The

There is a well-known ancient example of a retortible dilemma mentioned by Aulus Gellius, and generally quoted by logicians, which may be added:-'Euathlus, a rich young man, desirous of learning the art of pleading, applied to Protagoras, a celebrated sophist, to instruct him, promising a great sum of money as his reward, one-half of which was paid down, the other half he bound himself to pay as soon as he should plead a cause before the judges and gain it. Protagoras found him a very apt scholar; but after he had made good progress, he was in no haste to plead causes. master, conceiving that he intended, by these means, to shift off his second payment, took, as he thought, a sure method of getting the better of his delay. He sued Euathlus before the judges; and, having opened his cause at the bar, he pleaded to this purpose:— "O most foolish young man, do you not see that, in any event, I must gain my point? for, if the judges give sentence for me, you must pay by their sentence; if against me, the condition of our agreement is fulfilled, and you have no plea left for your delay, after having pleaded and gained a cause. To which Euathlus answered, "O most wise master, I might have avoided the force of your argument by not pleading my own cause. But, giving up this advantage, do you not see that, whatever sentence the judges pass, I am safe? If they give sentence for me, I am acquitted by their sentence; if against me, the condition of our agreement is not fulfilled by my pleading a cause and losing it.”” The dilemma, as used by Protagoras, may be thus stated:Either the cause will go on my side, or on yours.

If the cause goes on my side, you must pay me according to the sentence of the judge; if the cause goes on your side, you must pay me according to your bargain.

Therefore, whether the cause goes for me or against me, you must pay me the reward.

Euathlus retorted the dilemma thus:

Either I shall gain the cause, or lose it.

If I gain the cause, then nothing will be due to you, according to the sentence of the judge; but if I lose the cause, nothing will be due to you, according to my bargain.

Therefore, whether I gain or lose the cause, I will not pay you, for nothing will be due to you.a

SECTION VI.

OF THE ENTHYMEME.b

A very prevalent error, regarding the nature of the enthymeme, is, that it is a syllogism with one premiss suppressed,

a This story is by the Greek authors generally told of the Rhetorician Corax (crow) and his pupil Tisias. The puzzled judges, in lieu of a decision in the case, angrily pronounced of plaintiff and defendent-Κακου κορακος κακον wov (plaguy egg of a plaguy crow!) Hence the proverb.-Sir W. Hamilton Reid's Works, p. 704.

The dilemma of Bias, viz.-Si uxorem ducas formosam, habebis communem, se deformem, pænam : ergo Nulla est ducenda-like many other examples, may be shown to be false, from not enumerating all the possible suppositions; for as Aldrich observes, 'est quædam media pulchritudo,—(there is a certain intermediate degree of beauty,) or it may be shown to be retortible; thus:

Si formosam duxero, non habebo pænam: si deformem, non habebo com

munem.

The usual view of the enthymeme, though of a remote date, is not Aristotelic. The Stagirite, as mentioned in the text, distinguishes the enthymeme from the pure syllogism by considering it as a reasoning of a peculiar matter, a reasoning proceeding on signs or likelihoods, συλλογισμος (ατελης) εξ εικοτων η onμerwy. The term areλns (imperfect), usually introduced into this definition, and on which the common view of the enthymeme mainly rests, has been ejected as spurious, on the most satisfactory authority. The supposition, also, that the word ενθυμημα, from being compounded of ev and θυμος, which, in an etymological point of view, is certainly correct, has tended much to confirm the general misapprehension. In the language of Aristotle, Ouros is not the mind; neither does he use the word evovunua as having anything to do either with expressed or suppressed premisses. Other writers also used

or, as it is often termed, an imperfect or defective syllogism. In Aristotle's writings, it never means this. The term imperfect is not applied by him to an argument with a suppressed premiss, but to a syllogism drawn in the second or third figure, the truth of which is not directly evident by the dictum de omni et de nullo.

a

An enthymeme, in its proper signification, may be as complete in its expression as any other kind of syllogism; for it merely differs from the syllogism in this, that its conclusion depends on signs and likelihoods. Its province is mainly probable reasoning, and therefore treats reasoning as applied to a particular kind of matter. It does not proceed upon axioms, like the syllogism. The matter of the major premiss of an enthymeme is taken from the TOT (topics or common places), and these hold the same place in regard to the enthymeme, which the axioms do to the syllogism. The TOTO, or common places, are general principles, based on

the word, but without any technical significance. The following passages from Sophocles may suffice in proof of this:

ταρβείν μεν ω γεραιε τανθυμηματα πολλη σε αναγκη ταπο σου. -Ed. Col. 292. (Much and forcible reason is there to be awed by the sentiments uttered by thee, old man.)

