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Some critics are not candid judges,

the subject 'critics' is also used in a restricted sense, for it excludes from its extension all such critics as are candid judges.

It is evident, therefore, that the distribution or non-distribution of a term depends on its quantity, and not on its quality. It follows from the foregoing, that the subject of an indefinite proposition, in necessary matter, is distributed. In the example,

Angels are incorporeal,

although there is no sign of universality prefixed to the subject, yet, as it is in necessary matter, we are warranted to affirm the predicate of all angels.

The subject of an indefinite proposition, in contingent matter, on the other hand, is undistributed. In the example, Misfortunes are unavoidable,

we know from the matter that the subject must be taken in a restricted sense, and that all we can affirm is some misfortunes, &c.

2. Of the Predicate.

The predicate (xarnyogouμevov) of an affirmative proposition, with few exceptions, is never distributed. In the following example of a universal affirmative, viz.,

All metals are fusible,

the predicate 'fusible' is not distributed; for although it is affirmed of all metals, this does not exhaust its application, inasmuch as it is predicable of many other substances besides metals, and, consequently, it cannot be said to be wholly distributed, since the subject of the proposition does not express all the substances capable of being fused.

This is still more obvious in the case of a particular affirmative, e. g.,

Some vapours are luminous.

Here the predicate 'luminous' is predicable not only of some vapours, but of an indefinite variety of bodies.

It happens occasionally that the perdicate is of equal extent with the subject, i. e., that the predicate fully distributed may be affirmed of the subject also fully distributed. The judgments expressed in propositions of this nature are said to be substitutive; for since in them the predicate is used to define the subject, the whole of it must be given, otherwise it would be useless for definition. The subject and predicate are therefore exactly co-extensive, for they may change places in the judgment, so that the definitum may in its turn become a definition, e. g., in the example, 'Man is a rational animal,' no individual comes into the class of rational animals which is not also in man; and, conversely, no individual comes under man which is not also under rational animal; for here both the subject and predicate are generalisations from the very same class of beings-the only difference being that the subject is symbolical, or the sign of a class, while the predicate is notative, that is, noting essential attributes.

It is only in definitions that the subject and predicate are co-extensive, and this coincidence occurs wherever the predicate is a definition of the subject; as,

Rhetoric is the art of speaking persuasively.

Or its logical difference; as,

All men are rational.

A proposition is a declaratory sentence.

Or a specific property; as,

A triangle is a figure having three angles.

A proposition is a sentence signifying something true or false. Or in any case, in short, where the subject and predicate are simply convertible.

In these examples the predicate may, in its distributed sense, be affirmed of the subject; but it is to be observed that this circumstance cannot be inferred from the mere form of the proposition. It follows from the matter, not from the terms of the expression.

The judgment expressed by any proposition in which the subject and predicate are not co-extensive, is said to be attributive, as the predicate merely expresses an attribute not simply convertible with the subject, and cannot therefore be used to define the subject, e. g.,

Metals are fusible,

Gold is heavy,

are judgments in which this kind of predicate occurs.

In negative propositions, whether universal or particular, the predicate must be distributed, otherwise the proposition could not be true, e. g., the proposition,

Irrational animals are not morally responsible,

would be false if any part of the predicate, morally responsible,' agreed with the subject, irrational animals,'

In particular negatives, however, the distribution of the predicate is not so evident, e. g., the proposition,

Some critics are not candid,

asserts that there is a certain class of critics comprised in the subject, from which every individual of which the predicate can be affirmed is wholly excluded; in other words, the predicate candid,' in its most extensive signification, cannot be affirmed of any individual comprised under the particular class of critics denoted by the subject. Consequently, the predicate is used here in its universal, i. e., its distributed sense, and unless it were so, the proposition would not be true.

No signs of universality or particularity are prefixed to the predicate, because in affirmative propositions its non-distribution is indicated by the affirmation, and in negative propositions its distribution is indicated by the negation.

It has been shown above that a term may consist of one word, or several; but the only terms consisting of one word, which can be used as the subjects or predicates of propositions, are nouns substantive in the nominative case. We may add here that the infinitive of a verb, a certain form of which is only one word, may also be used as a term in a proposition,

being equivalent to a noun-substantive. In English, in addition to the usual form of the infinitive, which may be used as a term in a proposition, there is another, ending in 'ing,' synonymous with the ordinary form, e. g., 'Instructing the ignorant is praiseworthy,' and 'It is praiseworthy to instruct the ignorant,' are equivalent propositions.

This kind of infinitive is of the same form and sound as the participle present, but it can always be distinguished from it in this way, viz., when the usual form of the infinitive can be substituted for it without injuring the sense, it is the infinitive in 'ing;' but when this substitution cannot take place without injuring the sense, then it is the participle present.

The infinitive in 'ing' may be used as a categorem, i. e., as a word having enough of independent meaning in itself to constitute a term, as,

Seeing is believing;

or it may be used as a syncategorem, i. e., as constituting a term in connection with other words, e. g.,

Accuracy in observing individual facts is necessary to correct induction.

It may be remarked, that the infinitive is often the predicate of a proposition; but this never happens except when another infinitive is the subject, e. g.,

To imitate, is to admire.

To bear, is to conquer our fate.

To be loved, is to be happy.

Laborare est orare.

It may be remarked, that neither the infinitive, which is properly a noun-substantive, nor the participle, which is a noun-adjective, is included under the word 'verb,' for strictly speaking they are verbals, i. e., they have a relation to their verbs in signification, but they differ from them in the mode of signification. This arises from the circumstance that affirmation, which is essential to a verb, is not an attribute either of an infinitive or a participle.

CHAPTER III.

SECTION I.

JUDGMENT.

HAVING already considered the first head of the logical distribution of the cognitive faculties, viz., Simple Apprehension, and having treated of notions as simple or complex, of terms as singular or common, together with their names and classifications, as well as the logical instruments whereby we acquire distinctness in the apprehension of the meaning and use of terms, we now proceed to the second head, viz., Judgment.

Under this head, we consider the mind not only as possessing notions distinctly, but as capable of comparing them together, and of asserting some relation between them, whether of agreement or disagreement. While such assertion remains purely a mental act, it is called a judgment; but when it is expressed in words, it is termed a proposition.

OF SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS.

A proposition is defined by Aldrich to be 'Oratio indicativa congrua et perfecta verum vel falsum significans sine ambiguitate,'-an asserting sentence grammatical and perfect, signifying something true or false, and free from ambiguity. This definition is of a mixed nature. It is partly metaphysical, and partly accidental. It is metaphysical, in so far as

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a Xoyos ATOPAνT1x05.-Aristotle. Oratio enunciativa.—Boethius.

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