Intuition to which he appeals in the fourth book of his Essay as giving us the most certain of all our knowledge. Had he developed the nature of intuition, and the principles involved, with the same care as he has expounded the experiential element, his system. would have been at once and effectually saved from the fearful results in which it issued in France, where his name was used to support doctrines which he would have repudiated with deep indignation. He is right in saying that the mind has not consciously before it in spontaneous action such speculative principles as that "Whatever is is," or moral maxims in a formalized shape; but he has failed to perceive that such principles as these are the rules of our intuitions, and that they can be discovered by a reflex process of generalization. It is but justice to Locke to say that he acknowledges necessary truth, but it does not form a part of his general theory. His professed followers have abandoned it; and sceptics have shown that he cannot reach it in consistency with his system.

SECT. III.—LIMITS TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, IDEAS, AND BELIEFS.

It is instructive to find that not a few of the most profound philosophers with which our world has been honoured, have been prone to dwell on the limits to man's capacity. The truth is, it is always the smallest minds which are most apt to be swollen with the wind engendered by their own vanity. The intellects which have gone out with greatest energy to the furthest limits, are those which feel most keenly when they strike against the barriers by which human thought is bounded. The minds which have set out on the widest excursions, and which have taken the boldest flights, are those that know best that there is a wider region lying beyond, which is altogether inaccessible to man. It was the peculiarly wise man of the Hebrews who said, "No man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end." The Greek sage by emphasis declared that, if he excelled others, it was only in this, that he knew nothing. It was the avowed object of the sagacious Locke to teach man the length of his tether, which, we may remark, those feel most who attempt to get away from it. Reid laboured to restrain the pride of philos

ophy, and to bring men back to a common sense, in respect of which the peasant and philosopher are alike. It was the design of Kant's great work to show how little speculative reason can accomplish. In our own day we have had Sir W. Hamilton showing, with unsurpassed logical power, within what narrow bounds the thought of man is restrained.

We have already in our survey gathered the materials for enabling us to settle the general question, in which, however, are several special questions which should be carefully separated.

1. What are the limits to man's power of acquiring knowledge? The answer is, that he cannot know, at least in this world, any substance or separate existence other than those revealed by sense and consciousness. There may be, very probably there are, in the universe, other substances besides matter and spirit, other existences which are not substances, as well as space and time, but these must ever remain unknown to us in this world. Again, he can never know any qualities or relations among the objects thus revealed to the outward and inward sense, except in so far as we have special faculties of knowledge; and the number and the nature of these are to be ascertained by a process of induction, and by no other process either easier or more difficult. This is what has been attempted in this treatise, it may be supposed with only partial success in the execution, but, it is confidently believed, in the right method. A more difficult process need not be resorted to, and would conduct us only into ever-thickening intricacies; and an easier method is not available in the investigation of the facts of nature in this, nor indeed in any other department. After unfolding what seems to be in our primitive cognitions, I gave some account of the primitive faiths which gather round them, and classified the relations which the mind can discover, and unfolded the moral convictions which we are led to form. Such are the limits to man's original capacity, of which there are decisive tests in self-evidence, necessity, and catholicity.

Within these limits man has a wide field in which to expatiate; a field, indeed, which he can never thoroughly explore, but in which he may discover more and more. What he may discover, and what he may never be able to discover, are to be determined

by the separate sciences, each in its own department. Thus, what he can find out of mind, of its various powers and original convictions, is to be determined by the various branches of mental science. What he can ascertain by the senses, aided by instruments, must be settled by the physical sciences.

2. The limits to man's capacity of knowledge being ascertained, it is easy to determine the limits to his power of forming ideas. The materials must all be got from the four sources of knowledge which have been pointed out. There are two classes of powers employed in enlarging and modifying these. The one is the imagination, which can decrease, as when on seeing a man it can form the idea of a dwarf; and increase, as when it can form the idea of a giant; or separate, as when it sees a man it can form an image of his head; or compound, as when it puts a hundred hands on man, and forms the idea of a Briareus. It should be observed that the imagination can never go beyond the rearrangement of the materials supplied by the original sources of knowledge. The mind can further discover a number of relations among the objects primitively known. These I have endeavoured to classify. In particular, out of the concrete it can form innumerable abstracts, and from the singulars construct an indefinite number of universals. It should be observed that man's power of imagination and correlation extends over his moral convictions as well as his intellectual cognitions. Thus, he can clothe the hero of a romance in various kinds of moral excellence of which he has discovered the rudiments in himself or others, and perceive relations among the moral properties which have fallen under his notice. These are the limits to man's capacity of forming ideas, determined, first, by his original powers of cognition, and, secondly, by his powers of imagination and correlation.

