« ForrigeFortsett »
offense intended to be threatened by the Bill to quiet title upon the following criminal was.
state of facts: His sneaking, misera' le suggestions On the 1st of June, 1867, John 0. were all designed to intimate to Wilson Evans conveyed to the defendant, Moses his knowledge, assumed as it was, that Kelly, three sub lots in square 247, in the the latter had stolen his employer's prop. city of Washington, in trust for Jane erty, and that unless he (Crimmins) was Thompson, wife of defendant, J. Harry bought off, he would accuse him of it. Thompson. The trust is expressed in
The court will not in a case like this these words: “In trust, nevertheless, for seek for technical errors or indulge in hy. the sole use and benefit of the said Jane percritical construction to shield the Thompson, and for no other person whatwrong-doer.
soever, and only to be conveyed by her, Judgment affirmed.
or her heirs joining in the deed with said Opinion by Brady, j.
trustees. Davis, P. J., and Daniels J., concur
Jane Thompson died on the 10th of ring.
February, 1872, seized of the equitable
title to said lots, and by her last will and POWER OF ALIENATION UNDER testament, bearing date January 24, 1871, TRUST DEED. MARRIED
and duly admitted to probate and reWOMAN.
corded on the 26th of February, 1872, SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF she gave and bequeathed the sum of COLUMBIA.
$5,000, to be equally divided among her Louisa G. Smith v. J. Harry Thomp- four chiidren, the defendants, J. IIarry son et al.
Thompson, Jr., Perly, Jennie and Minnie Decided September, 1875.
A. Thompson, to take effect when said chil
dren shall have attained their majority, The rule may now be considered setiled
wherever the chancery jurisdiction and constituted said bequest a charge exists, that a married woman is to upon said above described real estate, and be regarded as a femme sole in re- directed that the same should be sold and spect to her separate property; and ci nveyed at the discretion of her executhat she may dispose of it as she tor to satisfy said bequest, and devised pleascs, unless her power of dispo- said real property, subject to the foregoing sition is restricted or limited by the charge and any prior legal incumbrance, deed or will creating her interest.
to her husband, the defendant, J. Where the beneficiary in a trust deed Harry Thompson, in fec simple, and con
is a married woman, and there is no stituted and appointed her said husband restriction upon the mode in which she shall alienate the property, only executor of said last will and testament. that the trustee shall join in the Subsequently, on the 15th of April, deed; this limitation has no refer- 1873, the defendant, Kelly, truste, as ence to a devise, and his testamentary aforesaid, conveyed to the defendant, J. capacity in regard to said property Harry Thompson, said real property in is complete.
fee simple By virtue of the act of Congress regu The complainant purchased a portion lating the rights of property of mar of the property and received a deed exeried women, passed April 10, 1869, cuted by Thompson, and gave back a a married woman may dispose of her entire property, constituting her trust deed to secure the purchase money. separate estate, whether such prop.
She endeavored to raise money upon erty was acquired before or after the the property by giving a trust deed, and
had concluded an arrangement, but her
passage of the act.
title was re’ected upon the ground that of the act of Congress of March 3, Jane Thompson, at the time she executed
1875, but in which a new trial had her last will and testament had nu legal
been granted, and which was pending
after the passage of the said act, capacity to devise the said real estate, and
may be removed from such State that in order to perfect complainant's title
court to the Circuit Court of the it is necessary that the testamentary ca United States. pacity of Jane Thompson in respect to On the 25th of March, A. D, 1867, suit this property should be judicially ascer- was brought by the plaintiffs against the tained and determined.
defendants, in the Court of Commo's The justice holding the Special Term Pleas of Muskingum County, Oh o. Atdismissed the bill without prejudice, from tachments were issued, and certain propwhich decree complainant appealed. erty was attached. On the 18th day of
Held, 1. The deed cf trust made by May, 1867, the defendants filed a motion Evans to Kelly, conveying the property to remove the cause into the Circuit . for the sole use of Jane Thompson, and Court of the United States, on the ground only to be conveyed by her or her heirs that the defendants were citizens and joining in the deed with trustee, was no residents of the State of Maryland, and restriction of the power to devise. It ap- that the plaintiffs were citizens and resiplies only to a conveyance, and must be dents of Ohio. Upon the hearing of the construed as giving her the right to dis- motion, it appeared that one of the p'ainpose of the property absolutely by will. tiffs was a citizen and resident of Ohio,
2. That although a married woman, one a citizen and resident of Illinois, and Jane Thompson had the same right to dis- one a citizen and resident of Minnesota. pose of her separate estate which belongs The notion was overruled. Thereupon to a femme sole, unless that right is lim- the parties proceeded to make up the ited or restricted by the deed or will cre- issues in said Court of Common Pleas, ating her interest.
and at the April term, 1873, a jury was 3. The act of April 10, 1869, relating empanneled and the case submitt:d to the to the disposal of their property by mar- court, and judgment rendered in favor of ried women, clearly authorized Jane the plaintiffs. Thompson to dispose of this land by will,
At the same term the plaintiffs were even if she had no power so to do under awarded a second trial, under the statute. the trust deed made in 1867; it makes no Amendments were made to the pleadings, difference that the property was acquired and the cause was continued from term previous io the passage of the act.
to term until the November term, 1874, Judgment reversed.
when a trial was had before a jury, and a Opinion by Mc Arthur, J.; Wylie, J., verdict was rendered for the defendants. dissenting
At the same term the verdict was set aside, and the cause was continued till
the January term, 1875. REMOVAL OF CAUSE FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT.
