with another piece, one eye with the other, and so on.

Hence, as

the Enunciation is universal, it asserts both of heterogeneous and homogeneous parts, that they can separately be the Material Cause of accidents.

Wherefore,

I. Any integrating heterogeneous part of bodily substance can be separately a Material Cause of accidents. This is manifest from experimental induction. Thus, the quantity of one part is different from the quantity of another part; since, in many cases, one quantity is physically separate from the other, as in the blood, in hairs, bones, etc. Moreover, it is of constant recurrence, that the qualities in one part are distinct from, and often opposed to, those in another. For example, the blood has qualities of colour, liquidness, chemical composition, widely different from, and in part opposed to, those of the bones. So marked is this quantitative and qualitative isolation in the instance of the blood, that Suarez judges this latter to be an incomplete substance with its own particular subsistence; and he adds that such was the all but universal opinion of the School. Further: It is by virtue of the variety of accidental forms in the diverse parts and organs of living bodies that the substantial form is enabled to exercise that multiplicity of functions, so useful and even necessary to the sustentation of life.

II. Any integrating homogeneous part of bodily substance can separately be a Material Cause of accidents. This, too, is manifest from experimental induction, whenever the homogeneous parts exist in a state of separation. Thus, in each of the two horns of an ox, in each of a man's nails, in each feather of a bird, you have a quantity and, consequently, qualities in each, proper to each and numerically distinct. But what is to be said of continuous homogeneous parts which are only separable, but not actually separate, from each other? First of all, let it be borne in mind that, under such circumstances, they are only potentially parts, divisible but not divided. Nevertheless, by virtue of its extension any physical molecule or corpuscle is capable, separately in itself, of being a Material Cause of accidents. Hence it not unfrequently happens that, in one continuous and homogeneous substance, distinct qualities are to be seen in different places. Thus, for instance, the same apple is here green, there red. So, one and the same hair of a badger or the same feather of a pheasant or partridge has a variety of colour.

The fundamental reason, which is applicable alike to each Member of the Thesis, is this. Any bodily substance is not only capable of,

but requires accidental information, as a natural condition of its existence. Matter, existing as part of a substantial composite, needs qualification. The substantial form requires qualities proportioned to its nature, by means of which it may energize. But, first of all, any separate part of a body by virtue of its separation requires its own quantity and, consequently, its own qualities; which latter, if not specifically, are at least numerically, distinct. Secondly, if the so-called parts are not separate, they are only potentially parts. In such case the quantity is actually one, though potentially many because partitive. But, because it is continuous quantity, it admits, within the limits of its extension, a plurality of qualities even appertaining to the same species.

PROPOSITION CLXII.

Substance in virtue of its own potentiality, without the addition of any accidental or modal entity really distinct from itself, is the Material Cause of accident. Otherwise: Substance receives accident immediately in itself.

PROLEGOMENON.

After having determined the fundamental Material Cause of accidents in the two preceding Theses, it now remains to inquire by what substance causes in the accidental composite; in order that the nature of its causality may be more clearly appreciated. Touching the question here proposed, there has been a diversity of opinion in the School. Nevertheless, as the controversy is a counterpart of that which has been already considered in the preceding Article relatively to Primordial Matter, and the resolution of the problem is identical in both cases; it would not have appeared here again under the form of a Proposition, had it not been that in the present instance a special philosophical difficulty offers itself, which is worth considering. Nor is this all. For while the difficulty referred to has a special interest and importance of its own which claim our consideration; the treatment of it and its solution assume the force of an obligation, in presence of the fact that it compromises the teaching of the Angelic Doctor.

It has been maintained, then, by one School of Doctors, that substance causes accident and the accidental composite by the intervention of a potentiality really distinct from the substance itself. Another School has taught, that it causes by means of a real mode.

Lastly: Others maintain that substance immediately and of itself exercises its causality in accident and the accidental composite. This last opinion it is that is defended in the present Thesis. The reader should be again reminded here, that a mode differs from an accident specifically such, (for, generically understood, accident includes all modes that are not substantial), in its inferiority to the latter and, as a consequence, in the nature of its inhesion. A mode. has, and can have, no entity whatsoever apart from its Subject. Hence, it could not be made, even by the Divine Omnipotence, to exist apart from its Subject; because such existence is a metaphysical impossibility,-in other words, a contradiction in terms. accident, on the contrary, has a real albeit attenuated entity of its own; and can, therefore, exist apart from substance by the Power of God, though always retaining its natural tendency towards inhesion in a Subject, which is essential to it.

An

The present Proposition is demonstrated by proving that in this material causality of substance relatively to the accidental composite there can be no intervention, first, of a real accidental potentiality, secondly, no intervention of a real mode. Consequently, the causality of substance is immediate.

