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Fraud in executing lease will vitiate it al-
though party injured had friends present who
could read and who could examine lease. Ediek
v. Dake.

As to ejectment for non-payment of rent, see


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As to release of sureties on lease, see PRINCI-

Held, That a transmissible interest vested in
the children upon the issuing of the policy, and
that the child of the deceased child took by
descent the interest of its parent, and was en-
titled to the portion of the fund which the par-
ent would have received if living. Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer et al.

A renewal of a life insurance policy, which
had been forfeited by non-payment of premiums,
As to damages for breach of covenants of procured by fraud, is void, and an offer of judg
lease, see DAMAGES.
ment for the amount of the money received as
premiums at the time of renewal, with interest

A life insurance policy, containing a clause
providing it shall be void if the answers made
to questions by the insured in his application
are found to be false in any respect, is wholly
avoided by a false answer whether it be material
or not. The Etna Life Ins. Co. v. France. 82


As to evidence in actions on lease, see EVI- and sts, after suit brought, is a sufficient ten-
der to allow the company to disaffirm. Harris
v. The Equitable Life Ass. Soc. of U. S.



As to lien of mortgagor under a mortgage on
the income and earnings of a railroad, see EXE-


In such case neither the court nor the jury
can inquire into the materiality of either the
question or answer.


A wife insured the life of her husband, the
amount payable to herself if living, if not, to
their children. She died before her husband,
and one of the children before him, leaving a


A Court of Equity will reinstate the holder of
a life insurance policy which has been forfeited
by reason of non-payment of premiums, where
payment of such premiums was impossible.
Bird v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co.

Statements in the application for insurance in
the declaration, or answers to the questions are
As to leases by married women, see MARRIED either warranties or representations. If war-


ranties, then materiality, or want of materiality
as to the risk, has nothing to do with the con-
tract. The only question is, were they untrue,
and if so, the policy is void. But if representa-
tions, then to avoid the policy, they must be
substantially and materially untrue, or made
for the purpose of fraud. Buell v. The Conn. Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co.


It is not necessary that an applicant for life
insurance should sign the application personal-
ly; he may authorize any other person to sign
for him. Stelwagen v. The Merchants Life Ins. Co.


Not stating in the application that the assured
had applied to another company for insurance
does not vitiate the policy.

Whether or not a disease is "serious" within
the meaning of a life insurance policy is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. Boos v. The World Mu-
tual Ins. Co.


An agreement to issue a policy of life insur-
ance is good, although the premium was paid by
note, and the note was not paid at maturity,
where the policy contains no condition avoiding
policy unless the note is paid. Shaw v. The Re-
public Life Ins. Co.


Where the administrator of the deceased had
received the policy, but it was not in reality de-
livered by the agent until after the death of the
assured, and in ignorance of that event, no re-
covery can be had unless a valid contract of in-
surance existed between the insurer and the in-

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Where a bond is given by an agent, as a con-
dition of his being retained as such agent, con-
ditioned that he will pay over all moneys be-
longing to the company which he may receive,
the sureties on such bond are not exonerated by
the fact that the agent made a further agreement
at the same time, as required by the company,
that all his commissions thereafter earned
should be applied to his past indebtedness to the
company, of which they were ignorant. Magee
et al. v. The Manhattan Life Ins. Co.

The mere relation of principal and surety does
not require the voluntary disclosure of all the
material facts in all cases.

The prompt payment of premiums, or of in-
terest annually in advance on premium note,
where the policy by its terms requires such pay-
ments, is a condition precedent to a recovery on
the policy. Anderson et al. v. The St. Louis Mut.
Life Ins, Co.
Dividends may be first credited on the princi-

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Where a policy of marine insurance, by its
terms, provides that the risk is to terminate at
the place and at the time the voyage shall be
stopped, in consequence of ice or the closing of
navigation making a completion of the voyage
impossible, and allows three days for a dis
charge of the cargo, the insured has the right to
make every effort to continue the voyage, after
stoppage, to a proper place to discharge the
cargo and lay up the boat for the winter, not-
withstanding it is apparent it could not be fin-
ished by reason of obstruction by ice. Sherwood
et al., exrs. v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co.


