pressing a disagreement between them. Yet the verb of existence combined with the negative particle is rightly called a Copula, since it serves to unite in one sentence the terms which express those objects of comparison. The trains of thought which are expressed in the following sentences, afford examples of Judgment: Time is an invaluable treasure. Revenge is a kind of wild justice. That which is past and gone is irrecoverable. The good before him; but perverts best things A flatterer is not deserving of a wise man's esteem. 3. Discursus, est motus sive progressus mentis ab uno Judicio ad aliud; quod et Ratiocinium dicitur; et significatur copulâ illativâ, qualis est Ergo aut alia similis. v. g. Qui est extra fortuna potestatem est beatus. Sapiens est extra fortuna potestatem. Ergo, Sapiens est beatus. Reasoning consists in the comparison of judg ments in which the mind has previously acquiesced, and in deducing from them a new and distinct judgment. For example; No element is liable to decomposition; Water is liable to decomposition; Therefore water is not an ele ment. Whatever makes a man most effectually superior to his enemies confers genuine glory; But the disposition to pardon their injuries makes him most effectually superior to them; Such a disposition therefore confers genuine glory. It is an undeniable truth, that it is the glory of a man to pass by an offence; for the wisest of men asserts it to be so. The mention made in the text of the characteristic particle which denotes an inference has relation, not to the operation of reasoning, but to the language in which it is expressed. It is therefore somewhat misplaced here. The same observation applies in some degree to the mention of the copula employed in expressing judgment. But it is very difficult to speak of the pure mental operations without some reference to the modes of communicating them. It is however useful to habituate ourselves to view them as really distinct. The English word Discourse, as employed in the sense of reasoning, is obsolete, and cannot be now so used without ambiguity. This ambiguity is very manifest in a passage of Dryden, in which the word occurs; and the force of which few readers, from that very circumstance, will discover at first sight. The poet addresses the deist thus: Vain, wretched creature! how art thou misled, The expression, discursive faculty, is however not uncommon, nor is it liable to the same objection. Singulis operationibus sui accidunt defectus. Apprehensioni, Indistinctio; Judicio, Falsitas; Discursui, Mendosa Collectio. 1. There are innumerable objects of which our notions or apprehensions must, from the weakness of our nature, be unavoidably indistinct. Such, for instance, are our conceptions of the Divine Being, and of all his attributes, Infinity, Omnipotence, Omniscience, Perfection, &c. The apprehensions we form of Heaven, of Angels, of the Human Soul, of the Operations of our own minds, are necessarily in distinct. In numberless other instances our ideas are accidentally indistinct; that is, not from any inherent defect, but from the want of an actual acquaintance with the object, whether from the deficiency of opportunity or of observation. Thus an uninstructed person forms an inaccurate conception of the nature and use of philosophy: A native of the torrid zone has an indistinct apprehension of ice: The ancients had no correct notion of an eclipse. Of those objects with which we are familiar we form ideas proportionately less indistinct; but there exist probably very few things, the nature of which we can be said, strictly speaking, to comprehend distinctly. 2. Nor is the faculty of judgment free from imperfection. It is misled by sense in the rustic who conceives that The earth is stationary; that The sun rises from the sea upwards. It is unduly influenced by authority and example in those who conceive that Earth, air, fire, and water, are simple elements; or in the illiterate mechanic, who judges that All which some factious demagogue says must be true: and that Whatever Government does must be wrong. It is often perverted by the passions; as when men decide that The Gospel consists in a repeal of the obligation of the moral law; that Honesty is the whole of religion. The Lycaonians at Lystra were guilty of a false judgment, when they said of Paul and Barnabas, The Gods are come down to us in the likeness of men. So also were the Pharisees, when they said of our blessed Lord, We know that this man is a sinner. 3. The powers of Reasoning are likewise imperfect. If our previous judgments are inaccurate, it is natural that the new judgment deduced from them should be erroneous: for instance, Honesty is the whole of religion; therefore I may indulge myself with impunity in excess. Again, if a true conclusion be deduced from a false judgment, the process in the mind must necessarily be inaccurate: for falsehood cannot produce truth. But the defect in the faculty of reasoning is most evident, when from true and undeniable judgments we infer an incorrect judgment. Such are the following examples : Bread is dear and work is scarce, therefore I am authorized to riot. I must accept a challenge, or else I shall incur the imputation of cowardice. Revenge is usually esteemed a mark of a noble spirit, and is therefore to be indulged in order to maintain our reputation. The Church is larger than the moon: for it is capable of concealing it from our view. Kings deserve honour; but subjects are not kings; consequently subjects do not deserve honour. The Pharisees argued erroneously when they inferred that our blessed Saviour was nol of God, because he kept not the sabbath day according to their traditions. The Melitans drew an erroneous conclusion when they reasoned thus: This stranger is about to be killed by a venomous serpent; therefore he is a murderer pursued by vengeance. Nor was their subsequent inference less erroneous, when in consequence of his shaking off the animal without injury, they said that he was a god. Quæ cum Sapientes animadverterent, et opportuna illis remedia excogitâssent, præcepta sua in unum compegêre; eorumque Scientiam dixêre Logicam, sive Artem Rationis. Logic, like Rhetoric, is not a mere artificial acquisition; but is natural to man; yet it is imperfect, as has been already shewn by an induction from the several faculties of the mind to which it bears relation; and it is therefore improvable by observation and study. Nor does it afford any just objection to the utility of a system of Logic, that many are able to form accurate conceptions, to judge correctly, and to reason well, without having studied any such system; or that many, after a familiar acquaintance with the technicalities of Logic, still continue to be weak reasoners. Without such study the latter may have been still more incompetent: with it, the former would have acquired a still greater command of their reasoning powers. Est igitur Logica, Ars instrumentalis dirigens mentem in cognitione rerum: ejusque partes tres sunt, pro operationibus mentis quas dirigit. 1. De Simplici Apprehensione. 2. De Judicio. 3. De Discursu. Logic is (like Rhetoric) an art, not a science. It relates to something which is to be done, not to any thing which is merely to be known; to practice, not to theory. It is not a final art; that is, an art the end and object of which consists in the performance itself, and which is therefore practised solely or primarily for its own sake; such as the art of playing on musical instruments, &c. Logic, on the contrary, is studied and exercised only with a view to some further object, distinct from itself; and is therefore an instrumental art. Thus the art of building, of warfare, of government, are instrumental arts; carried on not for their own sakes, but for the sake of their natural results, or the ends to be acquired by their exercise; as, the existence of the edifice required, the defence of our country, the maintenance of social rights and order. |