a priority and, consequently, some existing Being as measure of its priority. (ii) That Being must be other than the inceptive entity itself; because, during that priority, the latter was nothing. (iii) That Being is necessary, in order that the new entity may be able to begin existence; for, without the former, there could be no newness or commencement, because no priority. (iv) That same Being is sufficient for the possible existence of the new entity; because, according to the supposition, the existence of the former is de facto followed by the inchoated existence of the latter and, therefore, à fortiori, is capable of being so followed.

II. IN THE SAME MEMBER of the Thesis it is further asserted that the concept of efficient causation is likewise essentially contained in the idea of contingent Being; so that the Judgment, Contingent Being necessarily supposes its efficient cause, is analytical.

For the sake of greater clearness, contingent Being will be taken in the full latitude of its meaning, as inclusive not only of existent, but of possible, contingent Being. In other words, all contingent Being, possible, as well as actual, (whether past or present), is taken together as one existing whole; in order that, as a whole, it may be submitted to philosophical analysis. The assumption is obviously legitimate, and will save much useless elaboration.

Now, what is contingent Being? Contingent Being is Being either existing, or capable of existing, without absolute necessity of existence. Hence, it is defective Being; in other words, Being existing with defect of Being. By the very fact that such is its nature, it postulates, as a necessary condition of its existence, some existing entity other than itself. For, if there were nothing else besides contingent Being, then absolute necessity of Being must be either nothing, or contingent Being itself. But either hypothesis is self-contradictory. For, if absolute necessity of existence should be nothing, then, Being existing with defect would be identical with Being existing without defect; since the defect of nothing is no defect. On the other hand, if the absolute necessity of existence could be contingent Being itself; in that case, Being without absolute necessity of existence would be really the same as Being with absolute necessity of existence,-a contradiction in terms. The supposition that merely possible Being could supply the place of the entity required, has been excluded from the inquiry for the following reasons: (i) The actual existence of all possibles and, therefore, their desition as mere possibles, form a part of our hypothesis. (ii) Merely

possible Being, so far as the idea is real, represents an existing Being objective to itself. (iii) Such a supposition would make of a possible contingent entity a Being existing with absolute necessity of existence, which is a yet more flagrant contradiction. Wherefore, if there is contingent Being, there must be necessary Being; which latter cannot but be distinct from the former. Again: Necessary Being is absolutely required, in order that contingent Being may be able to exist. Lastly, necessary Being is of itself sufficient for the existence of contingent Being; for, by virtue of the sole existence of the former, contingent Being either exists or is capable of existing. These last two assertions are evidently based on the previous analysis. For, according to the hypothesis, contingent Being here represents the whole collection of contingent entities, as well possible as actual; therefore, it can find the necessary and, at the same time, sufficient reason of its actual or possible existence only in necessary Being.

III. IN THE SECOND MEMBER of this Thesis it is declared that the concept of an efficient cause is essentially contained in the idea of any change.

The analysis pursued in the two previous Sections, more notably in the latter, would seem to deal primarily with substances. The Proposition, which now awaits its verification, extends itself to every change, whether substantial, accidental, or moral. Now, it requires but little reflection to perceive, that the transition from Not-Being, or subjective nothingness, to Being, is a change,—nay, the greatest of all changes. But attentive consideration will suffice to convince us, that every real change of whatsoever kind is truly a transition from Not-Being to Being. Suppose that we take, as an instance, the change of a certain mass of water from cold to hot. Evidently there is, first of all, water without heat; afterwards, water with heat. Therefore, the heat in the given instance passed, metaphysically speaking, from nothingness (so far as the information of that particular mass of water was concerned), into Being. Here we have an example of accidental change. We will now take an instance of modal change. I sit down upon a chair; whereas, let us

I was previously standing. That sitting position is new; i.e. it was not, and now it is. Wherefore, it too has passed from NotBeing to Being, for so much of Being as it can claim. Such being the case, the formula, presented in the first Section of this Proposition, equally applies here. All change necessarily involves a

previous Not A, and a subsequent A. It postulates, therefore, some other than itself as measure of the required priority, i.e. of that Before, wherein the formal term of the change was as yet not existent. That other, as a consequence, is at once necessary to, and sufficient for, such novelty of existence as is essentially included in the idea of change. To take an example: A table begins to move. It was previously at rest. Evidently enough, that motion is something real and something inceptive; and, as evidently, the motion could not be to itself the measure of its previous non-existence. But we will suppose that a servant is in the room, who has moved the table. Now there is a real measure of the previous nonexistence of the motion; and an existing entity has been introduced that is (in the given hypothesis) necessary, and (so far as secondary causation goes) sufficient, for the local change in the table. That the motion is spontaneous in any given case,-not communicated from without (such as may be seen in living entities),—cannot weaken the conclusion. The only difference is, that in such cases the other which is postulated by the change would be intrinsic to the subject of such change.

