pality on this assessment, in the pro- insurance, to establish and maintain portion which the length of the road uniformity among its members in polwithin such municipality, bears to the ices or contracts of insurance, and acwhole length of the road within the state. 10. The action of the board of equalization in increasing the assessed value of the property of a railroad company or an individual, above the return made to the board, does not require a notice to the party to make it valid, and the courts cannot substitute their judgment as to such valuation for that of the board. 11. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois having decided that the law complained of in these cases is valid under her constitution, and having construed the statute, this court adopts the decision of that court as a rule to be followed in the federal courts. Decree reversed and case remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the bill. Opinion by Miller, J. NEW YORK BOARD OF UNDER WRITERS. MANDAMUS. People ex rel., James II. Pinckney and The Relief Fire Insurance Company, applts. v. New York Board of Fire Underwriters., respts. Decided May 5, 1876. Members of a corporation having no proprietary interest in its capital, may be expelled therefrom for a vio lation of its by-laws. Appeal from an order denying motion for writ of mandamus. quire, preserve, and disseminate valuable information relative to the business in which they are engaged." It was empowered "to make all needful bylaws not contrary to the provisions of the act, or to the Constitution and laws of this state or the United States." Among other by laws one was adopted providing that the board might establish and alter the rates of premiums for insurance by a majority vote. The Relief Fire Insurance Company, of which Jas. H. Pinkney is the president, subscribed to the charter and bylaws, and agreed to be governed and to maintain the rates, rules, &c., of the board, but, afterwards violated the rules by insuring two steamers below the board-rates. For this, after a proper investigation, it was expelled the board. The board owned no property other than what was necessary for carrying out the purposes of its incorporation, the necessary funds being raised by assessment upon its members. It issued no stock and declared no dividends. The members, individually, owned no part or interest in the property acquired and had no participation in the earnings. The relator sought to compel the board to receive it back by a writ of mandamus, but its application was denied by the court below. On appeal. Jno. E. Parsons, for applts. Held, That the board was not a corporation whose members could resist The New York Board of Under-expulsion on the ground of a propriewriters was incorporated by chap. 846 tary interest in its capital or earnings, laws of 1867, "for inculcating just and no such interest belonging to any of equitable principles in the business of them. It was organized merely to promote the proper management of insurance business by its members, and in a uniform manner. Its usefulness depended largely on their faithful observance of its regulations, and it necessarily possessed the power to expel members who violated their obligations in that respect; for, if they might violate its rules and still maintain their membership, its usefulness would be defeated-its very existence destroyed. This action was brought to recover damages for the conversion of a certificate of deposit for $4,000. Plaintiff' had been the defendant's clerk, with power of attorney to draw checks for him. Plaintiff drew a check on de fendant's bank account for $4,000, which included a debt due him from defendant of $3,000, borrowed money, for which he held defendant's note, and the balance was for salary due and unpaid and included a month's salary in advance. Plaintiff deposited the $4,000 There is a tacit condition annexed to to his own account, and received a the franchise of a member that he will certificate of deposit for it. This cernot oppose or injure the interests of the tificate was in plaintiff's possession corporate body, which, if he breaks, he when, as the court below found, demay be disfranchised. fendant by force and violence took it The leading purpose of defendant from him, plaintiff having previously was to secure uniformity in all substantial respects in the policies of its members. The rates of premiums being an important feature both of the business and the policy, uniformity could only be gained by declaring its rates. The by-laws enacted to secure this end were reasonable, were necessary to the welfare of the board, contained nothing in conflict with its charter or the Constitution of the State, or United States. endorsed the $3,000 note as paid, and passed it over the desk to defendant, who said he did not want it, and laid it upon the desk. Plaintiff said, "Pass it back to me and I will retain it with. the rest of my vouchers." This defendant did not do, but he did not refuse to allow plaintiff to take it, or claim any right to retain it. The note remained on the desk several days, and was then put in the safe by defendant's clerk. Defendant had just before the Relator having violated these by-laws above transaction denounced the plaincould properly be expelled. Order