And these abominations are not the ex Even in the annals of French violence in Spain, we have never before found such avowed atrocity as this-which was de-aggerated imputations of enemies, but testable, not only in itself, but as provok- French themselves, and were practised in facts published and republished by the ing and justifying retaliatory measures on the part of the Spaniards: yet Bes- Marshal Macdonald, a few months after, a province which, as Buonaparte wrote to sières had the reputation of being one of he intended to make a part of France. the least savage of Buonaparte's pro-con- (i. 435.) Of this last insanity we do not suls; and these infernal ordonnances are recollect to have before had such positive countersigned by 'The Auditor of the Council of State, De Broglie! What, the present Duke de Broglie? Alas, yes! The self-same liberal and tender-hearted gentleman who could not endure the intolerable despotism of the Restoration, and who was so peculiarly indignant at the Polignac ordonnances-which, compared with these of his own manufacture, were, we venture to think, as honey to vitriol--as water to blood! 'Prince Berthier to General Count Dorsenne, com. manding the army of the North at Burgos. 'Paris, 11th Feb. 1812. 'The Emperor is extremely dissatisfied with your negligence in this whole affair of Ciudad Rodrigo. How is it that you had not news from that place twice a week? 'What were you doing with Souham's fine divi. sion? evidence. * We beg pardon :-Colonel Jones, in his late so good as to read these pages before publication, work on Spain, quotes, from the uncontradicted recalls to us this horror, and adds-I saw with my pages of a French military writer, a distinct state-own eyes, when Massena had retired from before ment that, in Massena's army, detachments sent the lines of Torres Vedras, forty or fifty of these out to forage had orders to bring in all girls between wretches in a state of disease, famine, and insanity, twelve and thirty years of age for the use of the beyond all conception.' soldiery. A gallant friend of ours, who has been VOL. LXV. 4 Misprinted February in the original. This is a strange mode of making war; and the Emperor obliges me to say that the shame of this event falls on you. "This humiliating check can be attributed only to want of precaution on your part, and to the inconsiderate measures you adopted.'-vol. i. p. 608. 'Prince Berthier to Marshal Marmont. 'Paris, 11th Feb. 1812. The Emperor regrets that with Souham's division and the three other divisions you had assembled, you did not return towards Salamanca to see what was going on. That might have alarmed (donné à penser) the English, and been useful to Ciudad Rodrigo. 'Your Highness had yourself placed me under Marshal Marmont's orders, to whom you had given direct instructions relative to the defence of Rodrigo, with which, therefore, I had nothing at all to do. If the Emperor does not change his unfavourable opinion of me, I beg he will recall me, as I cannot remain in Spain with the conviction of having lost his confidence.'-vol. i. p. 609. 'Marshal Marmont to Prince Berthier. 'Valladolid, 26th Feb. 1812. Your Highness forgets that the Emperor had previously ordered me to leave the three divisions on the other side of the mountains. You must now concentrate your army on Sala- 'If I were to concentrate the army on Salamanmanca, and even push on to Ciudad Rodrigo, and if ca, it could not exist a fortnight. If I were to ad you have siege artillery, even take the place-your vance toward Ciudad Rodrigo, I could not honour requires it. If you cannot, for the moment, remain three days before the place would have retake Ciudad Rodrigo, take up an offensive position ruined my army. You say "my honour requires from Salamanca to Almeida-re-occupy the Astu- the re-capture of that place." My honour will alrias-make your preparations for a siege; push for ways prompt me to do what is useful to the Empeward heavy detachments on Ciudad Rodrigo, and ror's service; but it seems to me that his Majesty menace the English.'-vol. i. p. 611. reckons as nothing the difficulties of feeding the army. Perhaps his Majesty may not be satisfied with my reasons-in that case I beg that he will give me a successor, and place the command of his army in better hands.'-vol. i. p. 628. Berthier to Marmont. 'Paris, 18th Feb. The Emperor is not satisfied with the direction which you give the war. You have a superiority over the enemy, and yet, instead of taking the initia. tive, you do nothing but receive it. •You displace and harass your troops-that is not the art of war. The real road to Lisbon is by the north. The enemy, having his magazines and hospitals on that side, can only retire very slowly on that capital. 'You run great risks by receiving the initiative instead of giving it-by thinking about the army of the south [Soult's], which does not need your assistance, since it is composed of 80,000 of the best troops in Europe; and by busying yourself about districts which are not under your command-you risk, I say, by directing your attention to those objects, the receiving a check which might be felt throughout Spain. Marmont to Berthier. 'Valladolid, 22d Mar. 1812. My army is, I admit, strong enough to beat the English-[witness SALAMANCA-but it is inferior in the means of moving. The English have their abundant magazines behind them, and ampler means of transport. I, on the contrary, must be guided, not by the principles of military manœuvres, but by the resources of the localities, and the possibility of existing. This state of things will last till the harvest. 