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or union of continuity, which is characteristic of extension, and causes that the quantified entity should be capable of division into parts, each one of which is entitatively less than the whole. An illustration will best serve to explain what is here meant. The Naïdidae, or water-worms, exhibit a singular process of reproduction. In this process,' says Dr. Nicholson, the Naïs throws out a bud between two rings, at a point generally near the middle of the body. Not only is this bud developed into a fresh individual, but the two portions of the parent marked out by the budding point likewise become developed into separate individuals. The portion of the parent in front of the bud develops a tail, whilst the portion behind the bud develops a head '.' Here, then, we have at first one substantial Form and one body; afterwards, three substantial Forms and three bodies. In other words, that which was originally one living substance becomes three living substances. Now, each of these three newly generated animals has less matter, less quantity, than the original animal; taken together, they equal the latter in both. Informed matter, therefore, is capable of quantified totality. But what about the Forms? This is certain; that, whereas at the outset there was but one, by the separation of the matter there have arisen three. It is not necessary now to enter into the question touching the existence of these Forms; for thus much will not be denied, that the primitive worm had no more of act or Form than any one of the three into which it has developed. All in this respect are equal: They possess the substantial Form of the Naïs, which is capable of neither more nor less, but either is or is not. In like manner, if one flame is divided into two, there is as complete and adequate a Fire-Form in the parts as in the whole. These bodily Forms, therefore, do not exhibit a quantitative totality.

PROLEGOMENON II.

By presential determination is to be understood such determination to place as this, viz. that within the given limit the entity so determined exists and outside that limit exists not. Functional determination means the entire limitation of the faculty in its exercise to a particular part or organ. Thus, for instance, the human soul is presentially determined, like every other substantial act, by the limits of its body; and its vegetative and sensitive

faculties are functionally determined to this or that organ; but in its faculties of intellect and will it is not functionally determined.

PROLEGOMENON III.

The word, absolutely, in the Enunciation needs to be explained. An entity, then, is said to be absolutely capable of quantitative totality, when it is of such a nature as to admit of union with quantity as Subject of quantity, just as-for instance-matter is. On the other hand, an entity is said to be capable by accident of quantitative totality, when, though in its own nature it may be incapable of information by quantity, it nevertheless becomes to a certain extent subject to quantity, on account of its natural connection with another entity that is quantitatively informed. Thus, a qualitative Form is essentially connected, immediately with quantity as being its immediate Subject, mediately with the integral substance as being its ultimate and adequate Subject. In itself, however, it is a pure Form and, consequently, simple. Since, then, it is quantitatively divisible, (for of this there can be no question), yet not in virtue of its own entity but by virtue of its inhesion in quantified matter, it is capable of quantitative totality only by accident. But remark, in order even to thus much it is necessary that a part should be entitatively less than the whole. Thus, for instance, the sweetness in one small lump of sugar is less than the sweetness in two lumps; as we know from the experience of the break fast-table.

PROLEGOMENON IV.

It is obvious that the substantial bodily Form is here considered as actually informing the matter; for, apart from the matter it cannot exist and, therefore, is capable of nothing.

I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER of the Proposition it is maintained, that the bodily substantial Form is ABSOLUTELY incapable of quantitative totality. As we shall see presently, the intimate reason of this is explained by the Angelic Doctor. The proof is as follows. That Form which neither presupposes nor is founded in quantity, is not capable absolutely of quantitative totality. But a substantial Form neither presupposes nor is founded in quantity. Therefore, etc. The Minor is evident from all that has gone before touching the mutual relation between substance and accident. The Major is thus declared. Every Form is an act; and every material Form

actuates its Subject according to the nature of that Subject. But the substantial Form actuates primordial matter antecedently (in order of nature) to the quantification of the composite, as is plain; since the actuation of the matter by the Form is the constitution of the composite. Therefore, it is simply the act of a passive potentiality and wholly actuates an indivisible whole. Hence likewise it follows, that the subsequent (in order of nature) information of the composite by quantity cannot absolutely quantify the Form, because it is a Form. For all that it is, is act; and, if it could be quantified, it would no longer be wholly in all but partly here and partly there. This, however, would suffice to change its essential

nature.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER it is asserted, that these bodily Forms are presentially determined by the quantity of the substantial composite; which is thus declared. The substantial Form, because it is act of this definite portion of matter, is determined to it exclusively; and it is in this sense St. Thomas teaches that it is individualized by matter. An act cannot possibly be outside of the potentiality that it actuates. Consequently, when the composite is determined by quantity to a certain local extension, its Form is entitatively limited within the boundary of that extension; so that it is wholly there everywhere, but nowhere else.