appealed from affirmed. tiff's act in drawing the money, as having done it without right, and demand Opinion by Daniels, J.; Davis, P. ed that he should return it. J., and Brady, J., concurring. TROVER. N. Y. COURT OF APPEALS. Voltz, respt., v. Blackmar, applt. Decided March 21, 1876. Asher P. Nichols for respt. Wm. II. Gurney and John T. Hoffman for respt. Held, That the action for conversion could not be maintained; that plaintiff having drawn the check without auTrover does not lie to recover chattels thority, the money received on it befrom the owner who has violently longed to his principal, as did also the and forcibly retaken them from the certificate of deposit which represented plaintiff, although the latter held it, and the rights of the parties were them under a claim of ownership. not changed by the deposit of it to plaintiff's credit; that the taking of the ment," the rate on which was 2 1-2 per certificate by force from plaintiff did cent., that upon the dwelling adjoining not give him any right of action against being 1 1-2 per cent. In April, 1871, defendant to recover the money speci- F. removed from the dwelling he had fied in it; that the retention of the been occupying to the two and a half $3,000 note by defendant, under the cir-story building adjoining. F. wrote to D., cumstances proved, cannot be regarded "I would like you to make out a policy as a ratification or consent by him that of $800 on my house," &c. D. issued plaintiff should retain sufficient of the a policy, describing the property as money drawn from the bank to pay it, his two story frame dwelling, situate," and no inference could be drawn that &c., and charged 1 1-2 per cent. predefendant intended to ratify the draw-mium. The premises occupied by F. ing of the check, or that he accepted were destroyed by fire, and this and retained the note as paid. action was brought by plaintiffs, to Judgment of General Term, affirm-whom the loss was made payable. D. ing judgment for plaintiff, reversed, and new trial granted. Opinion by Andrews, J. REFORMATION OF CONTRACT. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS. Meade, et al., applts., v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company. testified, on his direct examination, that he supposed F.'s letter referred to property that had since been burned, and which was described in his book: but upon his cross-examination, being asked whether when the policy was issued he supposed the applicant referred to the building he formerly occupied, he answered, "I was in doubt." The simple question was, if it was on To justify the reformation of an instrument, except in case of fraud, it the building in which he lived it was must be established beyond doubt, by 2 1-2 per cent., and if on the one he the proof, that the parties agreed to formerly occupied, 1 1-2 per cent. He something different from what is ex-was then asked, "You issued it for pressed. Decided March 21, 1876. This action was brought to reform a policy of insurance, issued July 1, 1871, to one F., by D., an agent of defendant. It appeared that prior to April, 1871, F. had occupied a dwelling house, and D. had insured the furniture 1 1-2-which was it on?" and answered, My idea was, it was on the one formerly occupied." C. F. Brown for applts. Calvin Frost for respt. Held, That the policy could not be in it. F. owned the adjoining build-reformed; that there was not suffiing, and D. had insured that. He had cient proof that the minds of the para description of both buildings on his ties had met. books. The dwelling house was de- To justify a court in changing the scribed as a "two-story framed dwell-language of an instrument sought to ing house, situate," &c., and the adjoin-be reformed, except in case of fraud, it ing building as a "two and a half story must be established that both parties frame building and the addition at- agreed to something different from what tached, occupied as a dwelling and is expressed in the writing, and the paint shop, with stable in the base- proof on this point should be so clear and convincing that there can be no commenced in 1861, by Mr. Wheeler as room for doubt. Order of General Term, reversing judgment for plaintiff, on report of referee, affirmed. Opinion by Rapallo, J. the plaintiff's attorney, and judgment was entered against the defendant in March 1862, for $1,377.24, which amount included the sum of $117.51 costs and extra allowance. In July, 1862, the plaintiff assigned the judg ATTORNEY'S LIEN FOR COSTS. ment to John C. Barnes. In October, LIMITATIONS. N. Y. SUPREME COURT-GEN'L TERM. Charles O. Richardson, respt., v. The 1862, Mr. Wheeler informed the assignee, by letter, that he, Wheeler, should decline doing anything more in the suit until he was paid, and stating that he should allow the defendant to proceed and take a new trial and dismissal of the action. Prior to the 9th of attorney, to prevent his being de- December, 1862, the judgment was frauded by any collusive action be- further assigned to William Cutter. tween the parties to a suit out of his On the 10th of December, 1862, on a compensation, but he is called upon motion in behalf of Cutter, the asto seek the aid of the court with diligence; and an unreasonable delay signee, the special term ordered