3. Our beliefs, it is evident, may go beyond our cognitions. Still there are stringent limits set to them in our very nature and constitution. Thus, we can never believe anything in opposition to self-evident and necessary truths. There are beliefs which are in our very mental make and frame, and which are altogether beyond our voluntary power. If we except these, however, our power of possible belief is wide as our capacity of forming ideas. If it is

asked what we should believe within these limits? the answer is, Only what has evidence to plead in its behalf, what has self-evidence or mediate evidence. Metaphysics, with their tests, can determine what truths are to be received on their own authority; as to the kind and amount of evidence required in derivative truth, this can be settled only by the canons of the special departments of investigation, historical or physical.

But do our beliefs ever go beyond our ideas? This is a very curious question, and different persons will be disposed to give different answers to it. It seems clear to me that every belief must be a belief in something of which we have some sort of conception. A belief in nothing would not deserve to be called a belief, and a belief in something of which we have no apprehension would be equivalent to a belief in nothing. But it will be urged that every man must believe in certain great truths regarding eternity, of which he has no conception, and that the Christian in particular has such a truth in which he firmly believes, in the doctrine of the Trinity. Still, I maintain that even in such a case there is an apprehension or conception. Thus, in regard to infinity, we apprehend space or time, or God, who inhabits all space and time, stretching away further and further; but far as we go, we apprehend and believe that there is and must be a space, a time, a living Being beyond. Or we apprehend a spiritual God, with attributes, say of power and love; and we strive to conceive of Him, and of these perfections; and we believe of Him and His power and goodness that they transcend all our feeble attempts at comprehension. In every supposable case of belief we have an apprehension of some kind. A traveller tells us that he saw in Africa a monstrous animal, which he cannot describe so as to enable us to com. prehend it; we understand the man's language, and if we have reason to look upon him as trustworthy, we believe his statement; but in doing so our belief goes upon the apprehension of an animal different from all other animals. An inspired writer tells us about there being three persons in one Godhead; and, having evidence of his inspiration, we believe him but even here there is an apprehension; there is a conception of the God of truth as revealing the truth. There is more; this revelation is contained in words of

:

which we form some sort of apprehension: thus, we are told that Jesus Christ is God; that He became man; and yet we discover that He is somehow or other different from God the Father. Thus

in all our beliefs there seems to be a conception of something, and of something real and existing; but still it may be of something conceived by us as having qualities which pass beyond our comprehension, or qualities of which we have no comprehension.

Some of these conceptions, with their attached belief, are those which raise up within us the feeling of the sublime, and are, of all others, the most fitted to elevate the soul of man. Need I add that it is possible for us to believe in truths which we cannot reconcile with other truths of sense or understanding? It is wrong in us, indeed, to believe in a proposition unsupported by evidence; but when it is properly sustained, and when especially it is seen to have the sanction of God, then the mind asserts its prerogative of belief, even when the truth transcends all sense, all personal, all human experience, nay, even when it is encompassed with darkness and difficulties on every side. Faith feels that it is in one of its highest exercises when founding on the authority of God; it believes not indeed in contradictions (which it can never do), but in truths which it cannot reconcile with the appearance of things, or with other truths which the reason sanctions.

SECT. IV.-RELATION OF INTUITION AND EXPERIENCE.

We must now dive into the subject whose depths the great Teutonic metaphysician sought to sound; not that Kant spoke much of it in the intercourse with his friends, but he was for ever pondering on it as he sat in his bachelor domicile, as he paced forward and backward in his favourite walk in the suburbs of Königsberg, as he lectured to his class, or elaborated his published writings. The general question embraces several special ones, which must be carefully distinguished. In seeking to settle these, we must always have it fixed in our minds in what sense we employ the word "experience;" for the phrase may be understood in narrower or in wider significations. It may be confined to the outward fact known or apprehended, or it may also embrace the