III. IN THE THIRD MEMBER it is stated, that the Form is functionally determined by the quantity of the composite substance; which is thus declared. The purely material powers, or faculties, of all bodily Forms are determined in their exercise to certain particular organs. As soon, then, as these organs are locally extended by the supervening quantity, the faculties of the Form are determined in their exercise to a particular place in the body, occupied by its own organ. Therefore, the Form itself functionally is determined to such or such a particular place in the body by virtue of the quantity in the composite.

IV. THE FOURTH MEMBER declares, that this functional determination of the Form is either entire or partial; which is thus declared. Those material Forms, not all of whose functions are material, are not quantitatively determinable, so far as relates to those faculties which either are not material or in any way transcend material conditions. Hence, the human faculties of intellect and will of themselves are limited in their exercise to no bodily organ; though, for so long as the soul continues united to the body, they require

the co-operation of other lower faculties that only energize in and by some bodily organ.

NOTE.

From the above declarations a truth is made clear, which will claim our special attention in another Book. There is a real, physical, distinction between difference of parts,-or what may be called entitative extension,-and local extension which is the result of quantity. A material entity may have a most complex arrangement of parts, and yet de potentia absoluta might exist as a mathematical point, so far as space is concerned. To put it yet more plainly-Organism and an indefinite multiplicity of parts entitatively distinct from each other do not necessarily,--that is to say, independently of the constituted order of nature,-connote a correlative extension in space. Thus, de potentia absoluta the whole fabric of the visible universe, as it now is, might be so self-contained as to escape all actual or possible microscopic observation.

PROPOSITION CCXIV.

That retention of life after physical division of the organized body, which is observable in plants and in certain lower grades of animal life, is due, on the part of the Form, to the paucity of its faculties and, on the part of the body, to a corresponding paucity of its parts and organs.

PROLEGOMENON.

Suarez maintains the opinion, that the souls of all living bodies are subject to quantitative division, with the single exception of the human soul. Consistent with himself, he admits a specific diversity of parts in these Forms. Thus, speaking of plants, he observes: It may be easily granted that, in the different heterogeneous parts of the plant, there are different heterogeneous parts of the Form. For, of a truth, in a tree that part of the Form which is in a leaf, is not of the same nature as the part that is in a fruit.' Further on, he adds: 'Though there is some controversy touching the souls of perfect animals, I nevertheless consider it more probable that no material Form is truly and properly indivisible.' Finally: A little further on, he thus sums up: 'I think it more probable, in the case of living entities which have extended souls,' he assumes such to be the case with all plants

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and with all animals except man, that, between the parts of the soul which inform different organic parts, there is a greater diversity than there is between the parts of a homogeneous Form,'-such as is found in inanimate and inorganic substances;-and that, therefore, there is in the substance itself a sort of diversity between these parts, which may rightly be called a specific partibility'.' Here once more the author feels compelled to dissent from the opinion of this eminent philosopher. First of all, it is quite opposed to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, as will be seen in a future Thesis. From a careful inspection of the doctrine of St. Thomas, indeed, it seems very doubtful whether in his opinion any material Forms, even such as inform inanimate bodies, are capable, strictly speaking, of quantitative division. Certain it is that he denies such capability, considered as absolutely belonging to them; and it may fairly be disputed whether he admits that it is theirs by accident. As to the souls of the more perfect animals, he categorically denies that they are capable of quantitative totality and, consequently, of quantitative division, either absolutely or by accident. Of the souls belonging to the inferior grades of animal life, which in this respect may be considered as on a par with vegetative Forms,-he invariably speaks with hesitation. This latter point will be discussed, when his teaching on the question generally is brought before the notice of the reader. Other reasons for dissenting from the opinion of Suarez have been partly suggested in the preceding Theses, and will receive addition from those which have yet to follow. As touching plants in particular, which form part of the subject embraced in the present Proposition: Comparatively recent discoveries in botany, while tending to subvert the foundation on which Suarez professes to rest his opinion, have added proportional strength to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. It is little more than a hundred years ago, that certain botanists,-principally Goethe,-came to find out that a whole flower is only a terminal stem, or branch, under another form; and that all its parts and organs are merely modifications of a leaf. The sepals of the calyx and the petals that form the corolla, spite of the often rich and varied colours of the latter, speak for themselves in the great majority of instances; but it is not so clear at first sight with regard to the special organs

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