:

while the hexagonal prism, terminated by hexagonal pyramids, is the form. Try to imagine the quartz without any external form whatsoever it would become an indeterminate something scarcely perceptible by the senses. For the qualitative accidents,-colour, to take an instance,-require and presuppose a superficies; and a superficies physically connotes a form, or shape, of some sort. The form, then, may be said to practically render it actual to sense. Again: Supposing it possible that the existing lump of quartz should be deprived of all shape, it would be perfectly indeterminate, indifferent, to one form more than another, that is to say, within the limit of those crystalline forms that quartz assumes. Its form, then, determines it to one; and it is incapable of other forms for so long as its hexagonal form continues. Moreover, from the time that it first became a quartz-crystal, it had this hexagonal form by virtue of which it is de facto a crystal. Once more: The form of the crystal is in no slight degree indicative of the specific mineral; so that in many cases a practised mineralogist would be able from it to draw a comparatively safe conclusion as to the nature of the specimen. It is true that the form alone is not always a sufficient indication, because it may be common to more than one mineral; consequently, it will be necessary for him perhaps to take likewise into account the colour, refractive power, cleavage, hardness, even the taste. But still, after all, the form would be of prominent service in enabling him to determine the species. Thus, the oblique rhombohedral shape oft he crystal, combined with other indications, justifies the judgment that he is in presence of a specimen of Iceland-spar; and the oblique octohedra or long prismatic needles, together with the yellow colour, tell him that he is fingering a sulphur crystal. Similarly, the cubical form, together with the peculiar taste, assures him that he is dealing with salt. In the instance of living things, however, the external form determines much more clearly and independently to a sensile cognition of the species. For, as St. Thomas remarks in a passage quoted in the preceding Chapter, the external form is indicative of the species. A bird has one kind of shape,—a fish, another,— reptiles, another,-quadrupeds, another. Any one can tell by the outline, whether the being we are looking at is a cat, or a swan, or a serpent, or a salmon, or a plant; even prescinding from colour, height, &c.

If we now pass on to artificial entities, that is to say, to objects

which have been fashioned by the hand of man,-the analysis will afford still more satisfactory results. A carpenter has in his shop, (we will say), a block of mahogany out of which he makes a round. table. The mahogany is the matter, the table-shape is the form, of this piece of furniture. Now, it is plain that this mass of wood, before the carpenter began upon it, was capable of being made into anything. It was equally capable of being made into a chair, of forming a side-board, or a wardrobe, or a chest of drawers, or a balustrade, &c. Further, in its primitive unformedness it was of itself indifferent to whatsoever shape. Now, however, that the carpenter has impressed upon it by saw, chisel, and plane, the form of a round table, it is determined to one shape; and for so long as it continues to be a round table, it is incapable of receiving any other shape. If it is turned into something else; this can only be done at the expense of the table-form. It cannot at once be a table and a chair. Again: That piece of wood was from the first capable of receiving the table-form, like any other; in other words, it was in potentiality to that form. When the workman's labour is completed, it is in actual possession of the form; and the table is in act. Once more: This table-shape was antecedently communicable to other kinds of wood, to stone, to marble, and the like; it is determined to this individual table by the piece of mahogany that it actually informs. Yet again: The wood and the shape together constitute the table which is the composite artificial entity. Again: This table-form cannot exist outside its wood; neither is it that which is made, nor is the wood that which is made, but the table. Wherefore, the table is made out of the piece of wood shaped in such a manner. Finally: You know the nature of the piece of furniture, the purposes for which it serves, its so-called proper operation, from its form. No one for an instant would imagine that it was made to sit down upon, or to hang up dresses in, or to serve as fence to a staircase. It is evidently intended to support plates, books, and the like.

From the above analysis of these primitive uses of the term, Form, we may gather the principal characteristics of the same in its relation to its Subject, which form the foundation of its specific meaning in Metaphysics. i. The Subject, or material cause, is that element in the constitution of composites, which is indeterminate, indifferent, potential; yet determinable, capable of differentiation and actuation. So much we have seen in the

preceding Chapter. ii. The Form is that other element which determines, differentiates, actuates the matter. iii. Out of the union of these two arises the composite. iv. Neither the Form nor the matter is made, but the composite; though the composite is made to be that which it is by virtue of the Form, principally at least. v. The Form is of itself communicable to many matters, or Subjects, and is individually determined by the Subject. Hence, prior to its existence in the Subject, it is a universal, vi. The Form determines the specific nature of the composite. vii. It is the source of the natural operation of the composite, proportionately to its nature. viii. It cannot, however, naturally exist outside of the composite. ix. A plurality of Forms specifically the same in one and the same Subject is impossible.

