Fraud in executing lease will vitiate it al- though party injured had friends present who could read and who could examine lease. Ediek v. Dake. 559
As to ejectment for non-payment of rent, see
EJECTMENT.
As to release of sureties on lease, see PRINCI- PAL AND SURETY.
Held, That a transmissible interest vested in the children upon the issuing of the policy, and that the child of the deceased child took by descent the interest of its parent, and was en- titled to the portion of the fund which the par- ent would have received if living. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer et al. 60
A renewal of a life insurance policy, which had been forfeited by non-payment of premiums, As to damages for breach of covenants of procured by fraud, is void, and an offer of judg lease, see DAMAGES. ment for the amount of the money received as premiums at the time of renewal, with interest
A life insurance policy, containing a clause providing it shall be void if the answers made to questions by the insured in his application are found to be false in any respect, is wholly avoided by a false answer whether it be material or not. The Etna Life Ins. Co. v. France. 82
DENCE.
As to evidence in actions on lease, see EVI- and sts, after suit brought, is a sufficient ten- der to allow the company to disaffirm. Harris v. The Equitable Life Ass. Soc. of U. S. 156
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. See EVIDENCE.
LIENS.
As to lien of mortgagor under a mortgage on the income and earnings of a railroad, see EXE-
CUTION.
In such case neither the court nor the jury can inquire into the materiality of either the question or answer. Ib.
LIFE INSURANCE.
A wife insured the life of her husband, the amount payable to herself if living, if not, to their children. She died before her husband, and one of the children before him, leaving a
child.
A Court of Equity will reinstate the holder of a life insurance policy which has been forfeited by reason of non-payment of premiums, where payment of such premiums was impossible. Bird v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
Statements in the application for insurance in the declaration, or answers to the questions are As to leases by married women, see MARRIED either warranties or representations. If war-
WOMEN.
ranties, then materiality, or want of materiality as to the risk, has nothing to do with the con- tract. The only question is, were they untrue, and if so, the policy is void. But if representa- tions, then to avoid the policy, they must be substantially and materially untrue, or made for the purpose of fraud. Buell v. The Conn. Mu- tual Life Ins. Co. 161
83
It is not necessary that an applicant for life insurance should sign the application personal- ly; he may authorize any other person to sign for him. Stelwagen v. The Merchants Life Ins. Co.
125
Not stating in the application that the assured had applied to another company for insurance Ib. does not vitiate the policy.
Whether or not a disease is "serious" within the meaning of a life insurance policy is a ques- tion of fact for the jury. Boos v. The World Mu- tual Ins. Co.
211
An agreement to issue a policy of life insur- ance is good, although the premium was paid by note, and the note was not paid at maturity, where the policy contains no condition avoiding policy unless the note is paid. Shaw v. The Re- public Life Ins. Co.
212
Where the administrator of the deceased had received the policy, but it was not in reality de- livered by the agent until after the death of the assured, and in ignorance of that event, no re- covery can be had unless a valid contract of in- surance existed between the insurer and the in-
Where a bond is given by an agent, as a con- dition of his being retained as such agent, con- ditioned that he will pay over all moneys be- longing to the company which he may receive, the sureties on such bond are not exonerated by the fact that the agent made a further agreement at the same time, as required by the company, that all his commissions thereafter earned should be applied to his past indebtedness to the company, of which they were ignorant. Magee et al. v. The Manhattan Life Ins. Co. 418
The mere relation of principal and surety does not require the voluntary disclosure of all the material facts in all cases. Ib.
The prompt payment of premiums, or of in- terest annually in advance on premium note, where the policy by its terms requires such pay- ments, is a condition precedent to a recovery on the policy. Anderson et al. v. The St. Louis Mut. Life Ins, Co. 458 Dividends may be first credited on the princi-
MARINE INSURANCE.
Where a policy of marine insurance, by its terms, provides that the risk is to terminate at the place and at the time the voyage shall be stopped, in consequence of ice or the closing of navigation making a completion of the voyage impossible, and allows three days for a dis charge of the cargo, the insured has the right to make every effort to continue the voyage, after stoppage, to a proper place to discharge the cargo and lay up the boat for the winter, not- withstanding it is apparent it could not be fin- ished by reason of obstruction by ice. Sherwood 496 et al., exrs. v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co.
