pound they become relaxed in energy by mutual reaction, and conspire towards the production of the substantial Form of the compound. Against both these opinions the truth of the present Thesis must be established.

DECLARATION OF THE PROPOSITION.

i. The argument of St. Thomas against the first opinion, that of Avicenna,—is irrefragable. It is naturally impossible that more than one body should occupy one and the same place by reason of their mutual impenetrability. But the said opinion supposes more than one body to occupy one and the same place. Therefore, etc. The Minor is thus proved. Diverse substantial Forms postulate as their respective Subjects diverse portions of matter and, because diverse portions of matter, diverse bodies. For there can be no portioning of matter without dimensions; and matter with dimensions is a body. On the other hand, these bodies must be in one and the same place; because they are supposed to exist inseparably together in the one place of the compound. If they do not so exist, they must be in mere juxtaposition,-like wine and water, or oxygen and nitrogen in the air,-and consequently do not form a true compound. Further,—to borrow another argument of St. Thomas 1,-each substantial Form requires its own proper dispositions. But it is impossible that separate dispositions, often mutually repugnant, should exist in the same Subject. Thus, for instance, the Forms of sulphur and hydrogen respectively require repugnant dispositions; for sulphur in a natural state is a solid, has a yellow colour, assumes crystalline shapes, while hydrogen is a gas, colourless, and incapable of crystallization.

ii. The opinion of Averrhöes is refuted by the following arguments of the Angelic Doctor 2. First of all, the substantial entity .of any body is indivisible; so that a substantial Form which determines the specific substantial entity of a body is not capable of increase or diminution. Accordingly, Aristotle in his Categories expressly excludes more and less from the Category of Substance. Secondly, the existence of a hybrid Form,-half substance, half accident, is impossible; for on its one side it would be essentially presupposed to the composite, on the other, the composite would

1 Opusc. XXXIII (aliter XXIX), De mixtione Elementorum.
2 Ibidem.

be essentially presupposed to it as being its Subject. Besides, substantial Forms are in matter but not in an integral Subject, whereas accidental Forms are in the integral substance. Lastly,-to quote the words of St. Thomas,- It is ridiculous to talk of a medium between things which do not belong to the same Category; because the medium and its extremes must belong to the same Category, as is proved in the tenth Book of the Metaphysics'

§ 4.

The possibility of a multiplication in the same composite of substantial Forms which are independent of each other.

PROPOSITION CCXVIII.

It is impossible that two or more independent substantial Forms should simultaneously actuate one and the same portion of matter.

This Proposition has been subjoined, in order to exhaust the number of possible cases wherein a multiplication of substantial Forms in one and the same composite is supposable. But it needs no declaration; since its truth has been already abundantly established in the earlier Theses of the present Article.

ARTICLE VIII.

The Metaphysical Form.

Having ended the discussions touching physical substantial Forms; it follows in order, previous to approaching the consideration of accidental, that we should determine the nature of metaphysical, Forms. For these latter are identified with the essences of things and, in consequence, are more cognate than accidents with the physical substantial Form.

It must be clearly understood at the outset, that the terms, Composite, Form, Subject, etc., when used in a purely metaphysical sense, are analogical in their application; since the ideas which they represent are primarily representative of those physical entities from which they have been originally derived. The sub

1 Item ridiculum est dicere medium esse inter ea quae non sunt unius generis; quia medium et extrema oportet ejusdem generis esse, ut probatur in 10 Metaph.' Ibidem, p. m.

stantial Form and the matter are real physical parts constitutive of a real physical whole, and are only inseparable de potentia absoluta because they are mutually necessary to each other's existence by reason of their substantive imperfection. But the metaphysical Form and Subject are not real parts, though they are entitatively real; neither do they constitute a real composite. Perhaps the above statement stands in need of a short explanation. Let us then very briefly recall the ideas about matter and Form which, it is to be presumed, have been now sufficiently precised. The material cause, as it exhibits itself in material substances, is something undetermined in itself but capable of, and essentially disposed towards, determination,-something receptive of actuation, -something inchoative,-in a word, Subject of natural differentiation. The formal cause or Form, on the other hand, is a determining principiant,-an act,-constitutive of the specific nature, -the perfection, the beauty and splendour, of Being. Accordingly, wherever in the objective concept there is presented to the mind in what way soever the indeterminate, the inchoative, or the passively potential, there the concept of a Subject naturally arises. On the other hand, wherever in the objective concept there is presented to the mind the determinating, the perfect, the actuating, the actual, there the concept of a Form naturally arises. Form fashions the world, surmounts the world, and finds its full expression in the Infinite Who is Act Itself. Thus apparisoned, we may safely enter upon the present discussion.

