ever, modern scepticism has done its best to cast uncertainty on the existence of Causes in general and of efficient Causes in particular, the proofs for the existence of each kind or species of causation will be separately given in the Chapter devoted to each. For the present, in unison with the universal sense of the School, the existence of Causes will be taken for granted; and the discussions will be limited to their general character and divisions.

There is a higher genus under which Cause is ranged; and with it the present inquiry will commence. The Greeks called it apxn, the Latins Principium; as distinguished from Cause which the Greeks call atriov, the Latins Causa. In the purely causal signification of the two words as distinguished from that of mere order, the Greeks would seem to have used these terms indifferently. Much the same may be said of the Latins in pagan times. With the revelation of the Christian doctrine concerning the Blessed Trinity, for the first time was the real distinction between the two laid open to philosophic thought.

It was a difficulty with the author to determine in what way the former of the two terms could be best rendered in English. There are two words which naturally suggest themselves,—Principle, and Beginning; but there are solid objections to the employment of either. Principle would be ambiguous, and is somehow connected in the mind with ethics. Besides, there is its correlative, Principiatum, which awaits its English equivalent, and would require the introduction into our vocabulary of the word, Principled ;-a term, moreover, that does not convey the precise meaning intended. On the other hand, the word, Beginning, is intimately associated in the English mind with the idea of time, as consequent upon preceding nothingness. Nor does it easily suggest its correlative; since, though the Begun answers in some sort to the Beginning, yet it does not convey the idea, at least explicitly, of necessary relation to, and (as in most cases is needed, when Principium is used generically) dependence on, the Beginning even in its participial use. Wherefore, it has been found necessary to introduce two terms, one of which has a place already in our dictionaries, though not with the philosophic meaning attached to it here; and to call Principium, the Principiant, -Principiatum, the Principiate. The Principiant, then, will represent any and every entity that is naturally or conceptually prior in any way to another. This is its widest signification. More specifically, it represents any entity that is absolutely prerequired in a series; on

the principle that every second postulates a first,-every subsequent, a precedent. Consequently, a Principiant may be described generically as that whence something is. The something thence proceeding is the Principiate.

Principiant is first of all divided into that which is Principiant in order of being and that which is Principiant in order of cognition. There is this difference between the two; that the former is simple, the latter complex. For every Principiant or principle of cognition (i.e. of a scientific concept) is a self-evident Judgment; and for demonstration two of these is required. Now, a Judgment is evidently complex; since it essentially consists of two terms and a copula. If analysis pursues the inquiry further back, we light upon the Dignities, so called, which do not explicitly enter into any demonstration but are the fulcrum of its force. These likewise

are self-evident Judgments; as, for instance, the principle of causality. But a Principiant of being, in whatever way we take it, is individual; and, even though it may be of a composite nature, is simple as being and Principiant, or,-to borrow a logical analogy,it is a simple term, not a proposition. The Principiant, however, in order of cognition must be left to logicians; as it is foreign to metaphysical inquiry.

A Principiant in order of being is of two kinds. For it may be Principiant either in mere point of order, having an extrinsic connection, by virtue of some sort of priority or other, with the Principiate ; or it may be such by virtue of a real intrinsic relation. As the former will be presently eliminated from our field of view, this will be the place to say what has to be said about it. There are three orders of entities,' remarks the Angelic Doctor, which follow each other in their successive series; viz. the order of magnitude, that of motion, and that of time. For priority and posteriority of motion are according to priority and posteriority of magnitude; while priority and posteriority of time are according to priority and posteriority of motion; as Aristotle has it in the fourth Book of his Physics1.' A

''Sunt autem trium rerum ordines sese consequentes; scilicet, magnitudinis, motus, et temporis. Nam secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine, est prius et posterius in motu; et secundum prius et posterius in motu, est prius et posterius in tempore, ut habetur quarto Physicorum.' In Metaph. L. V, lect. 1. The passage to which St. Thomas alludes is as follows: Ἐπεὶ δ ̓ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀεὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον αὐτῶν. Phys. L. IV, c. 11, init.