As to effect of condition in restraint of, see


For goods purchased by a feme sole, she may
be sued after marriage withont joining her hus-
band. Helles et al. v. Rossele.

A married woman, living apart from her hus-
band and having a separate property of her own,
may be made liable for domestic work done for
herself and children. Conlin v. Cantrell. 128

The rule may now be considered settled wher-
ever the chancery jurisdiction exists, that a
married woman is to be regarded as a femme
sole in respect to her separate property; and
that she may dispose of it as she pleases, unless
her power of disposition is restricted or limited
by the deed or will creating her interest. Smith
v. Thompson et al.

Where the beneficiary in a trust deed is a
married woman, and there is no restriction upon
the mode in which she shall alienate the pro-
perty, only that the trustee shall join in the
deed, this limitation has no reference to a de-
vise, and her testamentary capacity in regard to
said property is complete.

By virtue of the act of Congress regulating the
rights of property of married women, passed
April 10, 1869, a married woman may dispose of
her entire property, constituting her separate es-
tate, whether such property was acquired before
or after the passage of the act.

A married woman may deal through her hus-
band as her agent, Crawford v. Everson et al. 168

In order to operate as a charge upon her se-
parate estate, when the engagement of a femme
Covert is made upon a consideration in which she
or her estate has no direct interest, the intention
to charge must be expressed in the contract
which is the foundation of the charge. Gosman
et al. v. Cruger et al.


A married woman who signs a lease not for
the benefit of her separate estate or business,
and not containing a clause expressly charging
her separate estate, incurs no liability.
pere v. Ketchem et al.


As to when property of a married woman
liable for debts of her husband, see Muirhead v.

Where a master has left the control of his
business to an employee, reserving to himself
no discretion, he is liable for the neglect er
omission of duty of the one thus representing

As to charging separate estate, see NEGOTIA-

As to release of dower, see DOWER.

When an employee under a contract for pay-
ment of money by installments for a term of
service is discharged without cause, he can only
recover for the amount that would have been
due, had he continued in service, at the time the
suit was instituted. Hamlin v. Race.

It is in general sufficient to make the master
A married woman is incapable of making a liable that he gave his servant authority or
contract except in regard to her separate proper-made it his duty to act in respect to the business
ty, but in reference to that she is treated as a in which he was engaged when the wrong was
femme sole; and if she gives a note, the law im- committed, and that the act complained of was
plies, in the absence of proof to the contrary, done in the course of his employment. Ib.
that she intends to bind her separate estate; but
the intention must be manifested from the con-
tract itself and cannot be shown by parol testi-
mony. The Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor et al.


A master is not liable to his servant for the
negligence of a fellow servant who has not
been negligently appointed. Malone, admrx., v.
Hathaway, survivor

If, when discharged, he rescinds the contract,
and then sues íor its breach, it may be that he
can recover for all the damages he sustained
during the term by the breac, if the trial was
had after the expiration of the term.

There is no implied liability on the part of an
employer to care for an employee injured in his
service. Rostern v. Dodd.

A willful act which will exempt a master
from liability for the tort of his servant, is in
its legal sense malicious also. Rounds v. The D.
L. & W. R. R. Co.

The master is not liable for the willful and
malicious act of the servant.

Whether bringing materials upon the prem-
Her contracts not for the benefit of her separises, and building a fence around the lot would
ate estate are void.
Ib. be sufficient to establish a lien, quære. Middle-
town Savings Bank v. Fellowes.

The relation of master and servant exists be-

tween the proprietor of a theatre and a star per-
former, and the former is liable for the negli
gence of the latter, whereby a spectator is in-
jured. Fox v. Dougherty.


Where the person who was the immediate
cause of an accident is a contractor engaged in
performing a special work, the relation of mas-
ter and servant does not exist, and the party
employing him is not liable, unless the work
contracted for is unlawful, or where an officer
or public body charged with a certain duty com-
mits its performance to another. King v. The
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.