On the 25th day of January, the cause
was again continued. At the same term, O. S. CIRCUIT Court--SOUTHERN Dis- to wit: April 25th, 1875, the order of conTRICT OF OHIO.
tinuance was set aside; and, on the same John W. Andrews, exr., v. John W. day, a petition was filed by the defendGarrett, et al.
ants in the State court, praying for a Decided October, 1875.
removal of the cause to the Circuit Court A suit commenced and actually tried of the United States, under the provisions
in a State court, before the passage of the act of Congress, of March 3d,
A. D. 1875. Bond, with proper security, The design of Constitutional provision, was filed. The grounds of removal were,
was to prevent the uniting of various that the defendants were citizens and
objects having no necessary, or natural
connection with each other in one bill. residents of the State of Maryland, and Geographical situs and various other cirthat one of the plaintiffs was a resident
cumstances, may be considered in deof the State of Illinois, one a citizen and termining the proper construction to be resident of Minnesota, and the other a given to a statute. citizen and resident of Ohio. This ap Appeal from an order at Special Term, plication was resisted upon the ground granting an injunction against the dethat the case did not come within the fendants and respondents, pendente lite. provisions of the act of March 3d, 1875, The injunction restrained the defendants because not filed with the court at or be- from establishing a line of steamships, or fore the first term et which the canse purchasing steamships to be used on could be tried, and before the trial thereof. proposed line between the Port of New Upon the hearing of this petition the York and the Port of Aspinwall, in the court, for the reason that the cause was Republic of New Granada, and between triable and was actually tried in said the Port of Panama, in said republic, and cours before the passage of the act of the Port of San Francisco, California. Congress, overruled said motion.
The plaintiff is a stockholder in the Afterwards, on the 12th day of May, Panama Railroad Company. And the 1875, the defendants filed in this court ground of the action as well as of the intranscripts of the record and proceedings junction, is that the defendant, The in said cause; and, afterwards, on the Panama Railroad Company, which is a 6th day of October, a motion was filed corporation, existing under the laws of in this court to strike the case from the the State of New York, has no power undocket on the ground of want of juris- der its charter to establish such proposed diction.
steamship line. The defendant claimed Held, That the proceedings removed that under the following provision of the the cause to this court; that the cause charter of the Panama Railroad Compacame within the act of March 3d, 1875, ny, such power was conferred, viz: “Afwhich is applicable to all causes pending ter constituting several gentlemen, a body at the time of its passage, in which no corporate by the name of the Panama final judgment had been entered, provided Railroad Company, for the purpose of the petition, &c., are filed at or before the constructing and maintaining a railroad term at which said cause could be first with one or more tracks, &c., in the Retried after the passage of the acto public of New Granada, it was further Motion overruled.
in said charter provided that said compaOpinion by Swing, J.
ny should have the power “of purchasing
and navigating such steam or sailing vesINJUNCTION.
sels as may be proper and convenient to N. Y. SUPREME COURT, GENERAL TERM, be used in connection with the said road, First DEPARTMENT.
and for such purposes, all the necessary Aaron Freeman, respt., 5. The Panama and incidental power is hereby granted to Railroad Company et al., applds.
said corporation." Decided March 7, 1876.
Plaintiff claimed that the aforesaid It was not the intent with which the Con
provision was inserted in the act for the stitutional Provision (Sec. 16, Art. 3) was framed, that the Title of an Act of reason, that owing to the shallowness of the Legislature should contain all the the bay, at the termini of the road, ships details set forth in the act.
were unable to come nearer than three
and a half sea miles from such termini, It is no constitutional objection 'to a and to confer upon the Panama Ra lroad statute that its uitle is vagve
and unmeanCompany the power to run lighters and ing as to its purpose, if it be sufficiently emall vessels, for the purpose of carrying plain as to the matter to which it refers. freight and passengers from the large That the title here sufficiently expresses ships to the termini of the road, the afore. the subject of the act of incorporation. said provision was incorporated in the That with reference to the act incorcharter and for no other purpose. It was porating the Panama Railroad Company, further claimed by plaintiff, that if the we are unable to see any lack of power in construction claimed by the defendant the Legislature to give to said corporation was the proper construction, that the act power to construct and maintain a railwas within the prohibition of Sec.16, Art. road, and als, the power of purchasing 3 of the Constitution of the State of New and navigating such steam and sailing York, which provides that “no private or vessels from the several termini of said local bill which may be passed by the Le- railroad, to and from the cities of New gislature shall embrace more than one sub-York and San Francisco, as may be project, and that shall be expressed in the per and convenient to be used in connectitle."
tion with such railroad. The title of the act incorporating the
lield further, Tbat as to the remainPanama Railroad Co. (Laws 1819, Ch. 284) is as follows, viz: “ An Act to incor- ing question depending upon the con.
struction of the act as to whether ly the porate the Panama Railroad Company."