MARRIAGE.
As to effect of condition in restraint of, see WILL.
MARRIED WOMEN.
For goods purchased by a feme sole, she may be sued after marriage withont joining her hus- band. Helles et al. v. Rossele. 85
A married woman, living apart from her hus- band and having a separate property of her own, may be made liable for domestic work done for herself and children. Conlin v. Cantrell. 128
The rule may now be considered settled wher- ever the chancery jurisdiction exists, that a married woman is to be regarded as a femme sole in respect to her separate property; and that she may dispose of it as she pleases, unless her power of disposition is restricted or limited by the deed or will creating her interest. Smith v. Thompson et al. 141
Where the beneficiary in a trust deed is a married woman, and there is no restriction upon the mode in which she shall alienate the pro- perty, only that the trustee shall join in the deed, this limitation has no reference to a de- vise, and her testamentary capacity in regard to said property is complete. Ib.
By virtue of the act of Congress regulating the rights of property of married women, passed April 10, 1869, a married woman may dispose of her entire property, constituting her separate es- tate, whether such property was acquired before or after the passage of the act. Ib.
A married woman may deal through her hus- band as her agent, Crawford v. Everson et al. 168
In order to operate as a charge upon her se- parate estate, when the engagement of a femme Covert is made upon a consideration in which she or her estate has no direct interest, the intention to charge must be expressed in the contract which is the foundation of the charge. Gosman et al. v. Cruger et al.
329
A married woman who signs a lease not for the benefit of her separate estate or business, and not containing a clause expressly charging Eausta- her separate estate, incurs no liability. pere v. Ketchem et al. 377
is
As to when property of a married woman liable for debts of her husband, see Muirhead v. Aldridge. 480
Where a master has left the control of his business to an employee, reserving to himself no discretion, he is liable for the neglect er omission of duty of the one thus representing him. b.
As to charging separate estate, see NEGOTIA- BLE PAPER.
As to release of dower, see DOWER.
When an employee under a contract for pay- ment of money by installments for a term of service is discharged without cause, he can only recover for the amount that would have been due, had he continued in service, at the time the suit was instituted. Hamlin v. Race. 117
It is in general sufficient to make the master A married woman is incapable of making a liable that he gave his servant authority or contract except in regard to her separate proper-made it his duty to act in respect to the business ty, but in reference to that she is treated as a in which he was engaged when the wrong was femme sole; and if she gives a note, the law im- committed, and that the act complained of was plies, in the absence of proof to the contrary, done in the course of his employment. Ib. that she intends to bind her separate estate; but the intention must be manifested from the con- tract itself and cannot be shown by parol testi- mony. The Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor et al. 218
MASTER AND SERVANT.
A master is not liable to his servant for the negligence of a fellow servant who has not been negligently appointed. Malone, admrx., v. Hathaway, survivor 85
If, when discharged, he rescinds the contract, and then sues íor its breach, it may be that he can recover for all the damages he sustained during the term by the breac, if the trial was had after the expiration of the term. Ib.
There is no implied liability on the part of an employer to care for an employee injured in his service. Rostern v. Dodd. 239
A willful act which will exempt a master from liability for the tort of his servant, is in its legal sense malicious also. Rounds v. The D. L. & W. R. R. Co. 260
The master is not liable for the willful and malicious act of the servant. Ib.
Whether bringing materials upon the prem- Her contracts not for the benefit of her separises, and building a fence around the lot would ate estate are void. Ib. be sufficient to establish a lien, quære. Middle- town Savings Bank v. Fellowes. 19
The relation of master and servant exists be-
tween the proprietor of a theatre and a star per- former, and the former is liable for the negli gence of the latter, whereby a spectator is in- jured. Fox v. Dougherty.
261
Where the person who was the immediate cause of an accident is a contractor engaged in performing a special work, the relation of mas- ter and servant does not exist, and the party employing him is not liable, unless the work contracted for is unlawful, or where an officer or public body charged with a certain duty com- mits its performance to another. King v. The N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.
460
MECHANICS LIEN.