I. There can be no intervention of a real accidental potentiality really distinct from substance, in order that this latter may be made proximately capable of becoming the Material Cause of accident.

THE FIRST MEMBER is proved by the following arguments. i. The intervention of such a potentiality involves an infinite process. For, according to the hypothesis in question, the said potentiality is an accident. Indeed, there is nothing else it could be. Therefore, the question returns: How does substance become the Material Cause of this accident? It must be either immediately by itself or through the medium of another accident. If the former, the hypothesis is subverted; and there is no assignable reason why immediateness of causality should not be conceded in the first instance as well as in the second. If the latter, again returns the question about that third accident; and so on, for ever. ii. The hypothesis is in open contradiction with the universally admitted doctrine touching the Material Cause of accident, as enounced in the hundred and sixtieth Proposition. For if substance be the primary and fundamental Material Cause of accident; to whatever length you may please to multiply your links in the chain of accidents, you must ultimately arrive at an accident which is immediately

united to substance. iii. A third argument is derived from the respective natures of substance and accident in their transcendental relation to each other. For accident has a natural inclination for finite substance; in order that, by informing, it may perfect substance and impart to substance that which, of itself, substance does not possess. Therefore, on the other hand, finite substance must possess in itself a corresponding inclination and immediate capacity for such information. If so, the intervention of an extraneous entity is an impertinence. Therefore, it must be rejected; according to the time-honoured philosophical axiom, that entities ought not to be multiplied without a necessity.

II. There can be no intervention of a real mode distinct from substance, in order that the latter may become Material Cause of accident.

THIS SECOND MEMBER of the present Proposition is so obviously demonstrated by the same arguments as those which have been produced to establish the first, that there is no need of further amplification.

NOTE.

Nothing need be added, either touching that by which substance causes in accident and in the accidental composite or touching the nature of that causality; since the conclusions already deduced concerning the causality of Primordial Matter, hold equally good in the causality of substance relatively to the accidental composite.

DIFFICULTY.

The one great objection urged against the present Proposition is seemingly derived from the teaching of St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor is discussing the question, whether a faculty of the soul is the soul itself. He decides in the negative; adding elsewhere, (for he repeatedly reverts to the same point in his teaching), that the faculties of the soul are accidents in the second species of Quality', -accidents, however, that are properties, that is to say, flowing from the essence. His primary argument in proof is the following: Since potentiality and act divide Being and every Category of Being, the potentiality and (its) act must necessarily be referred to the same Category. Consequently, if the act is not in the Category of Substance; the potentiality, which is denominated such in rela

1 See 1a lxxvii, 1, 5m; Spiritu, a. 11, c.

tion to that act, cannot be in the Category of Substance.' But, if it be true that the potentiality and its act must necessarily be referred to the same Category, substance cannot immediately be the Material Cause of any accident; otherwise, the potentiality would be in one Category and its act in another. There must, consequently, intervene some accidental potentiality or mode between the two, as proximate principle of causality.

ANSWER. Suarez is evidently troubled with this difficulty; and though, out of his wonted reverence for the authority of the Angelic Doctor, he strives to make the best of it, nevertheless, he seems altogether to deny the truth of the dictum as applied to active potentialities, and allows only its partial applicability to passive potentialities. For while somewhat grudgingly admitting its truth in the case of a passive potentiality essentially ordained to such act, as Primordial Matter is; he refuses to own its applicability to passive potentialities intrinsically included in, and concomitants of, any complete entity. But of such sort is the potentiality in dispute, that, namely, of substance as receptive of accident 2.

With all due deference to the opinion of so eminent a philosopher, there does not seem to be any sufficient reason for all these distinctions or exceptions. The dictum of St. Thomas, if rightly understood, is equally applicable to all active as well as passive potentialities. Previously, however, to entering upon the solution of this difficulty, it is necessary to interpose two preliminary observations. i. The distinction between the active potentiality and its Subject is not in all strictness of language physical. This would appear to have been the mind of St. Thomas in the special instance to which he has applied the principle, as quoted above. There are grave reasons (as it seems to the present writer) for concluding that he never intended to establish a physical distinction, strictly speaking, between the human soul and its faculties. For, first of all, he affirms that the human soul is a simple form 3. But, if its essence and its faculties were physically distinct, it would be a composite. Then again, he admits that, if it is considered as a potential whole,

1 Cum potentia et actus dividant ens, et quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus; et ideo, si actus non est in genere substantiae, potentia quae dicitur ad illum actum, non potest esse in genere substantiae.' I lxxvii, 1, c.

3

'Quamvis anima sit forma simplex, sicut et Angelus.' 2 d. iii, Q. 1, a. 4, 1".