εχεις γαρ ουχι βαια τανθυμηματα των σων αδερκτων ομματων TnTwμεvos.—Ibid, 1199. (For you bear no slight impressions of this, being deprived of your sightless eyes.)

It would appear from these passages, that the word ɛvdvunua originally meant something present to the mind for consideration or reflection; and the transition from this, as Mr Mansel observes, to an argument of probability—a suggestion, though not demonstrative, yet deserving attention in practical questions-is easy and natural enough. On this point the learner may advantageously consult Ed. Rev., vol. lvii., p. 221; Mansel, app. p. 40, et seq.

a

Εικοτα-Σημεια-Τεκμηριον. 'An argument which alleges some antecedent, is called by Aristotle an exos; and that which alleges some consequent, a σημείον. If it alleges a consequent which could not have been produced by any other cause but the supposed one, the argument is a rexμngiov, or positive proof. For instance, if it is to be proved that A murdered B, any former grudge of A's against B would be an exos, or predisposing cause which might have produced the act; and any sudden enrichment of B just about the time of the murder, would be a onerov, or probable effect of the action.'-Moberly, p. 166.

probabilities, not on axioms; and the term roos, in this application, may be explained by naming it the place where middle terms are found. But since enthymemes derive their force only from cumulation, there is nothing gained from reducing them to syllogistic form.

The foregoing is a brief statement of the nature of the Aristotelian enthymeme, and is merely given to guard the learner against a prevalent, though erroneous notion. The common view, however, whether the result of misapprehension or of intentional innovation, has been too long countenanced by almost all writers on logic to be readily rejected. It is a question, indeed, how far the rejection of the common view is desirable, if we consider how much it conduces to logical expertness. In ordinary argumentation, syllogisms invariably occur in an abbreviated form, for the entire statement of premisses and conclusion would appear pedantic and artificial; and in connection with the word enthymeme, in its ordinary acceptation, it may not be out of place to lay before the learner the rules by which he may ascertain the particular figure in which any enthymeme may be drawn.b

An enthymeme, as commonly defined, is an irregular syllogism in which one of the premisses is suppressed, or, as it might be, more properly defined—an argument in the form in

a Quum pervestigare aliquod volumus locos nosse debemus: sic enim appellatæ sunt hæ quasi sedes e quibus argumenta promuntur. Itaque licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem; argumentum autem, rationem, quæ rei dubiæ faciat fidem; Cic. Top. cap. 2.-(When we wish to trace out any argument, we ought to know the places, for, on this account, they have been named by Aristotle the seats, as it were, whence arguments are adduced. Therefore, we may define a place to be the seat of an argument, but an argument the reason or cause which confirms something doubtful.) The word argument is used here as synonymous with the middle term.

b In the formal view of logic, the enthymeme cannot be considered as syllogistic, for our belief in its conclusiveness must arise from our knowledge of the object-matter, and without this knowledge we could not supply the suppressed premiss either actually or mentally.

which it would naturally occur in thought or speech. It consequently consists of only the expressed premiss and the conclusion. These are designated the antecedent and consequent, the latter being the conclusion of the syllogism, and the former either the major or minor premiss.

Although the enthymeme, as ordinarily understood, is a defective syllogism, consisting of only one premiss and the conclusion, it always implies a syllogism, and expresses its

terms.

If the syllogism implied in an enthymeme be a simple one, it will be easy to discover which of the premisses has been suppressed, by observing which of the extremes occurs in it; because one or other of the extremes must occur in each premiss, and from this we ascertain which of the premisses the antecedent is, and how the syllogism is to be completed.

One of the terms (viz. one of the extremes of the question) always occurs twice, and when this term is the subject of the consequent, the major premiss is suppressed; but if the term twice occurring be the predicate of the consequent, the minor premiss is suppressed. The suppressed premiss is supplied by comparing with the middle term the extreme which occurs only once.a

In the greater number of enthymemes the minor is expressed as being more particularly related to the question to he proved, and also as being more likely to be called in question than the major. The major, as already stated, is usually

Although the major premiss is generally suppressed in most enthymemes, yet there are some enthymemes in which the minor premiss is found to be omitted. This may happen when the minor premiss is very evident, or when much stress is meant to be laid upon the major, e. g.—' Every tyrannical king deserves to be deposed by his subjects; therefore, Nero deserved to be deposed by the Romans.' The minor premiss which is suppressed may be thus supplied

'Nero was a tyrannical king;'

and thus the argument is reduced to regular syllogistic form.-Huyshe, p. 129.