The work done having far exceeded the price agreed upon at the time of the taking of a mort gage, whether, if the builder's lien had had pre- cedence, it could have covered more than work agreed upon, quære. Ib.
A party furnishing a contractor materials, &c., is not bound to notify owner of property in order to get and enforce his lien. Wheeler v. Schofield.
35
Where building was to be completed in one year, party may extend time verbally and lien will hold 10.
MISTAKE.
An act done or a contract made under a mu- tual mistake or ignorance cf a material fact, is voidable and relievable in equity. In the matter of the application of Mary E. Jackson, an infant, for leave to sell her real estate.
17
Where in exchange of real estate on the basis of an appraised amount per foot, there is a mu- tual mistake in the amount conveyed by one to the other, the injured party is entitled to recover at the appraised rate for the deficiency. Church v. Steele.
52
The same can be recovered in an action of as sumpsit for lands sold. Ib.
MORTGAGE.
A mortgage given upon the acquisition of title has precedence of a mechanic's lien ac- quired by reason of labor on, and materials furnished to the premises under a contract with the mortgagor, who at the time the labor and materials were furnished had a contract for, but
no title to, the premises. Middletown Savings
Bank v Fellowes.
19
In Pennsylvania an equitable mortgage can- not be created by a deposit of title deeds, but a Court of Equity will not enforce their return until the party depositing them has complied with the agreement under which they are held, Sidney v. Stevenson 29
Where a will divides the whole of testator's property into certain portions, but was not pro- perly executed as a will of real estate, and the in the first instance to that to pay a mortgage heirs at law recover the realty, they must resort upon it, but any deficiency will be paid from the personalty. Rice, admr., v Harbeson et al.
49
An actual, visible and open possession of the premises by the owner of an unrecorded title, is necessary to avoid the lien of a subsequent mort- gage executed by the owner of record; an session will not take the case out of the opera- equivocal, occasional, special or temporary pos- tion of the registry laws. Brown v. Volkening et
al.
86
Where the defendant after commencement of
the action pays a mortgage but not the costs, and sets up such payment by answer, it cannot be stricken out as sham. Wetmore v- Gale et al. 408 Costs in such an action are discretionary, and it is not certain that the plaintiff would be al- lowed costs. Ib. An agreement made prior to the bond in suit, As to correction of mistake in conveyance, see although it refers to it, cannot control it. Smith v. Smith. 422
DEEDS.
formally satisfied and discharged, and the Where a valid, subsisting mortgage has been which embraces other amounts, and the latter amount thereof included in a new mortgage mortgage is declared invalid as being usurious, the former mortgage revives. Faterson v. Bird- sall et al.
222
And the mortgagee in the second having paid off the first, upon having his mortgage declared void for usury, is entitled to subrogation to the rights of the first mortgagee. Ib.
In order to avail himself of usury in a mort- gage, a party other than the mortgagor must assert an interest in the mortgaged premises. Hubbell v. Mansfield.
256
remove, or control the officers constituting such department. Barnes v. The District of Columbia. 201
Where the mortgagor sells portions of the mortgaged premises, they will, on foreclosure, be sold in the order of their alienation. Grant- ees will be protected only to the amount of pur- chase money paid by them. In such a case the release of one lot does not necessarily discharge the others. McDonald v. Whitney.
529
Where a life estate is left to a widow, with remainder to infants, she stands in a position of trust towards such infants. And where she sells a portion of the property (under a power in the will) for a very low price, and did not apply the proceeds on a mortgage on the property, but allowed it to be foreclosed, the decree of fore- closure is ineffectual to bar the equity of the infant remaindermen, who were defrauded thereby, and they can maintain an original ac- tion in equity to avoid it. McMurray et al. v. McMurray. 543
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tion may bind it by an ordinance or resolution, The authorized body of a municipal corpora- which, in favor of private persons interested therein, may, if so intended, opera e as a con- tract. Town of Moultrie v. The Rockingham Ten Cents Savings Bank. 271
The power to enact and enforce ordinances has always formed an essential feature in the cr ation of municipal corporations. The legis- lature may confer the power upon the Common Council, or any of the departments of the muni- cipal government. Cox v. The People.
283
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