'If this alludes to the detachments in the valley of the Tagus, it cannot apply to me, for I did not send them there, and, on the contrary, have stopped move. ments that were making, and have taken the greatest pains to spare my troops all unnecessary fatigues. I believe that all who know the country are of a contrary opinion. The enemy has neither maga. zines nor hospitals on that side; his magazines are at Abrantes and in Estremadura, and his hospitals in Castelbranco, Abrantes and Lisbon itself. For my part, I am convinced that, whenever the army attempts to operate by the north, the result will be disastrous. The Emperor thinks that I trouble myself too much with other people's concerns, and not enough with my own. But until now I had considered that the Emperor himself had prescribed to me as a duty to assist the army of the south, and this duty has been formally urged upon me in twenty of your despatches, and lately repeated by the order to leave three divisions in the valley of the Tagus; but being now relieved from this, my position is much clearer and better. 'I repeat, therefore, the Emperor's orders-with- His Majesty's orders are so imperative that I in twenty-four hours after the receipt of this letter shall obey; but if, in consequence, Badajos shall be you will set out for Salamanca. You will concen- taken, I hope I shall not be blamed. [It was taken trate your army on that place, Toro, and Benevent, in three weeks after.] It seems that his Majesty fixing your head-quarters at Salamanca. Work forgets that I have neither money to pay, nor vicactively at fortifying that town. Employ for that tuals to feed, these 12,000 workmen, and that every purpose 6000 troops and 6000 peasants. Collect kind of service on every side is on the point of fail. there a fresh equipage-establish magazines of ing utterly for want of resources; and as to maga. provisions. zines, if his Majesty were to send me the necessary means, and if I could collect one month's subsistance for the army, I should think I had done wonders; and it would be most advisable not to spend these supplies in making demonstrations, but to reserve them for the moment when we are to act seriously on the enemy. 'Let your outposts exchange shots every day with His Majesty is then ignorant that our advanced those of the enemy. You will immediately send an advance guard to occupy the debouchés on Ciudad Rodrigo, and another the debouchés on Almeida. 'It will be eight days after these measures are taken before they will produce their effect on the enemy; but as you see the effect of these offensive operations on the enemy, you will gradually withdraw the division you will have left in the valley of the Tagus, and you will increase your offensive demonstrations so as to show that you only wait for the new grass to enter Portugal. (Signed) -vol. i. p. 614. 'ALEXANDER.' Our readers have seen that, in this correspondence, the inculpated generals were clearly in the right, and that Buonaparte's complaints were captious in spirit and unfounded in fact; and we shall see that -as in the former cases of Bessières and Dupont-the event contradicted his predictions, and that his own positive orders produced disasters of which he subsequently laid all the blame on the unfortunate generals. In spite of Marmont's explanations and remonstrances, we find that, in a letter of the 16th April, Berthier reiterates the preceding orders, Our readers will observe that, in the former instructions, there is not an allusion to King Joseph or his system, nor a hint that Marmont was placed at Salamanca in pursuance of any such system. On the contrary, he was there by the special and detailed orders of Napoleon himself, and he was told not to busy himself with anything beyond his own immeTo concentrate the army about Salamanca-diate sphere. But there is one point on to take the initiative, and give the war the character suited to the glory of the French army-and to exchange shots with the English every day under the very walls of Ciudad Rodrigo and ALmeida.'-vol. i. p. 642. which Buonaparte's criticisms appear to have been just, namely, Marmont's not having waited for the considerable reinforcements which he knew were within a couple of days of him. To these critiBut when Marmont, in pursuance of cisms Buonaparte directed Marmont to the spirit and almost the letter of these make precise and categorical answers ;' positive instructions, provoked the battle but M. Belmas does not give us the Marof Salamanca, and lost it, Buonaparte shal's defence, which we should be the (who, as Marmont had before hinted to more curious to see, as the Duke of WelBerthier, had a convenient facility of for-lington seems to concur with Buonaparte getting even his own orders) turned round in thinking Marmont's movements premaon Marmont, and on the receipt of the ture and injudicious. Our readers will despatches of the 22d July, directed the see with interest his Grace's short, yet Duke of Feltre, minister of war, to send comprehensive summary of this battle, him a very sharp censure of his conduct, addressed to Lord Lynedoch, then Sir which Feltre delayed to do for some T. Graham :months, waiting Marmont's recovery from the severe wounds he received in the battle. The following are the main points of this letter: The Emperor, in considering the case, has set out with a principle which you cannot