of a more general character than the minor, containing a truth better known, and consequently less liable to objection or contradiction.

In order to show in what figure an enthymeme is drawn, the following rules have been laid down; and by attending to these, in connection with the special rules of syllogisms, the figure of an enthymeme may be readily ascertained.

RULE I.

When the antecedent and consequent have a common subject, the enthymeme is drawn either in the first or second figure, and the major premiss is suppressed.

Here three things are to be noted.

1. That it is only in the first and second figures that the minor proposition and conclusion can have a common subject. 2. That if the minor is negative, the enthymeme is not drawn in the first figure.

3. That if the conclusion is affirmative, the enthymeme is not drawn in the second figure.

In the following enthymeme, viz. :—

Isaiah was a true prophet; therefore,
Isaiah was inspired,

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the antecedent and consequent have a common subject, viz. 'Isaiah.' The other terms are 'prophet,' the predicate of the antecedent, and inspired' the predicate of the consequent; but since a syllogism can only have three terms, and as the middle term does not appear in the conclusion, the term 'prophet' must be the middle term; and by comparing it distributed with the major term 'inspired,' we supply the suppressed premiss, and have a syllogism in Barbara of the first figure. Thus,

All true prophets are inspired.
Isaiah was a true prophet.

Isaiah was inspired.

The following enthymeme, viz.:

'No guilty pleasures are unattended with remorse, therefore no guilty pleasures are truly satisfactory,'

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is drawn in the second figure. The consequent and the antecedent have a common subject, viz. 'No guilty pleasures;' the other terms being truly satisfactory,' and 'unattended with remorse,' which latter term must be the middle, as it does not appear in the conclusion; and by comparing it with the major term truly satisfactory,' we supply the suppressed premiss, and have a complete syllogism in Camestres of the second figure. Thus,

Whatever is truly satisfactory is unattended with remorse.
No guilty pleasures are unattended with remorse.
No guilty pleasures are truly satisfactory.

RULE II.

When the antecedent and consequent have a common predicate, the enthymeme is drawn either in the first or third figure, and the minor is suppressed.

It must be noted here,

1. That it is only in the first and third figures that the major proposition and conclusion can have a common predicate. 2. That if the conclusion is universal, the enthymeme is not drawn in the third figure.

In the following example, viz. :

Nothing difficult of attainment is within reach of the indolent; therefore, useful knowledge is not within reach of the indolent,

the antecedent and consequent have a common predicate, viz. 'within reach of the indolent;' and, as the only other term which does not appear in the conclusion is 'nothing difficult of attainment,' this must be the middle term; and by comparing it with the subject of the conclusion, viz.

useful knowledge,'

we supply the minor premiss, and have a complete syllogism in Celarent of the first figure. Thus,

Nothing difficult of attainment is within reach of the indolent.

All useful knowledge is difficult of attainment; therefore, Useful knowledge is not within reach of the indolent.

The following enthymeme, viz. :

All who believe in dreams, must be ignorant of the effects produced by external objects on the body in sleep; therefore, some ancient poets must have been ignorant of the effects produced by external objects on the body in sleep,

is in the third figure; and by comparing the subject of the consequent or minor term, viz., 'some ancient poets,' with the middle term, believe in dreams,' we supply the minor premiss, and have a regular syllogism in Datisi. Thus,

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All who believe in dreams must be ignorant of the effects produced by external objects on the body in sleep.

Some who believed in dreams were ancient poets.

Some ancient poets must have been ignorant of the effects produced by external objects on the body in sleep.

RULE III.

When the subject of the antecedent is the predicate of the consequent, the enthymeme is drawn either in the second or fourth figure, and the minor is suppressed.

It must be observed here,

That it is only in the second and fourth figures that the subject of the major proposition can be the predicate of the conclusion.

An enthymeme is frequently an abbreviation of a conditional or disjunctive syllogism, and in either of these cases it presents four different terms, neither of which occurs twice. But as the consequent, in such circumstances, depends alto

gether on the suppressed premiss, that premiss must be either a conditional or disjunctive major proposition, e. g.– 'The objects in nature are not self-existent. Therefore, they were created by a self-existent being.' This example, on examination, will prove to be a conditional syllogism in an abbreviated form, and may be expanded thus,—

If the objects in nature are not self-existent, they were created by a self-existent being.

But the objects in nature are not self-existent; therefore, They were created by a self-existent being.

SECTION VII.

OF THE EPICHEIREMA.

An Epicheiremaa is a syllogism, with a prosyllogism appended either to the major or minor premiss, or to both. The prosyllogism is incidentally introduced, with the view of proving one or other of the premisses of the argument laid down. It forms the expressed premiss of an enthymeme, of which the premiss to which it is appended is the conclusion, e. g.

All sin is dangerous.

Covetousness is sin, (for it is a transgression of the law;) therefore,

Covetousness is dangerous.

The minor premiss, viz.—

Covetousness is a transgression of the law; therefore, it is sinis an enthymeme.

The following example of an epicheirema is a syllogistic condensation of Mr Payne's refutation of Dr Brown's theory on the nafure of virtue. In answer to the questions, What

a A syllogism with such a premiss is so called from exigew, I undertake to prove.

is virtue? How do our feelings of moral approbation arise? Dr Brown states that virtue is a relation, and that relations do not exist in the objects, but in the mind that contemplates them—that there is no virtue in actions-nothing that is in one action which does not exist in another, to excite the emotion of moral approbation—that virtue is a felt relation to certain emotions, and nothing more-that the mind might have been formed capable of approving what it now disapproves ; and in this case vice would not only seem virtue, but would really be virtue, as both depend on the arbitrary constitution of the mind.

Mr Payne's refutation may be epicheirematically stated thus

Whatever theory maintains that virtue has no character of itself, but depends on the arbitrary constitution of the mind, must be false; (for it supplies us with no adequate cause for the rise of the emotion of approbation; for it proceeds on a practical forgetfulness of the distinction which exists between what is and what ought to be; for it implies that the most flagitious actions may, upon a change of opinion, not only lose all their turpitude, but become positively virtuous; for it implies that we do not approve of an action, because it is right, but that the action becomes right, because we approve of it.)

But Dr Brown's theory maintains that virtue has no character of itself, but depends on the arbitrary constitution of the mind; therefore,

Dr Brown's theory must be false.

The prosyllogistic proofs may be stated in separate syllogisms; thus

Every theory on virtue that supplies us with no adequate cause for the rise of the emotion of moral approbation must be false.

Every theory on virtue maintaining that it has no character of itself, but depends on the arbitrary constitution