the United States court from the Northern District of the Indian Territory, such appellate jurisdiction being vested exclusively in the United States Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory.

CYRUS A. Brown, plaintiff in error in case No. 249, was indicted in the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, charged with the crime of murder, which indictment was filed in the United States court for the Indian Territory, Northern District, sitting at Muscogee on the 10th day of December, A.d. 1896.

On the 17th day of December, A.D. 1897, he was convicted of the crime of murder in said court, and the judgment of the court sentencing him to death was made on the 24th day of December, A.D. 1897. On the 1st day of February, A.D. 1898, the plaintiff in error filed a petition in said court for a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States, and filed an assignment of errors. On February 8, A.D. 1898, a writ of error was allowed in said cause, and on the same day a citation was issued in said cause, service of which was acknowledged on the 16th day of February, A.D. 1898. Pursuant to the writ of error in said cause a transcript of the record in said cause was filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States on the 23d day of February, A.D. 1898. The government has filed its motion to

180 260

Statement of the Case.

dismiss the writ of error in said cause, for the reason that the Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction under the law to entertain said writ of error, nor to pass upon any of the alleged errors in said record, because said court has no appellate jurisdiction of said cause.

George Curley, alias George Cully, plaintiff in error in case No. 250, was indicted in the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, sitting at Vinita, charged with the crime of murder, which indictment was filed in open court on the 21st day of October, A.D. 1897. On the same day the defendant took a change of venue to the United States court at Muscogee, and a transcript of the record and the original indictment were forwarded to the clerk of the United States court at Muscogee, Indian Territory. On the 13th day of December, A.D. 1897, at the December term of the United States court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, at Muscogee, the indictment heretofore found was referred to the grand jury, and upon the same day the grand jury returned into open court at Muscogee, Indian Territory, a new indictment against the defendant for murder. On the 22d day of December, A.D. 1897, the defendant was found guilty of the crime of murder, and on the 24th day of December, A.D. 1897, judgment of the court was pronounced upon said defendant, sentencing him to death.

On February 11, 1898, plaintiff in error, through his attorney, W. H. Twine, filed a petition for a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States, and also filed his specification of error. A writ of error was allowed, on the 19th day of February, 1898, and on the 23d day of February, 1898, service of the citation issued out of this court was acknowledged. A transcript of the entire record was filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States on March 1, 1898. The government has filed its motion to dismiss the writ of error in said case for the reason that the Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction under the law to entertain said writ of error, nor to pass upon any of the alleged errors in said record, because said court has no appellate jurisdiction of said cause.

Opinion of the Court.

Mr. Solicitor General and Mr. P. L. Soper for the motion.

Mr. John H. Koogler and Mr. John Watkins on behalf of Brown, and Mr. W. H. Twine on behalf of Curley, opposing.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

By the act of Congress approved March 1, 1889, c. 333, 25 Stat. 783, there was established a United States court for the Indian Territory. The act conferred no jurisdiction over felonies, but by the fifth section exclusive original jurisdiction was conferred over all offences against the laws of the United States committed within the Indian Territory, not punishable by death or by imprisonment at hard labor. Jurisdiction was conferred in all civil cases between citizens of the United States who are residents of the Indian Territory where the value of the thing in controversy shall amount to one hundred dollars or more. The final judgment or decree of the court, where the value of the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds one thousand dollars, may be reviewed and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of error or appeal, in the same manner and under the same regulations as the final judgments and decrees of a Circuit Court.

On March 1, 1895, Congress passed an act, c. 145, 28 Stat. 693, dividing the Indian Territory into three judicial districts, and providing for the appointment of two additional judges. This act extended the jurisdiction of the United States court in said Territory to capital cases and other infamous crimes, the jurisdiction over which had theretofore been vested in the United States courts at Fort Scott, Kansas, Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Paris, Texas, and provided that all such offences should be prosecuted in the United States court in the Indian Territory after the first day of September, 1896.

The eleventh section is as follows:

"That the judges of said court shall constitute a court of appeals, to be presided over by the judge oldest in commission.