dispute, namely, that you should consider the King (Joseph) as your commander-in-chief, and that you were bound to conduct yourself by the general system which he should adopt! Now being Flores d'Avila, 25th July, 1812. I cannot allow the despatches to go off with out writing you a few lines respecting our action of the 22d. We had a race for the large Arapiles, which is the more distant of the two detached hills, which you will recollect on the right of our position. This race the French won, and they were too strong to be dislodged without a general action. I knew that the French were to be joined by the cavalry of the army of the north on the 22ả or 23d, and that the army of the centre [Joseph's] was likely to be in motion. Marmont ought to have given me a pont d'or, and he would have made a handsome operation of it. But instead of that, and after manoeuvring all the morning in the usual French style, nobody knew with what object, he at last passed my right in such a manner, at the same time without engaging, that he would have either carried our Arapiles, or he would have confined us entirely to our position. This was not to be endured, and we fell upon him, turning his left flank, and I never saw an army receive such a beating.'- Wellington Dispatches, vol ix. p. 309. What force, what simplicity, what true grandeur, even in this familiar note to a private friend! Marmont, however, was not singular in his presumption that he was strong enough to beat the English, for Suchet writes to Joseph from Valencia, 30th June, The Duke of Dalmatia had with him 20,000 the allied army was composed of 31,000, including 4000 Spaniards under Castanos, and 10,000 other Spaniards of Blake's expeditionary army, a division of Portuguese (about 5000) and two British divisions under Cole and Stewart (10,000 men.)' The fact is, that at Albuera there were, of British infantry, nominally 7000, but really only 6000-of British cavalry 1200: there were 38 pieces of artillery, of which 24 were British; and the allied forces of all kinds were not quite 30,000 men:—while the enemy had 19,000 French infantry, 4000 French cavalry, and 50 pieces of artillery. But let us hear M. Belmas The main attack was on the right of the allies, where the English were posted, while General Godinot was to make a diversion on the left. General Girard advanced with the first French corps to attack the English right, while four regiments of cavalry, hussars, and lancers, • Marshal Marmont may unite the greater took it in flank by a brilliant charge; the first part of the army of Portugal, and I doubt line of the English yielded to these vigorous whether, in the present state of England-the efforts, but soon rallied, and, returning en potence, French always calculated on the factious spirit directed a most effective fire (des mieux nourris) at home as a powerful auxiliary]-Lord Wellingon Girard's column, which soon suffered enorton dare hazard a battle. He has too much to mous losses, and was forced to retire. The lose, and the French too much glory to gain, to second division, under General Danican, immediventure an engagement so far from his ships.'-ately advanced, like the first, in close column; vol. i. p. 660. • In my present position, I find myself under the disagreeable necessity of intreating your Majesty [Joseph] to request the Emperor to give me a successor in this command, who-more happy than I-may find your Majesty disposed to believe his reports, and who may possess enough of your Majesty's confidence not to be selected to afford the example of a commander-in-chief's being called from an extensive government and indispensable duties, to make a march of twenty days' distance from his head-quarters, with 12,000 men.' but it suffered the same difficulty in deploying under the enemy's fire. It struggled for a while, revolving in confusion on itself (en tourbillonnant sur elle-même), but at last entirely disbanded itself in the most frightful disorder (se débanda dans le plus Werte, hastened up to protect the retreat, but affreux désordre.) The reserve, under General could not retrieve the victory. It, in its turn, (entraîné par les fuyards.) The artillery, which was carried away in the flight of the others amounted to from thirty to forty pieces, sustained for two hours the efforts of the English. Its fire was dreadful, and it, supported by the cavalry, saved the army. So ended one of the bloodiest battles of the Spanish war. The French, very inferior in number'-[by M. Belmas's own account they were double the number of the Eng lish, on whom he also admits the whole brunt of the action fell]-lost 7000 men hors de It is not surprising, considering combat, the allies more than 8000, the most part that this work was patronised by M. of the artillery and cavalry-two-thirds of the Soult, that M. Belmas should give us English were destroyed. The two armies renone of Buonaparte's criticisms and mained in presence of each other the next day, tirades against that marshal; but we find could no longer hope to face the allies, made his the 17th; but in the night, Marshal Soult, who that he, like the others, complained that retreat-but so slowly, that he did not reach he had not the Emperor's confidence, and Llerena till the 23d.' The British cavalry'requested to be relieved in his command, [there was, it seems, cavalry enough left to take (vol. i. p. 459.) M. Belmas gives no pièces the offensive] pursued him, and there was a justificatives concerning the battle of Al- sharp affair at Usagre, but without result. Marbuera (17th May, 1811); but it is to his shal Soult remained in observation at Llerena to credit that his narrative presents a toler-couraged (dont le moral se trouvait fort affecté) by reorganise his which was very much disably fair account of the action, which, the losses it had suffered.'