array against the Spanish patriots. On this second invasion he carried with him, says his own official paper, the Moniteur, "four hundred and eighty thousand soldiers."

If he did, the question naturally arises, what has he done with this formidable force? why has he not subdued all Spain long ere this? "A few misguided rebels and insurgents," as he calls them, could surely never oppose any successful resistance against half a million of the best troops in the world, commanded by the greatest generals in the universe, with Buonaparte at their head. But it was said in June 1809, that Spain would have been conquered long since, if Napoleon had not thought it more expedient first to annihilate the Austrian empire; and then return to crush the whole Spanish peninsula at one blow. Now Buonaparte's Moniteur says, that he only withdrew "one hundred thousand" men from Spain in order to annihilate the Austrian empire, in concert with his German armies, and his vassal-princes of the Confederation of the Rhine. If then the Moniteur is to be believed, Napoleon in 1809, left three hundred and eighty thousand French troops in the peninsula, under the command of some of his very best generals, namely, Augereau, Soult, Ney, Victor, Bessieres, and others; not to mention, that since the peace with Austria in the autumn of 1809, the French government boast of having sent "three hundred thou sand fresh troops into Spain," under Massena, Levebre, Sebastiani, Regnier, &c. &c.

And what have these great commanders at the head of their numerous and invincible legions achieved during the years 1809-1810? Accounts of so late a date as the beginning of November, 1810, have reached this country; and the following very brief summary of the exploits of France during the last two years against the Spaniards, Portugueze, and British, will give no valid ground of exultation

for the past, nor of confidence in the future, either to Buonaparte or to any of his adherents. The French have been routed at Corunna, and at Talavera, and at Oporto, and at Busaco, by the combined forces of the allies; they have been driven out of the Asturias, and Gallicia; have been defeated under the walls of Tarragona; beaten in Catalonia and Valencia; utterly foiled in a twelve months siege against Cadiz; the grand army under Massena is most critically situated in Portugal, with Lord Wellington and his forces fronting him, while the Portugueze troops, who have equalled their most illustrious ancestors in feats of valor, harass him in the rear; and the various bodies of French dispersed throughout Spain are rapidly perishing from want, fatigue, and the perpetual attacks of the Spanish armies.

If all this has been accomplished in two years and a half, reckoning from May 1808, to November 1810, by the Spaniards and their allies against such fearful odds, what result might we not expect in future when the disparity between the contending powers shall be so much lessened? Spain, in the midst of all the weakness and confusion necessarily attendant upon the formation of a provisional government, has successfully opposed an unarmed peasantry, and a rude undisciplined militia, to almost incredible numbers of French troops in the highest state of discipline, and commanded by the most able generals. The rugged nature of the Spanish territory also, full of mountains, narrow passes, deep defiles, and unfordable rivers, not supplied with bridges; and above all, its being very scantily provisioned, partly from the great dryness of the soil, but more especially from the very low and miserable condition of its agriculture; throw serious and almost insuperable obstacles in the way of an invading army.

And now, after nearly three years consumed in contending with so formidable an enemy, the Spa

niards have had time and opportunity to learn the necessity and advantage of strict military discipline; to organize their armies; to wield the resources of the country with the greatest effect for their own defence, and the annoyance of their enemy. And accordingly Spain has now at the close of 1810, regular armies on foot, more numerous and better appointed than ever, under some very distinguished generals, as Blake, who defends Catalonia and Valencia; O'Donnel and Porlier who scour the seacoast; Romana who has joined Lord Wellington in Portugal; besides other commanders in chief who defend the isle of Leon, and harass the enemy in Andalusia and Estremadura. Add to this, the Cortes have already begun to infuse new life and vigor into the hearts of their patriotic countrymen by their wise and upright acts of legislation in favor of individual liberty, the freedom of the press, and the honor of the nation.

Buonaparte's Moniteur confesses that "five hundred thousand" Frenchmen have already laid their bones in Spain, since the beginning of the conflict between the two nations; and we may be well assured that the Moniteur does not overrate the loss of the emperor's troops in this service. The Spaniards are far better able now to contend with their enemy than ever they were; on account of the present more efficient organization of their resources to direct their population, their valor, their wealth, and their talents, against France; who with all her exclamations about "the inexhaustible number of her people that burn with ardor to cover themselves with glory on the other side of the Pyrenees," can but ill afford to lose another half million of men in arms in contending for the possession of the peninsula; the conscription-system having very materially diminished the effective population, not only of France, but also of Holland, and of Italy.

It indeed appears to be a hopeless attempt in Napoleon to subdue Spain; overrun it with his armies for a time doubtless he may; but to subjugate the Spaniards is quite a distinct and a much more difficult affair. The Spanish mode of warfare too is peculiarly calculated to wear out and destroy the invaders, and ultimately to save their own country. They do not stake the whole of their fortunes upon a decisive battle with a numerous army; but cut off every individual that straggles from the enemy's camp; and harass all his out-posts, separate detachments, convoys, and foraging parties; so that the French in point of fact will never be masters of a larger portion of the country than the immediate spots of ground which their armies occupy.

See the admirable "Precautions," &c. dated in June 1808, and published by the Junta of Seville. The whole of this state-paper is well worthy a perusal; the following extracts must suffice for the present purpose.

"1. Let the first object be to avoid all general actions, and to convince ourselves of the very great hazard without any advantage, or even the hope of it, to which they would expose us.

“2. A war of partisans is the system which suits us; the embarrassing and wasting the enemy's armies by want of provisions, destroying bridges, throwing up entrenchments in proper situations, and other similar means. The situation of Spain; its many mountains, and the passes which they present; its rivers and torrents; and even the collocation of its provinces; invite us to carry on this species of warfare successfully.

"6. Madrid and La Mancha require an especial general to concert and execute the enterprises which their particular local situation demands; his only object must be to embarrass the enemy's armies; to take away or cut off their provisions; to attack them

in flank and rear; and not to leave them a moment of repose. The courage of these inhabitants is well known, and they will eagerly embrace such enterprises, if they are led as they should be. In the succession-war the enemy twice entered into the interior of the kingdom, and even as far as its capital; and this was the cause of their defeat, their entire ruin, their utter failure of success.

"9. France has never domineered over us, nor set foot in our territory. We have many times mastered her; not by deceit, but by force of arms; we have made her kings prisoners, and we have made the nation tremble; we are the same Spaniards; and France and Europe, and the world shall see that we are not less gallant, nor less brave than the most glorious of our ancestors."

Buonaparte himself seems to be aware of the improbability, not to say impossibility, of bending Spain in submission to his yoke; otherwise he must be an idiot to lay waste and desolate a country which he expects to govern; and from whose resources of industry, population, and fruits of the soil alone, he can derive any accession of power and strength. The acquisition of a wilderness, without inhabitants, and without produce, will not carry him one step nearer to the accomplishment of his great object; namely, the subjugation of Britain, and thence, in course, of the whole world; but he will be so much less able to effect this purpose by all the blood and treasure which he expends in exterminating the Spaniards, and reducing their country to a desert.

Spain is already so devastated by the French, that not even refreshments can be found for a single traveller within a hundred miles of Madrid; and Buonaparte's army itself subsists entirely on provisions brought over the Pyrenees, all the way from France. It is supposed that sixteen thousand waggons are constantly employed in conveying from France into the