dismissing the writ of habeas corpus issued by one of its judges, and
remanding the prisoner to custody, denied to him any right specially
set up and claimed by him under the Constitution, laws or treaties of
the United States, it is reviewable by this court on writ of error. Ib.
4. By taking an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the Pullman
Company did not, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, waive
its right to appeal to this court, and the case being now before this
court either on appeal or by the writ of certiorari, it has jurisdiction.
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation Co., 138.

5. On error or appeal to the Supreme Court of a Territory, this court is
without power to reexamine the facts, and is confined to determining
whether the court below erred in the conclusions of law deduced by
it from the facts by it found, and to reviewing errors committed as
to the admission or rejection of testimony when the action of the
court in this respect has been duly excepted to, and the right to
attack the same preserved on the record. Young v. Ames, 179.

6. There is no error in the conclusions of law in this case: all the assign-
ments of error, and the argument based thereon, rest on the assump-
tion that the findings of fact certified by the court below are not
conclusive, and that this court has the power, in order to pass upon
the questions raised, to examine the weight of the evidence, and to
disregard the facts as found. Ib.

7. The ends of justice will be best subserved by not passing upon the
third assignment of error, but the rights of both parties in relation
thereto may be left open for further consideration in the court below.
New Orleans v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 312.

8. A judgment of the highest court of a State reversing the judgment of
the state court below, upon the ground that the case made out by the
findings was a different case from that presented by the pleadings,
and that the variance was fatal to the validity of the judgment, and
on the further ground that as the defendants in error were sued
jointly for a tort, a withdrawal of the action in favor of two of them
also operated to release the third, presents no Federal question for
the consideration of this court. California Bank v. Thomas, 441.
9. This case is dismissed because the judgment below was not a final
judgment; the settled rule being that if a superior court makes a
decree fixing the liability and rights of the parties, and refers the
case to a master or subordinate court for a judicial purpose, such, for
instance, as a statement of account upon which a further decree is to
be entered, the decree is not final. California Bank v. Stateler, 447.
10. Under an act of Congress, entitled "an act for the relief of the
estate" of a certain person deceased, and conferring upon the Court
of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine "the claim of the legal
representatives" of that person for the proceeds in the treasury of
his property taken by the United States, the executor is the legal
representative, and any sum recovered by him by suit in that court

is assets of the estate and subject to the debts of the testator; and
a decision of the highest court of a State in favor of creditors against
the executor presents a Federal question, as to which it may be
reviewed by this court upon a writ of error sued out by the executor.
Briggs v. Walker, 466.

11. On the hearing of a case, brought by certiorari from a Circuit Court
of Appeals on petition of one of the parties, in which the judgment
of that court is made otherwise final, this court will pass only upon
the errors assigned by the petitioner, and does not feel at liberty to
decide whether there was error in the decree below, of which the
other party might have complained. Hubbard v. Tod, 474.
12. This court has no appellate jurisdiction of capital cases from the
United States court from the Northern District of the Indian Terri-
tory, such appellate jurisdiction being vested exclusively in the United
States Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory. Brown v. United
States, 631.

13. The court again holds that when there is color for a motion to dismiss
on the ground that no Federal question was involved in a judgment
of a state court, this court may, under a motion to dismiss or affirm,
dispose of the case. St. Louis Mining Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 650.

MANDATE.

The motion to amend the mandate is denied. Central National Bank v.
Stevens, 108.

MEXICAN GRANT.

See PUBLIC LAND, 5, 6, 7, 8.

MINERAL LAND.

1. To the first question certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals, viz. :
"1. May any of the lines of a junior lode location be laid within,
upon or across the surface of a valid senior location for the purpose
of defining for or securing to such junior location under-ground or
extralateral rights not in conflict with any rights of the senior loca-
tion?" this court returns an affirmative answer, subject to the qualifi-
cation that no forcible entry is made. Del Monte Mining and Milling
Co. v. Last Chance Mining and Milling Co., 55.

2. It passes the second question, viz.: "2. Does the patent of the Last
Chance Lode mining claim, which first describes the rectangular claim
by metes and bounds and then excepts and excludes them from the
premises previously granted to the New York Lode mining claim,
convey to the patentee anything more than he would take by a grant
specifically describing only the two irregular tracts which constitute
the granted surface of the Last Chance claim?" because it needs no
other answer than that which is contained in the discussion of the
first question in its opinion. Ib.

VOL. CLXXI-45

3. To the third question, viz.: "3. Is the easterly side of the New York

Lode mining claim an 'end line' of the Last Chance Lode mining claim within the meaning of sections 2320 and 2322 of the Revised Statutes of the United States?" it gives a negative answer. Ib.

4. The fourth question, viz.: "4. If the apex of a vein crosses one end line and one side line of a lode mining claim, as located thereon, can the locator of such vein follow it upon its dip beyond the vertical side line of his location?" it answers in the affirmative. Ib.

5. It holds that the fifth question, viz.: "5. On the facts presented by the record herein has the appellee the right to follow its vein downward beyond its west side line and under the surface of the premises of appellant?" in effect seeks from this court a decision of the whole case, and therefore is not one which it is called upon to answer. Ib.