There is another term that will occur over and over again in the present Chapter; and it is therefore proposed to submit it to a like analysis. There can be little doubt that the word, act, was originally employed to express a human deed,-something done by a man. Indeed, this continues to be its signification in ordinary speech. In fieri,-that is to say, during the course of its production, it is commonly called action; in facto esse,—that is to say, in its completed production which is the term of motion,—it is properly speaking act. Thus, to give an example, the blacksmith is at his forge hammering a bar of iron on the anvil. The seizure of the hammer, the swing of the arm, are action; the blow inflicted on the iron is the act. So, to take another instance,—a man resolves to draw up his testament. The deliberation about it, the weighing of motives for and against, the seeking for advice, are the action; the final determination is the act. Now, let us proceed to analyze this second instance. It is sufficiently plain that the supposed person could not have made up his mind, as it is called, unless he had a free-will;-in other words, unless he had in his soul a power, or faculty, of freely choosing. What, then, is there observable about this faculty, or active power, before the idea of making his testament came into the man's mind? Evidently enough, it was in a complete state of indifference and indetermination with regard to the said testament. Let us further suppose, for the sake of making the matter more clear, that this determination to make his testament is the first choice the supposed testator has ever made in his life. In such case his will up to this time has been purely facultative, or as it might be otherwise

expressed-in simple potentiality. He has a will, but he has never used it before. In that previous time his will was capable of choosing anything and was indifferent to everything. Further:

In itself it is an imperfect entity, and useless so long as it remains merely what it is. But the question of the testament turns up; and the human will is set going. It decides in favour of making the testament. We will now look at it, as it appears in its completed election. There is something new in the will, which was not there before. The faculty is in act. It has become perfected, and has in a certain sense attained to the fulness of entity which its nature admits. At the same time its previous condition is changed. It has so far lost its indetermination, and is determined to one. It is no longer indifferent, so far as the drawing up of the testament is concerned; and, provided that the purpose remains unchanged, it is individually completed. If there should be a change of purpose, it will be by virtue of a new act. In like manner, the blacksmith, -to recur to the first example,-has a muscular power in his arm; and he might put it to service in a multitude of ways. He might fell trees, or carry burdens, or train for a pugilist, or go through his drill as a soldier, or exhibit as an acrobat, or take to shipcarpentering, as to a multitude of other things. One thing is certain; that, till he employs it in some way or other, his strength of arm is of little use to him. As a fact, however, he uses it on his anvil. It comes into act; and by the act is determined in one particular direction. Moreover, the bodily faculty is perfected by something within itself added to itself, and may be said to exist in the natural fulness of its entity.

Let us collect what has been learnt by this analysis. i. In all created things act and potentiality are correlatives. A potentiality supposes an act as natural term of its perfectness; an act supposes a potentiality as that from which it must spring and in which it must inhere. ii. The potentiality by itself is indeterminate, indifferent, imperfect, as it were dimidiate being; having a natural inclination towards its act, forasmuch as every entity naturally tends towards its own perfection. iii. The act is perfective of the potentiality, and determines it to one. iv. The act specifically informs the potentiality,-that is to say, it reduces the latter in one way or other under some particular species. v. It must be borne in mind, however, that there is a considerable difference, even as touching the present comparative analysis, between a

passive, and active potentiality such as we have been contemplating. The difference will be seen more plainly as we advance in this Chapter.

Such, then, are the principal elements that constitute the transcendental concepts of Form and Act.

PROPOSITION CLXXIV.

Every Form is an act.

PROLEGOMENON.

As St. Thomas declares in passages quoted during the course of the preceding Chapter, there are two acts common to every entity. These go by the names of the first and second acts. The first act is that of being. Since all finite entities were once not-being, but capable of being; they were in potentiality to being. That potentiality is determined by the act of existing. (In the Infinite Being there is no such potentiality; accordingly He is pure Act, and first and second Act in One). Such is the first act. Again: Every entity, once constituted, is determined to a proper and specific operation by which it naturally tends towards its constituted end. This is the second act; and it is called second, because a thing must first exist, in order to energize. The Angelic Doctor in the following passage explains the division, as it might seem at first sight, after a somewhat different manner. The act of a Form,' he remarks, is twofold. One is operation,—as, for instance, to impart warmth,-which is the second act. Such act is attributed to the supposit of the Form,'-that is to say, to the integral, subsisting, substance. But the other act of a Form is the informing of the matter, which is the first act;—as, for instance, to quicken the body is the act of the soul. Such act is not attributed to the supposit of the Form1. It is easy to see, however, that St. Thomas is here speaking of the twofold act of the Form; whereas in the present Prolegomenon it is question of the

1 'Duplex est actus formae. Unus qui est operatio, ut calefacere, qui est actus secundus; et talis actus formae supposito attribuitur. Alius vero actus formae est materiae informatio, quae est actus primus; sicut vivificare corpus est actus animae; et talis actus supposito formae non attribuitur.' Verit. Q. xxvii, a. 3, 25m.