-vol. i. p. 184. from the official pen of an enemy, is worth abstracting. He says: army, Such was the battle as described by M. * (Translation.) 'My Cousin, sent such a man. Belmas, Colonel of Engineers, from the archives of the French war-office, which Marshal Soult, with his usual modesty, described as a 'victoire signalée,' and which some English writers have pleased You will express to the Duke of Dalmatia to misrepresent in the same style. We my displeasure at his having sent me the colours* heartily wish that M. Belmas had given of Albuera by a foreigner. I shall not confirm us Marshal Soult's original despatches, his appointment as his aide-de-camp. It seems and above all, Buonaparte's observations that this Lafitte comes from the Austrian service. on them. We happen, however, to have an He has, therefore, fought against us. It is riindication of Napoleon's opinion on the diculous that the Duke of Dalmatia should have subject, in an original note signed and un-informed that he shall not return to Spain, and Let this Captain Lafitte be derscored by his own imperial hand, in that I have given directions that he should join which he desires Berthier to acknow- the 9th regiment of light horse. ledge the receipt of Marshal Soult's despatches, which it seems had been forwarded by one Captain Lafitte, who, instead of promotion and reward, (with the expectation of which Soult had sent him,) received a sad rebuff, and suffered, poor man, for the misadventure of his patron. We shall give this curious piece-of which the autograph is before us-both in French and English. Au Major Général [Berthier.] • Mon Cousin, On this I pray God to have you in his holy keeping. St. Cloud, 23d August, 1811. 'NAPOLEON.' This needs no comment from us to explain the temper with which Buonaparte received Marshal Soult's account of the victoire signalée d' Albuera, which seems to have been a victory of the same class, but not quite so signal, as that which he won three years after at Toulouse. By the way, we should like to know how the French monument of that crowing victory Vous témoignerez mon mécontentement au gets on; we hope that King Louis PhiDuc de Dalmatie de ce qu'il m'a envoyé les dra-lippe's 407. has not been subscribed in vain. peaux d'Albuera par un étranger. Mon inten. As Englishmen, we somehow have a great tion n'est pas de le lui accorder pour aide-de- anxiety that this memorial should be comcamp. Il paraît que ce Lafitte sort du service pleted, and if there is any want of funds, d'Autriche il a donc fait la guerre contre nous. we pledge ourselves to collect in the UnitIl est ridicule que le Duc de Dalmatie m'envoye ed Service Club ten times his Citizenun pareil homme. Faites connaître à ce Capitaine Lafitte qu'il ne retournera plus en Espagne Majesty's subscription. But we fear that et que je donne ordre qu'on le place dans le 9 the design is abandoned, for we see in a régt. de Chevau-légers. late article of the Revue des Deux Mondes, a publication of high authority in France, a full and fair admission that' after all that has been said about it-the plain truth is, we [the French] lost the Sur ce je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde. 'St. Cloud, le 23 Aout, 1811.' 'NAPOLEON.' *It is hardly worth while to notice even M. battle, but lost it with honour.'--vol. xix. p. 766. Belmas's little inaccuracies-which, however, are always in favour of the French. One brigade of Before we conclude, we must add one the British infantry could not cross the Guadiana; or two important observations suggested so that in reality we had but 6000 of our own in- by these papers-which, besides the light fantry in the field. Of these 4500 were killed or wounded, so that we had but 1500 during the they throw on the conduct of the Peninnight. The Spaniards would not fight early in the sular war, afford an answer to a question day; and Soult, with 20,000 infantry and a very which has been often asked, and never, great superiority of cayalry, ought, by all rules, to that we know of, quite satisfactorily exhave won that battle. But our 6000 British infantry, commanded by gentlemen, stood firm, in hap. plained; namely, how it was that all py ignorance of the tactical pedantry which permits Buonaparte's marshals abandoned him so troops to run away whenever their flank is turned suddenly, so readily, and apparently so or their line broken. Thus, for example, the 57th ungratefully. It has been usually acregiment had at Albuera, out of 25 officers, killed and wounded 22; of 570 rank and file, killed and counted for by their having grown wounded 425. This regiment was composed rich, and being anxious to realize, as it chiefly of Londoners from the Middlesex militia. were, and secure their prodigious but They had been notorious as marauders, and were nicknamed the Steelbacks, from being daily flogged by the provost; but after Albuera their more honourable style was the Die-hard's.'-MS. Note of an officer previously referred to. old and No English nor Portuguese colours were lost, nor we believe any Spanish, but if in the melée the French carried off anything like colours, they must have belonged to the Spanish irregulars. |