other accidents, on substance. Further: In answer to the first objection in the same Article, St. Thomas adds: The first accidents that follow upon substance are quantity and quality. And these two are proportioned to the two essential principiants of' material substance,-to wit, the Form and the matter. For this reason Plato laid it down that great and small are differences of matter; whereas quality is on the side of the Form. Again: Because matter is the first Subject which is in no other, while the Form is in something else, viz. matter; for this reason quantity approaches nearer to this characteristic of not being in another than quality, and consequently than the other accidents 2.'

In these two passages we have a summary, sufficient for our present purpose, of the teaching of the Angelic Doctor touching this question of quantity. He tells us, first of all, that there is no difference between quantity and the other accidents on the point of their one and all depending for their being on the composite substance. But, in the second place, quantity and quality, the two primary accidents,-differ from one another, in that quantity approaches more nearly to the nature of matter, while quality approaches more nearly to that of the Form,-the two essential constitutives of bodies. The reason why quantity approaches more nearly to the nature of matter, is this, that it is receptive of qualities and has, moreover, a universality or indeterminateness of its own in such wise that it appertains to matter as a whole, not to this or that portion separately. Its very nature is, as it were, generic; so that, as the Angelic Doctor teaches elsewhere, it accompanies the body-Form, which is the first

1 'Prima autem dispositio materiae est quantitas; quia secundum ipsam attenditur divisio ejus et indivisio, et ita unitas et multitudo, quae sunt prima consequentia ens; et propter hoc sunt dispositiones totius materiae, non hujus aut illius tantem. Unde omnia alia accidentia mediante quantitate in substantia fundantur, et quantitas est prior eis naturaliter; et ideo non claudit materiam sensibilem in ratione sua, quamvis claudat materiam intelligibilem, ut dicitur in 7 Metaph. Unde ex hoc quidam decepti fuerunt, ut crederent dimensiones esse substantiam rerum sensibilium; quia remotis qualitatibus nihil sensibile remanere videbant nisi quantitatem, quae tamen secundum esse suum dependet a substantia, sicut et alia accidentia.' 4 d. xii, Q. I, a. I, q. 3, c.

2 Prima accidentia consequentia substantiam sunt quantitas et qualitas; et haec duo proportionantur duobus principiis essentialibus substantiae, scilicet formae et materiae (unde magnum et parvum Plato posuit differentias materiae); sed qualitas ex parte formae. Et quia materia est subjectum primum quod non est in alio, forma autem est in alio, scilicet materia; ideo magis appropinquat ad hoc quod est non esse in alio quantitas quam qualitas, et per consequens quam alia accidentia.' Ibidem, Im

Form of matter and is virtually contained in every specific material substance. Lastly, it does not include in its definition, (for the Subject enters obliquely into the definition of an accident), sensile substance or matter; because material substance, denuded of quantity and its qualities, is not pervious to sense. But it includes intelligible matter and substance, which is the formal subjectmatter of mathematics.

From the above doctrine of St. Thomas we are enabled to extract the solution of the difficulty proposed. It is impossible to admit, (looking at the whole question metaphysically), that quantity can precede the information of matter by the Form, and the consequent constitution of the composite, in order of nature; for quantity, just like any other accident, depends for its being on the integral substance. Looking, however, at the same question in the concrete, it divides itself off into two, corresponding with the twofold order in the constitution of material substances. In the creation of the primordial elements, the concreated substantial Form brought along with it, so to say, quantity together with the other accidents. Neither was the apportionment of matter a previous necessity; since the Form, by actuating, portioned the matter. In the natural generation of bodies the case is different. There can be no doubt that quantity, like many qualitative accidents afterwards to become accidents of the new substance, precedes even in order of time the eduction of the new Form as a material disposition; since it, together with the others, exists under the previous substance that is corrupted. But, as has been said already, it receives a new existence with the generation of the new substance.

iii. The third objection is derived from the evolution of higher Forms, as taught by St. Thomas. We have seen how in the human embryo, for instance, the matter progresses in organization till it evolves the vegetable-Form ;-how the organization goes on, till the animal-Form supervenes ;-how the organization proceeds yet further, until the human soul is breathed forth by creation into the fully organized body. This gradual development of organization is a necessary disposition by which the matter is prepared step by step for nobler Forms; and it continues through the whole process of transformations. But, after the explanations already given the answer is easy. Such organization is an accident,-or rather a congeries of accidents,-of material substance; and, in the generation of each new composite, receives a fresh existence.

ARTICLE VII.

The unicity of the substantial Form.