6. In discussing the first of these questions the court holds: (1) That it is dealing with statutory rights, and may not go beyond the terms of the statutes; (2) That as Congress has prescribed the conditions upon which extralateral rights may be acquired, a party must bring himself within those conditions, or else be content with simply the mineral beneath the surface of his own territory; (3) That the Government does not grant the right to search for minerals in lands which are the private property of individuals, or authorize any disturbance of the title or possession of such lands; (4) That the location of a mining claim means the giving notice of that claim: that it need not follow the lines of Government surveys: that it is made to measure rights beneath the surface: and that although the statute requires it to be distinctly marked on the surface, the doing so does not prevent a subsequent location by another party upon the same, or a part of the same territory, as, in such case, the statute provides a way for determining the respective rights of the parties: (5) That the requisition in the statute that the end lines of the location should be parallel was for the purpose of bounding the under-ground extralateral rights which the owner of the location might exercise. (6) That the answer to the first question does not involve a decision as to the full extent of the rights beneath the surface which the junior locator acquires. Ib.

7. In discussing the fourth of these propositions the court says: "Our conclusions may be summed up in these propositions: First, the location as made on the surface by the locator determines the extent of rights below the surface. Second, the end lines, as he marks them on the surface, with the single exception hereinafter noticed, place the limits beyond which he may not go in the appropriation of any vein or veins along their course or strike. Third, every vein 'the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically' becomes his by virtue of his location, and he may pursue it to any depth beyond his vertical side lines, although in so doing he

enters beneath the surface of some other proprietor. Fourth, the only exception to the rule that the end lines of the location as the locator places them establish the limits beyond which he may not go in the appropriation of a vein on its course or strike is where it is developed that in fact the location has been placed not along but across the course of the vein. In such case the law declares that those which the locator called his side lines are his end lines, and those which he called end lines are in fact side lines, and this upon the proposition that it was the intent of Congress to give to the locator only so many feet of the length of the vein, that length to be bounded by the lines which the locator has established of his location." Ib.

8. The answer given to the fourth question in Del Monte Mining and Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining and Milling Co., 171 U. S. 55, compels an affirmance of the judgment below in this case. Clark v. Fitzgerald, 92.

9. On the 28th of April, 1871, on a previous location made in 1857, the Providence Gold and Silver Mining Company obtained a patent in which it was recited that it was "the intent and meaning of these presents to convey" to the company "the vein or lode in its entire width for the distance of 3100 feet along the course thereof." Under that act a patent could be issued for only one vein; but the act of May 10, 1872, c. 152, gave to all locations theretofore made, as well as to all thereafter made, all veins, lodes and ledges, the top or apex of which lies inside of the surface lines. September 29, 1877, the Champion Mining Company made a location upon the Contact Vein, which overlapped the Providence location, both as to surface ground and lode. In 1884 a dispute took place, which brought about a relocation of the lode line of the Champion Company; but eventually the conflicting claims resulted in this suit. Held, (1) That the extent of the rights passing under the act of 1866 was decided by this court in Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U. S. 463, viz.: that "the right to follow the dip of the vein is bounded by the end lines of the claim;" (2) That that right stops at the end line of the lode location, terminated by vertical lines drawn downward; (3) That the original location and lode determined those end lines. Walrath v. Champion Mining Co., 293.

10. The following propositions, announced in Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., ante, 55, are affirmed with the addition that the end lines of the original veins shall be the end lines of all the veins found within the surface boundaries: "First, the location as made on the surface by the locator determines the extent of rights below the surface. Second, the end lines, as he marks them on the surface, with the single exception hereinafter noticed, place the limits beyond which he may not go in the appropriation of any vein or veins along their course or strike. Third, every vein the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically' becomes his by virtue of his location, and he may pursue it to any depth beyond

his vertical side lines, although in so doing he enters beneath the surface of some other proprietor. Fourth, the only exception to the rule that the end lines of the location as the locator places them establish the limits beyond which he may not go in the appropriation of a vein on its course or strike is where it is developed that in fact the location has been placed not along but across the course of the vein. In such case the law declares that those which the locator called his side lines are his end lines, and those which he called end lines are in fact side lines, and this upon the proposition that it was the intent of Congress to give to the locator only so many feet of the length of the vein, that length to be bounded by the lines which the locator has established of his location." Ib.

11. There is no merit in the contention that by agreement, by acquiescence, and by estoppel, the line f-g on the plan has become the end line of the two claims. Ib.

12. It is the end lines alone which define the extralateral rights, and they must be straight lines, not broken or curved lines, and to such the right on the vein below is strictly confined. Ib.

13. When a location is made of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator, and he may sell it, mortgage it or part with the whole or any portion of it as he may see fit; and a contract for such sale is legal and will be enforced by the court. St. Louis Mining Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 650. 14. Where an application to enter a mining claim embraces land claimed by another, the latter is under no obligation to file an adverse claim; but he may make a valid settlement with the applicant by contract, which can be enforced against him after he obtains his patent. Ib.

MORTGAGE.

See CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

At the time when the plaintiff in error received from the city of Detroit exclusive authority to construct and operate its railways in that city, the common council of Detroit had no power, either inherent or derived from the legislature, to confer an exclusive privilege thereto. Detroit Citizens' Street Railway Co. v. Detroit Railway, 48.

NEW MEXICO, LAWS OF.

1. An order signed in vacation by the several members of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico cannot be considered as an order of the court. Naeglin v. De Cordoba, 638.

2. The statutes of New Mexico provide that, in the absence of legitimate children, illegitimate children inherit. Ib.