order, an efficient cause must introduce into the Matter the generating motion by which the form is evolved. Therefore, generation and the educing of the form are previously required, in order that the form may be united to the Matter and the composite produced.

IV. THE FOURTH MEMBER, which affirms that generation and the educing of the form are prerequisite in another or different order, the one from the other, plainly follows from the preceding expositions. For the educing of the form requires previous generation; but generation does not necessarily postulate, as a result, the educing of the form. This is clear in the instance of human generation. Moreover, the educing of the form is the effect of generation. Lastly, generative motion precedes in order of time the union of Matter with form; as also, of course, the production of the composite. But the educing of the form from the potentiality of Matter does not precede in order of time either the one or the other; though it does precede both in order of nature. The reason of this is, that generation is action in Matter; the form is the act of Matter.

COROLLARY I.

Though at first sight there might seem to be only a conceptual distinction between the eduction of the form, the union of the latter with Matter, and the production of the composite, viewed in the concrete as effects of the causality of Matter; yet, considered in themselves, there is a marked distinction. For the form educed is distinguished from the composite, as a part from its whole. The union of the form is distinguished from the form itself, as a substantial mode from the Subject of modification. Again: The form, as in the instance of the human soul after death, may sometimes actually exist without this mode; which is the sure sign of a real distinction. Lastly; the eduction of the form is really distinguished from both union and form; since the former is not essential to all complete material substances, whereas the two latter are.

COROLLARY II.

Though generation in its term, as caused by Matter, is identified in the concrete with the composite substance, yet it is in itself really distinct from this latter; not only because the process of being made is really distinct from that which is made,-the being pro

duced from the thing produced, but more especially, because the composite remains after generation has ceased.

COROLLARY III.

Corruption, or the expulsion of the antecedent form, has justly not been reckoned among the effects of the Material Cause; though Matter is the Subject in which the expulsion takes place. The reason is, that such expulsion, or desinence, of the old form is not directly intended either by generation or in the production of the composite substance; though it follows, as a necessary consequence, from the introduction of the new form. For two substantial forms, as we shall see in the next Chapter, cannot at one and the same time inform the same portion of Matter. Besides, corruption is a privation; and, as such, a nonentity. But a natural operation cannot have for its term, and a real cause cannot have for its effect, a no-thing. It is, therefore, rather to be accounted a result (as it were, accidental),—or a concomitant,—of the causality of Matter.

COROLLARY IV.

Generation and corruption are predicated neither of the Matter nor of the form, but of the composite. Primordial Matter, as we have already seen, is ungenerative and incorruptible. Touching the form, the Angelic Doctor supplies us with a special reason for its exemption from both. It must not be said,' he writes, that the form is made or corrupted; because to be made' (i. e. generated) 'or to be corrupted, is the part of that whose it is to be. But to be does not belong to the form as though existing, but as that by which something exists 1;' that is to say, the Form is not in itself an existent entity, but that by which the composite substance is what it is and exists as such. Wherefore, it is material substance that is corrupted by the expulsion of its form from the Matter; and it is material substance that is generated by the introduction of a new form into the same Matter. As, then, in order of nature, the expulsion of the old form is a necessary condition of the introduction of the new; the generation of one body is always preceded by the corruption of another.

'Nec est dicendum, quod forma fiat vel corrumpatur; quia ejus est fieri et corrumpi, cujus est esse; quod non est formae ut existentis, sed sicut ejus quo aliquid est. Spiritu. a. 3, 12m.

§ 2.

By what does Matter cause ?

This second question is of some moment; yet, from the nature of the case, it is more than ordinarily abstruse. It has been apparently suggested by parallel discussions touching the efficient cause, where it is more easy to seize the bearings. For the sake of clearness, therefore, let us preface the present investigation by turning aside for one moment to consider the efficient cause. Generally speaking, there are three distinct things necessary in their several ways to efficient causality. There is, first of all, the efficient cause, the primary principiant of the effect. Then, there is the particular faculty by which the efficient cause causes, the proximate principiant of the effect. Lastly, there are certain necessary conditions, in whose absence actual causal influx is rendered impossible. An example or two will set this doctrine before the eyes. A man, we will say, has chosen the military profession for his future career. That choice is a real effect; and the supposed individual is the principal cause of it. Proximately, however, it is the man's will that is the cause; because it is by that faculty he chooses, not by intellect, or imagination, or the senses. But now, let us suppose that the person is a clergyman or a chronic invalid; he would be ipso facto prevented from making such a choice, however he might wish it. It is a necessary condition, then, of all deliberate choice, that the thing to be chosen should be within reach,—practically possible. The above example has been taken from the moral order. Let us select one other from art. It is the sculptor who primarily produces the statue; but he does so by the sculptorial habit, which supposes a knowledge of the principles as well as a manual dexterity, or, as the Greeks called them respectively, yvôσis montɩKÝ and prepía, the two constituents of réxvn. The sculptorial habit, accordingly, will be the proximate efficient cause, or that by which the principal efficient cause causes. Now, let us suppose that the artist is suffering from paralysis, or that the block of marble is still at the docks, or that there is an irremediable flaw in the stone; the statue cannot be effected. Therefore, in this case, there are at least three necessary conditions, in defect of which the artist cannot proceed with his subject,—namely, sufficient physical energy, proximity to the Material Cause, due disposition of the Matter. To transfer these elements of efficient causality to our investigation of the