little reflection will suffice to justify this statement of the two philosophers. For in communicated motion the order of successive movements is evidently measured by the order of succession in the molecules that constitute the size of a body to which the motion is communicated. Take the instance of a cannon made on a billiardtable, by way of illustration; for the phenomenon is more easily detected in the case of distinct bodies. There are three sensible motions communicated in all, or rather, three communications of motion; viz. that communicated to the striker's ball, thence communicated to the object-ball, and thence to the remaining ball. The same is sometimes sensibly appreciable in the instance of the constituent molecules (shall we call them?) of one and the same body. We see it in the enlarging circles on the bosom of a lake, when a stone is thrown into it; in the vibrations of a musical chord; in the propagation of heat (if heat be motion) along an iron bar. The third order presents no difficulty; since it is well known that time is measured by the motion of the heavenly bodies. In the illustrations given above, the Principiant is more or less causal; but there are Principiants, in each of these orders, that are such principally, if not entirely, in virtue of mere succession or other like extrinsic connection. Thus, in magnitude or continuous quantity, a point is prior to a line, a line to a plane, a plane to a solid. In motion, assuming the yard for the unity of measure, the passage of a pedestrian over the first yard is prior to his passage over the second. In order of time, the dawn is Principiant of the day; the first of January is the Principiant of all the days in the year. Besides these already mentioned, there are other orders; such as that of place, for instance. He who sits at the head of the table is said to occupy the first place; the rest are ranged after him. So, in moral bodies,-that is to say, societies whether ecclesiastical or civil,—there is a priority of dignity. Thus, the archbishop of a province is called a primate; and the first lord of the treasury is known as the premier or prime minister. Lastly, in a great majority of such cases, there is an absolute, and there is likewise a relative, priority. Thus, in numbers, one is absolutely first; two is prior relatively to three. So, the first day of the month is not necessarily the first day of the year; nor the first day of the week, the first day of the month. Similarly, the first officer of a regiment is not the first officer of an army, and the lord-mayor of London is not the Queen of England. But these and numerous other kinds of Principiants may be disinissed; as they have little or no con

There are other

nection with the subject-matter of this Book. Principiants, therefore, which are more deserving of philosophical investigation; called such by virtue of a real intrinsic relation of some sort subsisting between themselves and their Principiates. This relation may be of two kinds. For the Principiant may be related to the Principiate by virtue of a positive influx and communication of itself to its correlative. Now, there is but one instance in which this positive influx is not causal; and the one exception is to be found in the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. But, as this is a truth whose cognition surpasses the limits of unassisted reason, it belongs to Theology rather than to philosophy, and cannot find admittance into our present discussions. Speaking, then, the language of pure philosophy, we may say that all Principiants of this kind are causes. But a Principiate may be indebted for its origin to its Principiant, not by reason of any positive influx or communication of being, but solely because of a necessary intrinsic relation which the two bear to each other. It is in such sense that privation is enumerated among the Principiants of being; forasmuch as, in the established order of things, corruption is a necessary antecedent of natural generation. Aristotle supplies us with another division of these Principiants, properly so called; to wit, Principiants of an entity in the process of its production, and Principiants of an entity in its ultimate constitution. To the former belong all Principiants of motion, or operation, or successiveness. For instance, the cue is the immediate, though instrumental, Principiant of the motion communicated to the billiard-balls; and the player's ball is relatively Principiant of the motion communicated to the object-ball. Active generation is the Principiant of passive generation, or conception. The first stroke of the sculptor's chisel on his block of marble is, in the language of art, Principiant of the bust. The first syllable pronounced is Principiant of the complete sentence; just as the last syllable is Principiant of the idea conveyed. To the latter belong all those Principiants of being which, in one way or other, appertain to, or exist in, the constituted Principiate. But of these more anon. The passage from Aristotle here referred to shall be given; because it introduces one other division which will be brought into service in the next Article. It is common,' he says, 'to all Principiants, to be that whence first a thing is, or is generated, or known.' Hence, Principiant in order of constituted being; Principiant in order of generation; Principiant in order of cognition. And of these some are

intrinsic, others cxtrinsic1. Assuming, then, Principiant and Principiate in their philosophical meaning, two things are plain. The one is, that these two concepts are of wider periphery than those of Cause and Effect. The other is, that they include the latter as subordinate determinations. Whence it follows, that an accurate perception of the nature of a Principiant will conduce, in no slight measure, to a clearer understanding of the nature of a cause.

PROPOSITION CXXVIII.

Between the Principiant and the Principiate there subsists a true relation.

The truth of this Proposition is self-evident, when once the terms are understood. For a Principiant is that from which in one way or another the Principiate proceeds; and the Principiate is that which in some way or other proceeds really, and not conceptually only, from the Principiant. But between the origin and the originated there is real relation, since origin connotes the originated, and vice versa; and, in like manner, Principiant connotes Principiate. Again: The two are entitatively as well as conceptually simultaneous; that is to say, if the Principiant exist as Principiant, the Principiate must also exist, nor is it possible to conceive one without having at the same time a concept of the other. But these are specific properties which evince the presence of a true relation; as will be seen later on, when we come to consider that Category.

PROPOSITION CXXIX.

The Principiant and Principiate are really distinguished from each other.

According to the established doctrine of relations, this Proposition follows as a Corollary from the preceding. For, in every real relation it is necessary that there should subsist a real distinction between the subject and term, or, in other words, between the relative and its correlative.

1 πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται. τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσαί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐκτός. Met. L. IV, c. I.