The question proposed for consideration in the present Article should at the outset be clearly understood. It is this: Whether it is either naturally possible or at the least possible to the Divine Omnipotence, (Which is able to do any thing that does not involve a contradiction in terms), that more than one substantial Form should simultaneously inform the same portion of matter, or the same body. In the discussion of this question, (as, indeed, in that of others), the writer is bound to study the special requirements of the age in which he lives as well as the end which he has proposed to himself in the publication of the present Work. There are opinions, which of their nature would seem to claim a place in the proposed investigation, that will be entirely omitted, because they have become obsolete and have long since ceased to excite any interest. Such, for instance, is the opinion of the Manicheans, that man has two souls,-the one from the principle of good, the other from the principle of evil. Such, too, is the opinion of Occam, who would seem to have professed a somewhat similar theory, and has besides introduced a formal distinction between these two souls and the body-Form, with a similar distinction between this last and the sensitive Form in animals. Most of these forgotten, because erroneous, speculations will not be raised from their grave. One or two, which claim some amount of Scholastic authority, will be brought before the reader's notice but summarily dealt with. On the other hand, there are opinions, allied to the present question, which have an important bearing on subjects of modern interest and on recent discoveries in Physics. To these a marked prominence will be given.

As Suarez points out, there are three ways in which we may conceive a multiplication of substantial Forms to be possible in one and the same portion of matter. It may be maintained that there is one primary and dominant Form among the group, to which the remainder are essentially subordinate; or, secondly, that there is one essentially determinant Form which the remainder subserve as dispositions, so that the latter may be regarded as partial constituents of the material cause of the principal Form; or, lastly, that there is a congeries of Forms equal and independent of each other.

Previously, however, to entering upon the consideration of these special hypotheses, the general question arises, whether under any conditions the existence of more than one Form in the same body is possible; if possible, to what extent possible. Consequently, the Article naturally divides itself into the four following sections:

1. The possibility in general of such a multiplication of substantial Forms in the same composite.

2. The possibility of multiplication with a subordination of the rest to one dominant Form.

3. The possibility of the co-existence with the determining Form of other dispositive Forms.

4. The possibility of the co-existence of Forms independent of each other in the same composite.

The possibility in general of a multiplication of substantial Forms in the same substance.

PROPOSITION CCVIII.

It is naturally impossible that more than one substantial Form should exist simultaneously in one and the same bodily substance.

THE PROPOSITION IS PROVED BY THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS:

I. Every entity owes its being and its entity to the same cause; because unity is a transcendental attribute of being. From the fact that a thing is Being, it is ipso facto one. But bodily substance owes its Being to the substantial Form. Therefore, to the substantial Form it likewise owes its unity. If, then, there were more than one substantial Form in one body, there would be more than one bodily substance. Even supposing, therefore, for the sake of argument, that the same portion of matter could admit of being actuated by more than one Form, the result would be the constitution of two or more integral substances. Let us, by way of illustration, imagine the same portion of matter to be informed at once by a rose-tree-Form and a dog-Form; plainly enough two distinct substances would be generated,-to wit, a rose-tree and a dog. This is the argument on which the Angelic Doctor seems principally to rely, when establishing the truth of the present Thesis. Thus; for

instance, demonstrating that there is but one soul in man, he argues as follows: It is impossible that in one and the same entity there should be a plurality of substantial Forms, for the reason that a thing derives its Being and its unity from the same source. Now it is manifest that an entity receives its Being through the Form; wherefore, through the Form likewise it receives its unity. Consequently, wherever there is a multitude of Forms, the entity is not simply one; as, for instance, a white man is not simply one,'because he is accidentally white and substantially man ;- and a twofooted animal would not be one simply, if he were animal from one cause and two-footed from another, as the Philosopher observes1.' So, again, in another place where he is discussing the same subject, he repeats the same argument. An entity,' he writes, 'has its Being and its unity from the same source; for unity follows upon Being. Since, therefore, everything has Being from its Form; from its Form likewise will it have unity. On the hypothesis, then, that there are more souls than one in man after the manner of different Forms, man will not be one Being but many. Neither will an order in the Forms suffice for the unity of man; because unity of order is not simply order, since it is the least of unities 2.'

II. It is naturally impossible that more than one Form should simultaneously actuate the same portion of matter. The first reason is as follows: Matter, as we have seen, is a pure passive potentiality, and this connotes three things; first, a disposition for actuation as the essential complement of its perfection; secondly, an indifference as to the particular Form by which it is actuated; and lastly, an essential dependence on the Form for its existence. But its disposition, or tendency, towards actuation is satisfied by the information of one Form; its essential dependence receives adequate support from one Form; while it is indifferent to actuation by any other.

1 'Impossibile est in uno et eodem esse plures formas substantiales et hoc ideo quia ab eodem habet res esse et unitatem. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam; unde et per formam res habet unitatem. Et propter hoc, ubicum. que est multitudo formarum, non est unum simpliciter; sicut homo albus non est unum simpliciter, nec animal bipes esset unum simpliciter, si ab alio esset animal et ab alio bipes, ut Philosophus dicit.' Quol. L. I, a. 6, c.

2 Ab eodem aliquid habet esse et unitatem; unum enim consequitur ad ens. Cum igitur a forma unaquaeque res habeat esse, a forma etiam habebit unitatem. Si igitur in homine ponantur plures animae sicut diversae formae, homo non erit unum ens, sed plura; nec ad unitatem hominis ordo formarum sufficiet, quia esse unum secundum ordinem non est esse unum simpliciter, cum unitas ordinis sit minima unitatum.' Cg. L. II, co 58.