IV. IN THE SECOND MEMBER of this Thesis it is further asserted, that the concept of an efficient cause is essentially contained in the idea of the purely possible.

The truth of this part of the Proposition will become at once manifest, by a reference to the doctrine touching Possibles, as evolved in the second Book of the present Work. For it was there shown, that purely possible Being is in itself, or subjectively, nothing; and that the real element in the concept is discoverable only in some other existing Being Who is really distinct from the possible entity. It was further shown that, while the internal possibility of such entity depended proximately on the exemplar Idea, fundamentally on the Nature, of that other Being Whom it supposes; its external possibility is entirely measured by the Power of the same Being. Consequently, for the verification of the idea of the purely possible there is required an existent Being (distinct, therefore, from the possible entity), Who is necessary to, and in Himself sufficient for, the existence of the possible, or its transition from a state of pure possibility to that of existence. But, in the union of these three elements everything is to be found that fulfils the idea of an efficient cause. Therefore, the idea of an efficient cause is essentially contained in the notion of the purely possible.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The so-called Principle of Causality is a mere assumption, unsupported by facts; and has been unthinkingly accepted on the authority of the old philosophers. The Antecedent is thus proved. The facts of sensile experience only exhibit a succession in beings, i.e. that one Being is prior, another subsequent. But such succession is not in any way adequate to the concept of efficient causality, as commonly understood. For efficient causality supposes that the precedent Being, (or, in other words, efficient cause), energizes influxively towards the production of the subsequent entity or, (in the hypothesis of causation), of that which would be denominated the effect. Now, sensile experience supplies no evidence whatsoever of the existence of any such virtue or energy, passing from the so-called cause to its effect; but simply reveals an order of succession as subsisting between the two. Since, then, all our ideas are originally derived from sensile perception, it follows that the Principle of causality is a mere assumption, as has been said, entirely destitute of foundation.

ANSWER. The Antecedent is, of course, denied. Now, for the proof. In the first place, it may be categorically denied, that the facts of sensile experience only go to prove succession of beings. For the universal persuasion of mankind affords sufficient evidence of the contrary. There is no one that has attained the age of reason, who does not recognize, in the sensile facts which come before his notice, an essential difference in the nature of the priority and posteriority which those facts severally reveal in various groups of instances. However, it will conduce towards a more complete and exhaustive solution of the difficulty, if we distinguish the above proposition. Accordingly: That sensile experience, by itself and without the assistance of the understanding or reason, affords evidence only of a succession in Being,-well, let it pass. That sensile experience, as subjected to the intuition of the intellect, affords evidence of nothing but such succession,-denied. As touching the confirmatory proof: The Major, wherein it is asserted, that Efficient causality supposes the cause to energize influxirely in the production of its effect, in like manner requires distinction. For the phrase, energize influxively, is more or less analogical and, at least, indefinite. If, then, it is merely meant, that efficient causality supposes the cause to be at once necessary to, and of itself sufficient for, the existence of its

effect, The Major is granted. If, on the other hand, it is meant that efficient causality supposes the cause sensibly to transmit something from itself as foundation of the effect, there is need of further distinction. That it supposes this essentially and, therefore, always, cannot be allowed. That it supposes the same in certain cases and (as it were) accidentally, may be granted. As to the Minor: It is not true universally, that sensile experience supplies no evidence whatever of the sensile influx of the cause into its effect. It is absolutely false, that sensile experience reveals nothing save an order of succession between the one and the other; as has been remarked already.

The concluding Antecedent must also be denied; though, for the sake of greater precision, it shall be distinguished. That all our ideas about the Ego, i.e. our own selves, are formally derived from sensile perception, is not true. That all our ideas about the non-Ego (or, in other words, all reality that is not ourselves) are primitively derived from sensile perception, needs further distinction. For, if it is thereby intended, that those ideas are in such wise derived from sensile perception as that the idea is a mere reflex of the sensile perception and, consequently, represents nothing which is not explicitly precontained in the latter, the proposition is false. If it is only meant, that all such ideas can trace their origin to some sensile perception or other, yet so, that the idea represents the essence or nature of the object, while the sensile perception exhibits the sensile phenomena, the material conditions, or the accidents, of corporeal substance, it is granted. The Consequent, therefore, subject to the given distinction, must be denied.

As the present difficulty is the magnus Achilles of modern scepticism, it may not be unserviceable to subjoin certain notes explanatory of the above answer. Wherefore,

i. It is evident to common sense and abundantly confirmed by constant experience, that the human intellect perceives in sensile phenomena various kinds or orders of succession (i. e. of priority and posteriority) among entities; and likewise perceives that these orders are wholly distinct from each other. Sometimes, the priority and subsequence are seen to be purely accidental; and it is plain that there is no dependence whatever of the subsequent on the prior entity. Thus, for instance, day succeeds night. But no one has ever imagined that the day was dependent on the night; since it is equally true that night succeeds day. Again, one man gets into an