Select one of them. The body of this microscopic organism is composed of (speaking chemically, and without prejudice to any particular theory) a certain number of molecules; each one of which, again, is composed of atoms of composing elements. We ask of chemistry to supply us with one of these atoms. Let it be an atom of carbon, existing, as it ordinarily does, in a state of chemical combination with other elements. Isolate it; let it be in the structure of that diatom; that is to say, take it as an atom of carbon, but existent in that living structure. Let its value be represented by a fraction with twenty figures, if you will, in the denominator. Physical science has reached its ultimate. The metaphysical science takes up the inquiry. First of all, this atom of carbon is the atom of a diatom at present. It is, therefore, informed somehow or other with life. The diatom dies; but the atom of carbon remains,-speaking physically. It is not now what it was before. Virtue has gone out of it. Suppose, again, that, in the process of decay, it goes forth into the air in combination, is there seized upon by the grass after a process of decomposition, and enters into the substance of the grass. Thence we may trace it to a sheep; and thence to a human body which returns it, we will say, to the air. Thus much chemistry teaches me. But I go on to inquire: What is that which has been constantly changing, while the atom of carbon has remained potentially the same? Again: This atom of carbon is in combination with other elements, say, oxygen; so that out of the combination a new substance has arisen, in which the carbon only exists potentially. Chemical combination and mechanical mixture are two very different things; as one can see in the composition of air and water respectively. In the former, the atoms of the respective elements remain in act as they were according to their primitive constitution; in the latter, they exist only potentially. Well,-to revert to the original example,— in the supposed chemical composition what is that new something that has arisen, which is neither carbon nor oxygen but something quite different from either? Here, again, there is something or other which remains the same, and there is a differential. Both are essential to the compound. What are they? Lastly, take the atom of carbon by itself exclusively. We have not done with composition yet; though carbon is chemically called a simple element. For there is that in the said atom which is common to iron, sodium, hydrogen, and other elements, (otherwise, these would not have

received the common name of material substance); and there is likewise that which distinguishes it from the rest. Therefore, it is composed, and has parts. But assuredly they are not chemical parts; for this atom is the ultimate of a simple body. They are not integral parts; for it is the supposed constituent of a molecule. What are they then? Such is the inquiry of metaphysics.

Now, it is notorious that, in the sensile order,--or rather in nature, that which remains the same throughout these changes is never alone, but is always under some form or another. Not only so; but it appears before us as a mass under some geometrical or other form. It extends itself before our eyes in space. The minutest animalcules exhibit this extension, when rendered visible to the human eye beneath the microscope. Whether you divide a body physically to secure the molecule or decompose it chemically to obtain the atom of an element, it is always a complete substance of some sort; and quantitatively, it is indefinitely capable of division. You cannot possibly convert the essentially composite into the simple by physical division or chemical analysis. You will have body to the last; and body has extension, mass, composite essence. With material substance you began; and with material substance, after all your efforts, you must end. An atom of hydrogen is as much hydrogen as a gallon of it; and the millionth part of a grain of calcium is as much calcium as a square foot of it would be. Neither physical division, therefore, nor chemical analysis will help us to discover the essential constituents of bodily substance, as such. Essences are not patent to the senses; they are the object of the understanding. Now, it is these essential constituents of which we are in search. In the present chapter the inquiry is limited to that one of the two constituents which has received the name of the Material Cause.

To begin with, then :-Is there a Primordial Subject of all substantial changes in bodies? If so, what is its nature? Such are the questions proposed for discussion in the following Article.

ARTICLE I.

Primordial Matter.

PROLEGOMENON I.

The Material Cause is a cause really, though intrinsically, contributing to the composite being of bodily substance, as itself an

incomplete substance determinable to such a kind of being. It is extrinsically thus determinable by the efficient cause; intrinsically, by another incomplete substance which is called the formal cause. Thus, for instance, the material cause of a dog is, loosely speaking, its body; the formal cause is its soul; the efficient cause, its parents.

PROLEGOMENON II.

According to a well-known division, Matter is divided into the out of which, the in which, and the about which. The same Matter is said to be out of which, relatively to the entire composite towards the constitution of which it contributes; as well as relatively to the substantial form which is evolved, or educed, out of it: in which, relatively to the substantial form in its state of union with it: about which, relatively to the efficient cause. Thus, to continue with the same example,—the body of the dog is the Matter, (speaking again loosely), out of which its soul is evolved, in which its soul exists in union, out of which the complete composite is formed; lastly, the Matter about which active generation is concerned. When the substantial form is not evolved out of the potentiality of the Matter, as in the case of man, there is no Matter out of which, relatively to the form.

