adequate definition the definitum and its definition should also reciprocate, i. e., be simply convertible.

The adequacy of any definition may be tested in this way. The following are examples of adequate definition :

Wine, a juice extracted from grapes.

Conscience, the faculty by which we judge of right and

wrong.

Pension, an allowance for past services.

The following examples err by excess :

An insect is an animal that flies.

Man is an intelligent being.

In the first example the definition is too extensive, being applicable to birds as well as insects; in the second, the definition applies to all intelligences as well as to man. The definitum and definition are not, therefore, simply convertible,

or do not reciprocate.

The following examples, on the other hand, err by defect:Man is a civilised, rational animal.

Here the definition is too narrow, for it excludes uncivilised man.

A religious person is one who holds the peculiar doctrines of Calvin.

This definition is also defective, for many persons who must be accounted religious reject some of Calvin's doctrines. 2. The definition must in itself be clearer than the thing defined.

a It has frequently been objected to metaphysical definition, that it is not clearer, in most cases, than the term defined; and when the term which is to be defined is very familiar to the hearers, this certainly is the fact. Thus the word man is more familiar to the ear, and is accidentally better known than the term rational animal; but yet the words 'rational animal' are in their nature more clear and better known than the word man,' inasmuch as they convey less complicated ideas.-Huyshe, p. 44.

It is necessary that the definition should convey a clearer idea than the definitum, otherwise it would not explain it; and it is one of the objects of definition to explain a term implying a complex conception by other terms implying less complex conceptions, or, at all events, better known.

The following examples offend against this rule :

Net-work, anything reticulated or decussated with interstices between the points of intersection.a

Species is the identity of determinate form, cardinal properties, and organific or constitutive law."

3. The definition must be included in a just number of proper words.

d

By proper words (voces propria) Aldrich means words sanctioned by common usage, in contradistinction to metaphorical and obsolete phraseology. The terms which compose the following definitions are metaphorical :

Old age is the evening of life.

A warrior is a thunderbolt of war.

The following examples are characterised by undue brevity :

A chariot is a vehicle.

A cascade is a waterfall.

Money is coin.

e

a Johnson.

b Tappan.

c Nam ex Metaphoris oritur ambiguitas, ex prolixitate, confusio-for from metaphorical terms there would rise indistinctness or ambiguity, from undue brevity obscurity, and from too great prolixity confusion.—Aldrich. Tav yap ασαφές το κατα μεταφοραν λεγομενον, παν γαρ ασαφες το μη ειωθος -for everything is deficient in precision and clearness which is spoken metaphorically, or in language not sanctioned by common usage.—Artistotle.

d κυρια ονοματα, otherwise called established names (κειμενα ονόματα).

-Aristotle.

• These instances exemplify what is called by some, definition from change of symbol, where both subject and predicate are symbolical conceptions-the latter being given as a substitute for the former on a principle of expedience only. See Outline of the Laws of Thought, p. 160.

The subjoined examples, on the other hand, are vitiated by unnecessary prolixity :—

Astrology is that curious science, so much in vogue during the middle ages, which instructs mankind in the supposed influences which the stars possess over human circumstances and actions, and by which they rule and direct the world.

Money is that useful species of property which, by serving as a common measure, by which all the necessaries, all the conveniences, and all the luxuries of life may be estimated and procured, becomes itself the great essential, and comprises within itself all that can be thought needful to render life desirable.a

Aristotle's view of definition is threefold. 1. The definition of a thing as it is in itself (2070S TOU TI SOTI), corresponding to the Real Definition of more recent logicians. This kind of definition is first applied to substances which exist per se; and as their existence is assumed, not demonstrated, their definition is said to be unsusceptible of demonstration (avaπODEIXTOS). 2. The definition of an attribute. This is also a definition (TOUT EOT), with this difference, that the existence of an attribute is not assumed, but demonstrated to exist in the substance, or subject of inhesion, and the demonstration consequently proceeds on the assumption of the existence of the subject in other words, the cause of the attribute is sought in the subject. This is illustrated by defining an eclipse.— Why is the moon eclipsed? Because the sun's light is intercepted by the earth. Consequently, to the question, What is an eclipse of the moon? the answer (i. e., the definition) will be,

a If a definition be chargeable with tautology, it is incorrect, though without offending against the two rules. Tautology consists in inserting too much, not in mere words, but in sense. Thus to define a parallelogram, a 'four-sided figure, whose opposite sides are parallel and equal,' would be tautological, because though it is true that such a figure, and such alone, a parallelogram, the equality of the sides is implied in their being parallel, and may be proved from it. Whateley, book II., cap. 5.

The interception of the sun's light from the moon by the earth. This demonstration is capable of being reduced to syllogistic" form; but as it stands, it differs from demonstration, as stated by Aristotle himself, in the arrangement or position of the terms (15), or grammatical variety of form (Two). 3. Nominal definition, or, according to others, imperfect Real Definition. Aristotle's explanation of it is, S TOU TI ECTIV αποδείξεως συμπερασμα—the conclusion of the demonstration of what a thing is. As Aristotle objects to nominal definition, on the ground that it furnishes no proof of the actual existence of the things to which it applies, and as in many cases the nominal and real definition of a thing may nearly or altogether coincide, the latter opinion, viz., that of imperfect real definition is here considered to be meant by him. His views on the whole doctrine of definition are, however, ob

scure.

SECTION VII.

OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF TERMS.

The subject (Toxeμsvov) is distributed in all universal propositions, and the predicate in all negative propositions, since in the former the entire conception is included, while in the latter the entire conception is excluded. In considering terms with reference to their distribution, there are two rules which it will be necessary to remember :

1. All universal propositions (and no particular) distribute the subject.

2. All negative propositions (and no affirmative) distribute the predicate.

When we say that a term is distributed, we mean that it is

a Omne corpus naturale illuminatum a sole, privatum luce a terrae objectu deficit; luna est hujusmodi, ergo luna deficit.—Aquinas.

used in its fullest extent; that it stands for all its significates, viz., the several things which it signifies or to which it is applicable.

1. Of the Subject.

In all universal propositions, whether affirmative or nega tive, the subject must be distributed; for this is the differentia of a universal proposition viewed as to its quantity. In the proposition,

All tyrants are miserable,

the common term 'tyrants' includes Dionysius, Phraates, Nero, and every other individual answering to the description; in other words, it stands for the whole of its significates. When, again, we say,

No islands are surrounded by water,

everything of which the common term 'island' can be affirmed is excluded from the application of the predicate 'surrounded by water;' in other words, none of the significates of the term 'island' agrees with the predicate.

Since the distribution of the terms of propositions is indicated by the universality of the subject or the negative cha racter of the proposition, it is manifest that in all particular propositions the subject is undistributed," as it stands only for a part of its significates, being restricted to this either by its indefinite character or some qualifying term. In the example, Some islands are fertile,

the term 'island,' though applicable in its unrestricted sense to Iceland, and all barren islands, yet, as used in this proposition, it does not embrace these among its significates, as it only contains in its extension such islands as may be affirmed to be fertile; and hence it is not distributed. In the ex

ample,

a Where we represent, judge of, or reason from a whole conception, it is said in technical language to be distributed; where a part only is treated, we call it undistributed.-Outline of the Laws of Thought, p. 138.