Material Cause ;-it occurs to inquire, Is there here likewise a principal and proximate principiant? in other words, by what does Matter cause? Again: Are there certain necessary conditions required in order that Matter may be capable of causal influx? If so, what are they? These are the questions which now await our attention.

PROPOSITION CLI.

Principally alike and proximately Primordial Matter intrinsically causes its effect by virtue of its own entity.

THIS PROPOSITION IS PROVED,

I. DIRECTLY, from the nature of Primordial Matter, which admits of no distinction between a principal and proximate cause. The reason is as follows. Wherever such distinction is really discoverable, it arises from a composition, at the very least metaphysical, between the entity of the cause and that of the causal faculty, or potentiality belonging to that cause. But, in the instance of Primordial Matter, its potentiality is its entire essence; for it is essentially nothing else but a receptivity, or passive potentiality. Consequently, there is no ground for any such distinction; for the entity which is the principal principiant is neither more nor less than its own subjective potentiality which is, if anything, the proximate principiant. In other and plainer words, since Primordial Matter is nothing but a passive capacity for receiving the form, its whole essence in act is causal. It exists in causing.

II. INDIRECTLY, from the impossibility of its being otherwise. If the potentiality by which Primordial Matter causes is not its own essence, it is either an accident really distinct from the entity of Matter or it is some mode really distinguishable from the same; for there is no other conceivable foundation for the distinction. between the principal and proximate principiant in the present. instance. But it cannot be either the one or the other. Therefore, the entity of Matter must be its proximate as well as primary principiant. The two Members of the Minor are thus separately proved. i. The supposed proximate principiant cannot be an accident really distinct from the entity of Matter. For a potentiality is always proportioned to its act. Consequently, a substantial act postulates a substantial, not an accidental potentiality. Further: The union between Matter and form in bodies is a substantial union. But, if

it could be effected by the intervention of an accident, it would not be a substantial, but merely accidental union. Lastly: If there were such an accident in Primordial Matter prior to its information by the substantial form, it must inhere in the Matter as an accidental form; for this, accident of its nature requires. Now, such inhesive union of the accident with Matter is either caused by the intervention of another accident, or it is not. If it is, the question returns touching the union of this second accident, and so on, for ever; which is absurd. If it does not; then, seeing that Matter can be immediately united to the accidental form, what reason is there for supposing that it cannot be united immediately to the substantial form? And this question tells the more, if we bear in mind that Primordial Matter is essentially ordered to this union with the substantial form. ii. The proximate principiant in Primordial Matter cannot be a mode really distinguishable from the entity of Matter. For this passive receptivity of Primordial Matter is its essence; so that it cannot be separated from the Matter even by the Divine Omnipotence. Such separation is inconceivable; nay, it is a simple self-contradiction. Wherefore, it is no mere mode; but the quasi difference of Matter; as the Angelic Doctor says, in a passage already quoted1: Matter, if its nature could be defined, would have for its difference simply its relation to form.'

PROPOSITION CLII.

The existence of the Material Cause is not a necessary condition of its causality.

PROLEGOMENON.

be

This and the next Thesis are directed against the teaching of Suarez on this head, who introduces these two conditions:-viz. the existence of the Matter, and its proximity to the form,—in accordance with his general theory touching the absolute possibility of preserving each in existence apart from the other. If it may permitted to say as much, Suarez is inclined to attribute an independence of entity to the one and the other, which is certainly foreign to the teaching of St. Thomas. The reader will do well to consult the hundred and ninety-seventh, hundred and ninety-eighth,

1 Article i, § 3, of the present Book.