To some one of these heads we may refer every term, according as may best suit our purpose, for the subject under discussion.

Substance (answering to the question, 'Quid est?') considered without reference to inhering qualities, has been defined quod sub se stat, i. e., which supports itself, or which, in the mode of its existence, is independent of everything else. With reference to inhering qualities, it has been defined ens per se subsistens et substans accidentibus, i. e., an entity having independent existence and supporting qualities. The substance is the ens, the self-existing thing; the accidens is the ens entis, which may be freely rendered the mode, quality, or accident of the self-existing entity.

Substance is divided into first and second substances. Individual things are first substances; as, Socrates, Bucephalus, this castle, that tree; second substances are denoted

a The words substance, entity, being, are each of them less or more ambiguous in their signification. Of substance, in its philosophical sense, we have no direct knowledge; we only know it indirectly or through attributes, but when in a familiar language we use the word substance, we are supposed to mean by it some really existing object or thing cognizable by the senses. Entity and being are in their strict meaning synonymous, being both immediately connected with a verb which simply denotes mere existence. 'Being' is, however, commonly used as a synonym for substance, with this difference, that being is applied equally to mind and matter, while substance rather suggests the idea of matter only. Being and entity should be understood as implying mere abstract existence, and never separate existence, as cognizable by the senses.

by common or general terms, which merely denote creations of the mind; as, man, animal, body. This category includes whatever constitutes the very being of things, and of which all objects of thought are modifications; substances are divided into self-existent and dependent, material and immaterial, &c.

Quantity. The answers to the questions, How great? How many ? How long in time? &c., fall under this category. It includes all things capable of being measured or numbered. Quantity is divided into continuous and discrete. Continuous quantity is that whose parts are united by some common boundary, such as magnitude, or the modifications of extension, having permanent continuity; and time and motion having successive continuity. Discrete quantity is that whose parts have no continuity, such as number, to which sound and speech are sometimes added.

Quality, (answering to the question 'Quale?') includes the properties which principally distinguish or characterise objects. It is divided into natural or innate powers and properties, as the mental faculties and the capabilities of objects; acquirements, such as learning, virtue; sensible qualities, such as sounds and colours, and forms or figures, with all their modifications.

Relation includes all the circumstances about objects which imply a connection with others, in considering which we may observe both the principle of the relations, and the things related, called correlatives, e. g., the consideration of master implies servant, and of pastor, flock, &c.

Place (answering to the question Ubi?) includes all the modifications of space, and the more general relations of objects to space.

Time (answering to the question Quando?) as to-morrow, yesterday, in the year of the building of Rome; but time implied by the question quando, must not be confounded with the time denoted by the question quam diu; the latter is

continuous time; as, a month, a year, and belongs to the second category.

Posture includes chiefly the relations of objects to one another as occupying space, such as the relations of the constituent parts of objects, the relations of parts to the whole, and the relations of entire objects to one another in their attributes, combinations, &c.

Habit expresses what anything has; as, to be clothed, to wear shoes, has a ring, &c. It should be noted, however, that 'clothes,' 'shoes,' &c., do not of themselves imply habit; this is only predicable of them when possessed.

Action includes all the varieties of causes, or all the ways in which objects may produce changes in others.

Passion includes whatever implies the notion of suffering, and all the varieties of effects, or the ways in which objects may undergo changes.

Various objections have from time to time been made to the Aristotelic enumeration of the categories, and probably upon satisfactory grounds; it is questionable, however, whether a more satisfactory classification has yet appeared. The Aristotelic categories are adopted here, as deduced and simplified by Sir W. Hamilton: 'They' (the ten categories) 'are all divisions of being,―ens. Being is divided into ens per se, and ens per accidens. Ens per se corresponds to substance, the first of the Aristotelic categories. Ens per accidens comprises the other nine; for it either denotes something absolute or something relative. If something absolute, it either originates in the matter of the substance, and is divisible-quantity, Aristotle's second category; or in the form, and is indivisible-quality, Aristotle's third category. If something relative, it constitutes relation, the fourth category; and to relation the other six may easily be reduced. For the fifth, where, denotes the relation between different objects in space, or the relation between place and the thing placed. The sixth, when, denotes the relation between objects in succession, or the relation between time

and a thing in time. The seventh, posture, is the relation of the parts of a body to each other. The eighth, having, is the relation of the thing having and the thing had, while the ninth and tenth, action and passion, are the reciprocal relations between the agent and the patient. There are on this scheme one supreme category-being; two at the first descent, ens per se, ens per accidens, four at the first and second, substance, quantity, quality, relation, and to the dignity of category these four are, of Aristotle's ten, pre-eminently, if not exclusively, entitled.' Locke has reduced all things to three classes, viz., substances, modes, and relations.

Hume classifies all things under the two categories of ideas and impressions.

Kant's list amounts to twelve, viz., unity, plurality, totality, affirmation, negation, limitation, independence, dependence, interdependence, actuality, possibility, and necessity.

Mr Mill's categories are four in number, viz., 1. Feelings, or states of cousciousness; 2. Minds which experience these feelings; 3. Bodies or external objects which excite certain of these feelings, together with powers or properties whereby they excite them; and, 4. The successions and co-existences, the likenesses and unlikenesses, between feelings and states of consciousness.

The author of the Outline of the Laws of Thought' proposes the following scheme :- Conceivable things,' he says, 6 are substance and attribute.' He subdivides attribute into quantity, quality, relation, and relation into that of time, of space, of causation, of composition, of agreement and repugnance, of polar opposition, of finite to infinite.

'Most of these names,' he remarks, 'will be easily understood: the relation of polar opposition may not be so. We find that, in different parts of the field of knowledge, pairs of things unite and form a new whole different from either of them.' He gives, as examples, the doctrine of the Mean in morals; in chemistry, the neutral salts, &c.

A facetious mathematician, of the last age, was of opinion that all the predicaments of the peripatetics might be substituted by these two, viz., data and quæsita."

SECTION V.

DIVISION.b

Division literally signifies the separation of the component parts of some really existing whole, as when we divide a tree into its several parts; as, root, trunk, branches, &c.

In a division of this nature, each of the parts is strictly and properly a 'part,' and is really less than the whole; for it cannot be affirmed of any part separately, that it is a 'tree.' A whole of this description is said to be a real or physical whole. It follows that physical division can only be applied to individuals.

As recognised in logic, division is used in a figurative sense, and means the distinct, i. e., the separate enumeration of the several things signified by a common term.o It is therefore on common terms only, as denoting classes, that logical division can operate. A whole of this kind is said to be an ideal or metaphysical whole.

If we consider the common term tree as a genus, and proceed to divide it, the word 'division' will be used in its

a It is still an open question whether the categories ought to be referred to metaphysics, logic, or grammar. The weight of opinion is, however, in favour of their being considered a metaphysical distribution.

b Boethius is the chief authority on the doctrine of 'division.' His treatise de divisione is founded on a work on the same subject by Andronicus Rhodius, a peripatetic.

• Distincta enumeratio plurium quæ communi termino significantur.Aldrich.