PROPOSITION CCXIX.

The metaphysical Form is twofold, in accordance with a twofold metaphysical composition.

DECLARATION OF THE THESIS.

Every essence may be metaphysically regarded in two ways. It may be considered as a whole in the abstract, yet connoting a transcendental relation to supposit; or it may be considered analytically as determined to its specific nature by its ultimate specific difference. Both these ways of contemplating it are founded in reality; yet they are very different in the respective concepts by which they represent essence. In the former case the metaphysical

composite will be the entire abstract essence conceived as united to supposit,-not to this or that individual supposit, but to indeterminate supposit; in the latter case, the entire essence is resolved into its material and formal parts, and the composite consists in the synthesis of these two metaphysical parts. To take an instance, by way of illustration: Vegetativeness is an entire essence, considered in the abstract; yet connoting a transcendental relation to a supposit in general, that is to say, (because it is a substantial essence), to a subsistent existence on its own account, without support from, or a belonging to, any other entity. The metaphysical composition of these two will be vegetable, which is vegetativeness in the concrete. Such metaphysical composition and corresponding concept of a metaphysical Form are conceivable of all finite being, and not of substance only. Wherefore,-to describe it as it is in its transcendental universality,-it may be said that being is the material part, and the essence by which being is determined to this specific being is considered as the metaphysical Form. The former is the quod, the latter the quo, of the School. Thus, for instance, whiteness is the Form by which an accidental being is white. On the other hand, the concept vegetativeness may be analyzed, and separated into that which is common to it with other grades of being and that which is specifically determinative of its own essence. For instance,--for the analysis differs according to the line of abstraction, or relationship with other grades of being, that may have been selected,-vegetativeness is seen to include the general concept of life, and the determining concept of the vegetable form of life. The union of these two metaphysical parts, resulting in vegetative life,-constitutes a metaphysical composition plainly different from the former; for in the one the metaphysical Form of the composite is the entire essence; in the other, the entire essence is the composite and the specific difference the Form.

The Angelic Doctor sets forth this twofold concept with his usual succinctness. There is a twofold limitation of a Form,' he writes, one by which the specific Form is limited to the individual,' in a way to be explained presently. And such limitation of the Form is by means of the matter. There is another' limitation by which a generic Form is limited to a specific nature. Such limitation of the Form is not made by matter, but by a more determinate Form from which the difference is assumed. For the

difference, added over and above the genus, contracts it to species'.' It is true that he is here alluding, in the former of these two divisions, to material Forms and their physical individuation; but the principle will apply equally, as will be seen, to the metaphysical composition first mentioned.

The nature of these respective metaphysical Forms will be better understood, now that we proceed to consider them separately.

PROPOSITION CCXX.

Substance is metaphysically composed of its integral essence and supposit; and in such composition the integral essence is the metaphysical Form, while the supposit may be considered as the material cause.

PROLEGOMENON I.

As no science deals with individuals, as such, but with universals; à fortiori Metaphysics, the queen of the sciences, cannot admit individuals into its subject-matter. If such, then, is the case, how can it ex professo deal with supposit which connotes the individuation of its substantial Subject? Again: It has been enforced in the first Book that Metaphysics treats of essences, not of existences; forasmuch as the latter are contingent and mutable, whereas the former are necessary and eternal. Yet here existences seem to be the metaphysical composites that are the exclusive subject of the present Proposition. It is to be observed,-in order to obviate that which might otherwise prove a difficulty,-that, (as there has been occasion to remark before), Metaphysics does not concern itself with the individual and existent as a physical fact, but as a real entity having its own nature. But again: Though supposit connotes individuation, and after a manner existence, like all other realities; yet its objective concept is separate from both. Accordingly, we can consider supposit as a universal concept and prescind, as in the case of other abstract ideas, from its actual existence. Regarded as such, it is a universal, embracing

1 'Duplex est limitatio formae. Una quidem secundum quod forma speciei limitatur ad individuum; et talis limitatio formae est per materiam. Alia vero secundum quod forma generis limitatur ad naturam speciei; et talis limitatio formae non fit per materiam, sed per formam magis determinatam, a qua sumitur differentia; differentia enim addita super genus contrahit ipsum ad speciem.' Spiritu. a. 1, 2TM. Vide Ibidem, 8m