a referaud laches on his part will be as fa-erence to George G. Reynolds, Esq., to tal to his claim as it would be to the ascertain and report to the court the claim of any other suitor. taxable costs due to Mr. Wheeler, and Proceedings by an attorney to enforce that on the payment of such costs by his claim do not constitute an action Cutter, Mr. Hitchcock be substituted as within the literal operation of the statute of limitations, but in enforc- the attorney for the plaint.ff, and that ing it the court will be be governed Wheeler deliver to said Hitchcock the by the analogy of the statute. papers in the action. On the 26th day Appeal from an order granting a motion of January, 1863, this order was on the part of C. B. Wheeler, formerly amended by requiring the referee to replaintiff's attorney, to establish a lien port separately the lien or right of upon the judgments in this action, and said Wheeler, if he has any beyond the directing the record of satisfaction of taxable costs referred to, as against the the judgments to be vacated, and giv-assignee of the judgment, without preing the said Wheeler leave to issue an execution for $479.30. judice to the further lien of said Wheeler, if he has any. In March, 1863, on This appeal is from an order made at motion of Mr. Hitchcock, as attorney a special term, on the 17th of May, for Cutter, the order was again amend1875, vacating a satisfaction-piece of the ed by striking out the words requiring judgment in this action, and authoriz- the referee to report the amount of ing Clark B. Wheeler, Esq., formerly Wheeler's lien, it any, beyond the taxthe attorney for the plaintiff, to issue able costs. Mr. Wheeler appealed from an execution upon the said judgment the order, as thus modified, to the genagainst the defendant for the sum eral term, and the order was affirmed. $479.30, with interest. The action was in May, 1863. The referee, Reynolds, Dudley Field, for the applt. reported as remaining unpaid to Mr. but without reporting any amount due Wheeler the sum of fifty-three dollars to Mr. Wheeler, or the nature and exand fifty-nine cents. Mr. Wheeler filed tent of his lien. exceptions to this report, which excep- The order appealed from, made at tions where overruled and the report special term, May 7, 1875, orders that confirmed. From the order overruling Mr. Wheeler have leave to enforce his the exceptions and confirming the re- lien for $419.70, with certain costs and port Mr. Wheeler appealed; but the expenses, amounting in all to $479.30, papers do not show that any disposi- and vacating and setting aside the sattion has ever been made of the appeal. isfaction of the judgment, and giving The next movement on the part of Mr. Wheeler the power to issue execution Wheeler, so far as the papers disclose, on the judgment against the defendant is an application to the special term in for $479.30, with interest from the Kings county, for an order, which was date of the order. granted on the 4th day of October, 1869, whereby it was referred to John P. Rolfe, Esq., to take proof of the na- Held, There appears to have been ture, extent and value of Mr. Wheel- the most extraordinary delay and lacher's professional services, the nature es on the part of Mr. Wheeler in prosand extent of his lien upon the judg-ecuting this claim for compensation in ment for such services and for the ex- excess of the taxable costs, in this case. penses and disbursements incurred by If the question of Mr. Wheeler's comhim, and what he has become liable to pensation beyond the taxable costs was pay to associate counsel, employed by embraced in the order of reference to him at the request of the plaintiff, to Mr. Reynolds, it is still pending, so far the end that, upon the coming in and as the papers show, on the appeal from filing of said report, the defendants the order confirming the report of Mr. shall pay the amount reported due, Reynolds. If it was not embraced in with costs of the motion and the ex- that reference then it was intended to pense of the reference, and the order be embraced in the reference to Mr. expressly reserved the question whether Rolfe of the 4th day of October, 1869, Wheeler had any lien at all. It does more than six years after the last modinot appear that any further proceedings fication of the order of reference to were had until January 1875, when an Reynolds; and the order of reference to order was made by the special Term, Rolfe was suffered to remain unexecuton a motion in behalf of Mr. Wheeler, ed, and without any movement, on the that Mr. Greenwold be substituted as part of Mr. Wheeler, to cause the same the referee in place of Mr. Rolfe. It to be executed for nearly five years would seem, though the fact does not very distinctly appear, that Mr. Wheeler at some time received the amount reported by Mr. Reynolds. On the 3d of April, 1875, Mr. Greenwood reported to the court that he had taken proof, etc., as directed by the order of reference, and reports the same, more. The court will extend its aid to an attorney to prevent his being defrauded by any collusive action between the parties out of his reasonable compensation, but he is called upon to invoke the aid of the court with due diligence, and great and unreasonable delay and laches on his part in assert |