of the mind, supplies us with no adequate cause for the rise of the motion of moral approbation; therefore,

Every theory on virtue maintaining that it has no character itself, but depends on the arbitrary constitution

of the mind, must be false.

The learner may easily throw the remaining prosyllogistic proofs into syllogisms.

The following examples may be subjoined for exercise. One of the best and most frequently quoted examples, is Cicero's defence of Milo. It is as follows:

He who attempts to assassinate another, may be justly killed by the object of his murderous intentions; (for the laws of nature, and of nations, and the conduct of good men, prove it lawful.)

But Clodius attempted to assassinate another; (for he formed an ambuscade against him, and provided himself with armed soldiers ;) therefore,

Clodius was justly killed, by the object of his murderous

intentions.

Studies which regulate the conduct of the mind are of the utmost importance; (for it is the mind which directs all our actions.)

Logic is a study which regulates the conduct of the mind; (for it is wholly employed about its operations ;) therefore, Logic is a study of the utmost importance.

This form of reasoning is often employed efficaciously; but every superfluous proof should be omitted. In many examples, the proof of the minor is of little use; yet, whenever the auxiliary propositions are employed to strengthen either the agreement or repugnancy of the extremes in the conclusion, they are used with effect.

SECTION VIII.

OF THE SORITES.

The sorites is so named from owgos, a heap. It consists of a series of propositions so arranged, that the predicate of each becomes the subject of the next, till at length, in the ultimate conclusion, the predicate of the last proposition is affirmed or denied, as the case may be, of the first subject in the series. In a sorites there are as many middle terms as there are intermediate propositions between the first and last, the subject of each intermediate proposition being a middle term. sorites may, therefore, be drawn out into as many separate syllogisms as there are intermediate propositions, since each intermediate proposition contains a middle term.

In this kind of syllogism the mind proceeds from link to link in the chain of reasoning, without drawing separate conclusions, as for instance,

A is B,

B is C,

C is D,

D is E,

Therefore A is E,

but for these abstract symbols let us substitute an example.

a

The term sorites implies that the propositions are piled, as it were, one on another. The German term (kettenschluss), meaning chain-argument, is more appropriate, as it denotes the mind's progress in linking one judgment to another in a process of argumentation.

b A sorites has as many middle terms as there are propositions, less by two, for there are exactly as many different terms as propositions, but two of these terms are extremes. It hence also appears that if a sorites be resolved into syllogisms, those syllogisms will be two less than the propositions of the sorites, since there will be as many syllogisms as there are middle terms. However, the number of syllogisms may be better determined thus; if but one proposition of the sorites were employed in each syllogism, there would be as many syllogisms as propositions; but in the first and last syllogism there are, respectively, two propositions of the sorites used, and for each of the intervening syllogisms but one proposition.- Walker.

All who truly love wisdom earnestly desire it;

All who earnestly desire wisdom use the means of attaining it;

All who use the means of attaining it encounter difficulties; All encountering difficulties are patient, persevering, and self-denied ;

All who are patient, persevering, and self-denied, are virtuous;

Therefore, all who truly love wisdom are virtuous.

be

The separate syllogisms into which a sorites may expanded may be all of the first figure, and as the design of forming them is to bring the minor extreme, or first term, into connection with all the other terms, the following arrangement is followed. The first syllogism in the series has for its major premiss the second proposition in the sorites, and for its minor premiss the first proposition; while the conclusion connects the minor extreme with the second middle term, thus

All who earnestly desire wisdom use the means of attaining it;

All who truly love wisdom earnestly desire it;

All who truly love wisdom use the means of attaining it.

In the second syllogism, the major premiss is the third proposition in the sorites, and the minor the conclusion of the first syllogism, thus—

All who use the means of attaining wisdom encounter difficulties;

All who truly love wisdom use the means of attaining it. All who truly love wisdom encounter difficulties.

The same order is followed in the remaining syllogismsthe succeeding proposition becoming the major, and the conclusion of the preceding syllogism the minor of each. The series ends when the first term in the sorites, or the minor

extreme, is connected, or compared with the last predicate, or major extreme, as follows :-

All who encounter difficulties are patient, persevering, and self-denied.

All who truly love wisdom encounter difficulties.

All who truly love wisdom are patient, persevering, and self-denied.

All who are patient, persevering, and self-denied, are virtuous. All who truly love wisdom are patient, persevering, and self-denied.

All who truly love wisdom are virtuous.

The true force of the argument in a sorites is to be deduced, not from the resolution of it into syllogisms, but from the consideration that something is universally affirmed or denied in the last premiss of a term, in which the preceding premisses show that the first subject is contained; and therefore, in the conclusion, the same is legitimately affirmed or denied of the first subject, in the same quantity which it has in the first premiss.

It has been stated above, that in expanding a sorites into separate syllogisms, the first in the series has for its major premiss the second proposition in the sorites, and the first proposition for its minor. This transposition is required, in order that the separate syllogisms may be in the first figure, and consequently brought under the dictum which applies to that figure. Thus all the syllogisms will be in the first figure, and all except the last will be in the moods AAA or AAI, in the latter, if the first premiss of the sorites be particular. On examining the two first propositions in the foregoing sorites, it will be seen that the middle term is the predicate of the major and the subject of the minor; hence were a conclusion to be drawn without a transposition of the premisses, the syllogism would be in Bramantip of the fourth figure; thus—

All who truly love wisdom earnestly desire it.

All who earnestly desire wisdom use the means of attaining it. Some who use the means of attaining it truly love wisdom.

It has also been stated, that in the second syllogism of an expanded sorites, the major premiss is the third proposition in the series, and the minor the conclusion of the first separate syllogism. And it may be mentioned, in explanation of this, that as the two first propositions in the sorites have been made use of in the first separate syllogism, in drawing the second syllogism, the third proposition in the sorites, used as a major premiss, with the conclusion of the first separate syllogism used as a minor, will give a conclusion in Barbara of the first figure. The process consequently to be followed, in expanding a sorites into separate syllogisms, is to begin with transposing the two first propositions in the soritical series, in order to give the middle term its proper place in the premisses of a syllogism drawn in the first figure; and, in the second, to use the third proposition in the sorites as a major, with the conclusion of the first separate syllogism as a minor. This latter process is equally necessary as the first, in order to bring all the separate syllogisms under the principles which regulate the first figure.

With reference to a categorical sorites, such as given above, it may be remarked—

1. That no proposition of a sorites except the last can be negative.

2. That no proposition of a sorites can be particular except the first. And

3. That if the first proposition be particular, the conclusion must be particular.

In explanation of the first of these rules, viz., that no proposition except the last can be negative, it may be stated that when a sorites is expanded into separate syllogisms, the last syllogism can alone admit of a negative premiss and con