PROLEGOMENON III.

Matter out of which has been subdivided into passing and persistent Matter. Thus, for instance, the Matter of straw, wood, paper, under the action of fire, is called passing Matter; the Matter of the clay, when it changes under the same action into brick, is persistent. But this is really a division of little account; since it is based on that which is purely phenomenal. It is manifest that, in both cases alike, the Matter persists under the transformation.

PROLEGOMENON IV.

Matter is called primordial under a twofold aspect; first, as excluding any ulterior Subject to which it might be capable of being reduced, and, secondly, in relation to secondary Matter. That Matter, then, is primordial, which supposes no preceding Subject and is itself the ultimate Subject of all changes and forms. Secondary Matter is that which supposes a preceding Subject. All secondary Matter, therefore, supposes the primordial; and adds to it some form and disposition. In proportion to the nobility of the form

to be evolved, there is required a more complex disposition of the Matter; as is exemplified in vital organisms.

§ 1.

The present Section is devoted to a twofold inquiry. First of all, it becomes us to inquire, whether there is such a thing as Primordial Matter, or an ultimate Subject in all bodily substances; secondly, if there is, what are its chief characteristics.

PROPOSITION CXXXIX.

In all bodily Substance there is a Primordial Subject of substantial changes.

The following are the proofs:

I. Whatsoever entities are capable of formal changes, must contain within them some Primordial Subject of such changes. But all bodies are capable of formal changes. Therefore, they must contain within them some Primordial Subject of such changes. The Major is thus declared. In every change, as we have already seen, there is that which changes and something that remains, Subject of the change. Without the presence of this latter, it is impossible even to conceive of a change. Thus, in a change of wind, the direction changes, but the air remains the same. So, in a change of health, the person who has passed from strength to sickness is one and the same. A block of marble has been made into a column; then, into a slab; eventually, into paper-weights. But it is the same stone under these successive forms. A given intellect conceives first one idea, then another; but it is the same intellect and the same soul, persevering under both these forms. The thought has changed, not the thinker. Now, that persistent Subject either supposes another Subject, or it does not. If it does not, we have arrived at the Primordial Subject. The Proposition is established. If it does suppose an ulterior Subject, the inquiry returns upon that second; and so on, till we finally arrive at the Primordial, unless one would take refuge in the absurdity of an endless regress. This argument receives confirmation from the nature of bodies. For they are composite substances; and, forasmuch as they are substances, they exist in and by themselves, without the need of any other entity to which they may eling for support. In this sense it may be said of them, that

they are self-sufficient. They, therefore, exclude any Subject or Material Cause outside of themselves. On the other hand, they are composite entities; that is to say, they are made up of certain constituent parts. But one part cannot be supported by another, and that other by a third; and so on, without limit. There must necessarily be some ultimate Subject of the rest. But that ultimate cannot be outside the composite substance, for reasons already alleged. Therefore, it must be among the intrinsic constituents of the substance itself. That constituent we call Primordial Matter. The above confirmation needs a word or two by way of explanation; otherwise, its cogency might not be appreciated. It must, then, be borne in mind, that the argument is derived from the intrinsic constituents of bodily substance; not from its integrating parts. There is no logical repugnance in supposing a body physically composed of a certain number of molecules, united by mutual cohesion; which by their sole union constitute that body, without need of a common Subject on which they depend. Similarly, in the dynamic theory, there is nothing to hinder us from conceiving a number of forces, gathered into one separate collection by virtue of a mutual attraction among themselves and repulsion beyond. But, we take from the former theory a molecule which, in spite of its minuteness, is a complete substance; and argue on the basis of its essential and accidental constituents,-its Matter, substantial form, extension, mass, figure, colour, hardness, etc. The same process applies to a force; but as its nature, as ordinarily represented, presents special difficulties to a metaphysician, and as we are here engaged only in the illustration of an argument, the dynamic theory shall be reserved for separate consideration elsewhere. The reasoning, then, in confirmation of the argument amounts to this. A bodily substance includes a substantial form, (by which it is what it specifically is, e.g. carbon, iron, sodium, and so on), together with various accidental forms. These inhere in Matter, as all are free to confess; otherwise, the thing would not universally go by the name of material. Now, of these constituents some manifestly depend on others. Thus, colour, as we have seen, depends on extension. Accidents, in general, depend upon the specific nature of the body, that is, (as the School would say), on its substantial form. Thus, iron is hard; wax is soft: a living animal is warm; a corpse cold: a diamond is solid; water, liquid; nitrogen, gaseous. Transform sugar into carbon and its other constituents by the action of sul

is