The work done having far exceeded the price
agreed upon at the time of the taking of a mort
gage, whether, if the builder's lien had had pre-
cedence, it could have covered more than work
agreed upon, quære.

A party furnishing a contractor materials,
&c., is not bound to notify owner of property in
order to get and enforce his lien. Wheeler v.


Where building was to be completed in one
year, party may extend time verbally and lien
will hold

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An act done or a contract made under a mu-
tual mistake or ignorance cf a material fact, is
voidable and relievable in equity. In the matter
of the application of Mary E. Jackson, an infant,
for leave to sell her real estate.


Where in exchange of real estate on the basis
of an appraised amount per foot, there is a mu-
tual mistake in the amount conveyed by one to
the other, the injured party is entitled to recover
at the appraised rate for the deficiency. Church
v. Steele.


The same can be recovered in an action of as
sumpsit for lands sold.


A mortgage given upon the acquisition of
title has precedence of a mechanic's lien ac-
quired by reason of labor on, and materials
furnished to the premises under a contract with
the mortgagor, who at the time the labor and
materials were furnished had a contract for, but

no title to, the premises. Middletown Savings

Bank v Fellowes.


In Pennsylvania an equitable mortgage can-
not be created by a deposit of title deeds, but a
Court of Equity will not enforce their return
until the party depositing them has complied
with the agreement under which they are held,
Sidney v. Stevenson

Where a will divides the whole of testator's
property into certain portions, but was not pro-
perly executed as a will of real estate, and the
in the first instance to that to pay a mortgage
heirs at law recover the realty, they must resort
upon it, but any deficiency will be paid from the
personalty. Rice, admr., v Harbeson et al.


An actual, visible and open possession of the
premises by the owner of an unrecorded title, is
necessary to avoid the lien of a subsequent mort-
gage executed by the owner of record; an
session will not take the case out of the opera-
equivocal, occasional, special or temporary pos-
tion of the registry laws. Brown v. Volkening et



Where the defendant after commencement of

the action pays a mortgage but not the costs,
and sets up such payment by answer, it cannot
be stricken out as sham. Wetmore v- Gale et
Costs in such an action are discretionary, and
it is not certain that the plaintiff would be al-
lowed costs.
An agreement made prior to the bond in suit,
As to correction of mistake in conveyance, see although it refers to it, cannot control it. Smith
v. Smith.


formally satisfied and discharged, and the
Where a valid, subsisting mortgage has been
which embraces other amounts, and the latter
amount thereof included in a new mortgage
mortgage is declared invalid as being usurious,
the former mortgage revives. Faterson v. Bird-
sall et al.


And the mortgagee in the second having paid
off the first, upon having his mortgage declared
void for usury, is entitled to subrogation to the
rights of the first mortgagee.

In order to avail himself of usury in a mort-
gage, a party other than the mortgagor must
assert an interest in the mortgaged premises.
Hubbell v. Mansfield.


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remove, or control the officers constituting such
department. Barnes v. The District of Columbia.

Where the mortgagor sells portions of the
mortgaged premises, they will, on foreclosure,
be sold in the order of their alienation. Grant-
ees will be protected only to the amount of pur-
chase money paid by them. In such a case the
release of one lot does not necessarily discharge
the others. McDonald v. Whitney.


Where a life estate is left to a widow, with
remainder to infants, she stands in a position of
trust towards such infants. And where she sells
a portion of the property (under a power in the
will) for a very low price, and did not apply the
proceeds on a mortgage on the property, but
allowed it to be foreclosed, the decree of fore-
closure is ineffectual to bar the equity of the
infant remaindermen, who were
thereby, and they can maintain an original ac-
tion in equity to avoid it. McMurray et al. v.

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tion may bind it by an ordinance or resolution,
The authorized body of a municipal corpora-
which, in favor of private persons interested
therein, may, if so intended, opera e as a con-
tract. Town of Moultrie v. The Rockingham Ten
Cents Savings Bank.

The power to enact and enforce ordinances
has always formed an essential feature in the
cr ation of municipal corporations. The legis-
lature may confer the power upon the Common
Council, or any of the departments of the muni-
cipal government. Cox v. The People.


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