Sargent v. Sargent Granite Co. diction will not abate an action here for the same cause between the same parties is settled beyond dispute (Douglas v. Phenix Ins. Co., 138 V. Y. 209, 218). Why, then, should the added incident of an attachment work that result? "A plaintiff is entitled to all the remedies provided by law for the collection of his debt, and need not be satisfied until he has had such a judgment as will bind the defendant individually" (Oneida County Bank v. Bonney, 101 N. Y. 173, 175). The suit in Maine, not being an action in personam, cannot issue in a judgment binding upon the defendant and available to the plaintiff beyond the appropriation of the property attached (Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall, 368; Douglas v. Phenix Ins. Co., supra). Hence, the remedy by the suit in Maine is not commensurate with the remedy in the present action, and upon principle, therefore, the plaintiff should not be compelled to forego a complete for a partial redress. Moreover, the rights secured by an attachment being provisional and contingent on a recovery by the plaintiff, it follows that a final judgment for the defendant ipso facto vacates the attachment, and restores the parties to their original condition before the service of the writ (Franklin Bank v. Bachelder, 39 Am. Dec. 601, 609). And, pending the action, the inchoate lien of the attachment may be lost. by a dissolution of the process for any one of many causes (7 Lawson's Rights, etc., 3580-3589). Plainly, so precarious and inadequate a remedy as an attachment affords should not deprive the creditor of the security of a judg ment conclusive of his claim, operative in personam and available always and everywhere. How stands the question upon authority? Not a solitary decision, or dictum even, is cited to sustain the proposition that an attachment merely is a good plea in abatement. The adjudication below proceeds on the assumption of an analogy between garnishment and attachment; but the argument is fallacious. Sargent v. Sargent Granite Co. Garnishment of the debt by a third person is pleadable in abatement of a suit by the creditor, because otherwise the garnishee might be subjected to a double recovery (Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 101). But the attachment before us "is not analogous to the case of the pendency of a prior foreign attachment by a third person, for here the defendant would not be obliged to pay the money twice, since payment at least, if not a recovery in one suit, might be pleaded puis darrein continuance to the other suit; and if the two suits should even proceed pari passu to judgment and execution, a satisfaction of either judgment might be shown upon audita querela or otherwise in discharge of the other" (Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns. 221; Trubee v. Alden, 6 Hun, 75, 78). Indeed, upon application by the defendant, trial of the second suit may be stayed until the determination of the first (Douglas v. Phenix Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 218), and an attachment in the second may be denied because of an attachment in the first (Trubee v. Alden, 6 Hun, 75). It is, then, an illusory apprehension that, unless the plea in abatement be allowed, a defendant may be harassed by concurrent attachments in every State of the Union. The defense interposed is insufficient in substance (Woodruff, J., in Hecker v. Mitchell, 5 Abb. Pr. 453, 454), and the demurrer should have been sustained. So much of the order and judgment as plaintiff appeals from reversed, and judgment ordered for plaintiff upon his demurrer, with costs in both actions. DALY, C. J., and BISCHOFF, J., concurred. Wright v. Chapin. WRIGHT v. CHAPIN. N. Y. Supreme Court, General Term, First Department; December, 1893. 1. Appeals.] An appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer with notice that upon the appeal the interlocutory judgment will be brought up for review, brings up for review without mentioning it the decision on which such interlocutory judgment was entered; such decision is not an order and need not be referred to in the notice of appeal. Distinguishing Cambridge Valley Bank v. Lynch, 76 N. Y. 514. 2. Judgments.] An action may be maintained in this State upon a foreign judgment, recovered in an action brought by plaintiff, which directs defendant to pay a specified sum of money into court, if by the laws of the country in which the judgment was recovered, it has all the force and effect of a personal judg ment. Distinguishing Greene v. Republic Fire Ins. Co., 84 V. Y. 572. 3. Pleading. In an action upon a Canadian judgment directing defendant to pay a sum of money into court, allegations in the complaint, that under and pursuant to the laws of Canada and the rules and practice of its courts, the judgment has all the force and effect of a personal judgment; that plaintiff is entitled under said laws and practice to enforce the judgment as a personal judgment, and is entitled to receive payment, for the purpose of enforcing the same, are sufficient allegations of the laws, rules and practice of Canada and Canadian courts to sustain the complaint on demurrer. Appeal by plaintiff from a final judgment of a Special Term of the Supreme Court, first district, sustaining defendant's demurrer to the complaint, with notice of appellant's intention to review upon the appeal the interlocutory judgment. Action by Edward Wright against Robert W. Chapin upon a Canadian judgment. Defendant demurred to the complaint upon the grounds Wright v. Chapin. that there was another action pending; that there was a defect of parties; and that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The Special Term sustained the demurrer, holding that as it appeared from the complaint that the Canadian judgment upon which the action was brought, merely directed defendant to pay a sum of money into court, it was not a personal judgment, and plaintiff had no right to bring an action upon it; and that plaintiff was not aided by the allegations, that under the laws, practice and rules of Canada and Canadian courts, the judgment had the effect of a personal judgment against defendant, and that plaintiff was entitled to enforce such judgment as a personal judgment. The further facts are fully stated in the opinion. Arthur C. Rounds (Carter, Pinney & Kellogg, attorneys), for appellant. H. B. Closson (Parsons, Shepard & Ogden, attorneys), for respondent. VAN BRUNT, P. J.-In this action a demurrer was interposed to the complaint; and after a trial of the issue of law, a decision was made by the court, pursuant to 1021 of the Code, sustaining the demurrer upon the ground that the amended complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that there was a defect of parties apparent upon the face of the complaint in that George Goodwin was not made a party plaintiff or defendant; and directing that an interlocutory judgment be entered sustaining the demurrer, with leave to the plaintiff to amend; and further directing that in case the plaintiff should fail to amend, final judgment should be entered sustaining said demurrer with costs. The interlocutory judgment was thereupon entered; and Wright v. Chapin. the plaintiff not having amended, the final judgment was entered, and from such final judgment this appeal was taken, and notice was given that upon the appeal the interlocutory judgment would be brought up for review. It is now urged that inasmuch as the appeal is taken from the final and interlocutory judgments, and no notice is given of any intention to review the order directing. their entry, the appeal brings up only the question whether the judgment conforms to this order; and certain decisions of the Superior Court are cited to sustain this proposition, and also the case of Cambridge Valley Bank v. Lynch (76 N. Y. 514). The head-note of this last case is presented upon the brief; but an examination of the opinion will show that the consequences of the headnote, which are relied upon by the respondents, by no means follow. It will be seen that the provisions of 1021 in reference to the decision of the court upon the trial of issues of law raised by demurrer, are similar to those of 1022 in reference to what is to be done by the court or referee upon the trial of the whole issue of fact. In the one case the decision of the court, or the report of the referee upon the trial of a demurrer, must direct the final or interlocutory judgment to be entered thereupon. Upon the trial of the whole issue of fact, the decision of the court or the report of the referee must state separately the facts found and the conclusions of law, and it must direct the judgment to be entered thereupon. We have never heard it advanced but once, that in the case of an appeal from a judgment entered upon a referee's report or the decision of the court, in order to bring up for review the proceedings upon the trial, it was necessary to mention that the decision, in which was stated the facts found and the conclusions of law, and which directed judgment to be entered thereupon, would be brought up for review. The theory upon which this fallacy rests in the case of a demurrer is that the decision mentioned in |