From the order of the Court below language used in the act of incorporagranting the injunction sought for this tion, the power is conferred to establish
the proposed linə of steamships, we are appeal was taken.
inclined to think that, taking into conMr. Fullerton, for respt.
sideration the geographical situs of the Mr. McFarland, for applts.
contemplated railroad which the LegisHO That it was clearly not the in- lature must be presumed to have contemtent with which the constit itional provi- plated, ard that it was proposed to build sion was formed (Sec. 16, Art. 3) that the the road across a narrow isthmus, and title of an act of the Legislature should that the success of the undertaking decontain all the details, and set forth every pended altogether upon whether the corpower, duty and obligation of the body poration, by the powers and facilities corporate. The omission of such details granted, could make itself the carrier of a in the title of an act, was not the mischief remunerative inter-ocean commerce and sought to be prevented. In the first case travel, and also the language used, the that arose under Sec. 16 of Art. 3 of the
power to run such steamship line in conConstitution, the Court of Appeals held | nection with the road was conferred by that “ The design of the Constitutional the act of incorporation. provision was to prevent the uniting of
Order appealed from reversed, and invarious objects, having no necessary, or junction dissolved. natural, connection with each other, in one
Opinion by Davis, P. J.; Daniels, J., bill, for the purpose of combining various pecuniary interests in support of the concurring in opinion ; Braly, J., in rewhole, which could not be combined in
sult. favor of either by itself.” Connor v. The
ERRATA. Mayor 1 Seld (5 N. Y.,) 203. This, in substance, has been held to be the design On page 90, vol. 2, line 24, for "assign. of the Constitutional provision ever since. 'ment” read “ re-assignment."
NEW YORK WEEKLY
and also “Good for One Day Only," and
on the back of the same was stamped MONDAY MARCH 27, 1876. (No. 7.
“ Aug. 5th.” RAILROAD.
From the evidence on the trial it apN. Y. SUPREME COURT, GENERAL TERM. peared that, shortly after the plaintiff took FIRST DEPARTYENT.
the train to Southampton, the conductor Alfred Nelson, respt. v. The Long Island came into the car where the plaintiff was R. R., applt.
sitting and requested the fare from plainDecided March 7, 1876.
tiff, and the ticket aforesaid on being The ticket issued by a Railroad Com- shown to the conductor, he said, “ That
pany is not conclusive evidence of has run out.” Plaintiff said, “I guess not; the right of the holder, but only a to. I bought it on Saturday, and I told the ken or voucher, adopted for conven- man I bought it from I was coming back ience, to show that the passenger has on Wednesday.” The conductor said, paid his fare from and to the point “ Yes—but the rules are different.” The named.
conductor then went to the front of the The representation of a ticket agent car and came back with a book, and
who receives the money and hands out the ticket, as to the time the ticket opened it and took out the rules and said has to run, are admissible, and bind- that he must do so-and-so. Plaintiff reing on the Company.
fused to pay his fare, and at the next sta That a passenger, having been ejected tion (Westhampton) he was put off, the from a train for wrongfully refus- conductor using vo force, the plaintiff ing to pay his fare, has no right, walking with him to and off on to the upon an offer to pay his fare after platform. The plaintiff immediately got such expulsion, to be again admitted into the car again, and when called upon as a passenger on the train.
paid his fare, $1.15, to Manor, that being Appeal from a judgment entered on the the terminus of the Sag Harbor branch of verdict of a jury.
the road. This action was brought to recover of At Manor, the intersecting point of the the defendant the sum of $5,000 damages, main and branch road, the car in which for wrongfully ejecting plaintiff from a plaintiff was, was hooked on to another car upon one of the trains run by the de- train with another conductor. But the fendant. The plaintiff was ex pelled from second conductor had been informed of one of the defendant's cars on refusing to the action of the plaintiff in refusing to pay the fare. The answer set up that the pay his fare, and of his being put off and plaintiff, on the 3d of August, 1872, had paying to Manor. Plaintiff did not get off purchased an excursion ticket from Fun- the car at Manor, and after the train left ter's Point to Southampton, and return that station for Hunter's Point, the second at any time between the 3d and 6th of conductor came into the car where plainAugust, 1872, on which last mentioned tiff was and asked for tickets. Plaintiff day it should expire, and that on the 7th handed the same excursion ticket he had day of August, 1872, the day of the oc- shown to the former conductor. The concurrence set forth in the complaint. the ductor said it was not good; it had run plaintiff, learning the contract had ex-out-and requested his fare. Plaintiff pired, voluntarily left the train of defend- said, “ I tender this ticket as my fare;” ant.
plaintiff said, “I shall not pay, you can The ticket of the plaintiff, shown by put me off.” The car was stopped, and him on the 7th of August, was printed plaintiff was put off. Action was brought • Excursion Ticket” on the face of it, for the last expulsion. On the trial evi