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whether de potentia absoluta it could exist in the said state of separation, unless actually informed by its qualities. But, on the other hand, qualities are purely actuating Forms. Thus, for instance, the yellow in a jasmine-flower simply informs, or actuates, the quantity of the petals and, by means of the quantity, the petals themselves. It has no other either formal or material function. There is an instrumental causality which it possesses; but that is altogether outside the present question.

If follows from the preceding exposition, that the arguments adduced in proof of the inseparability of the substantial Form from its Subject apply with equal force to the case of qualities; for, as will be explained presently, accidental-like substantialForms are educed from the potentiality of their Subject, and have an essential dependence upon it. Indeed, the arguments are in one respect more cogent when applied to qualities than when applied to substantial Forms; because the latter are, so to say, in potentiality as to their faculties and forces. If, then, qualities could be separated from their Subject, (since they are actuating acts simply and exclusively); they would be acts of nothing,—that is, no acts at all, that is, absolute nothingness.

Here, however, it is necessary to interpose a remark; otherwise, the reader might labour under a false impression. The immediate Subject of qualities is, it is necessary to repeat,-quantity; and it is only through the medium of this latter that the qualities inhere in substance. When, then, it is said that a quality is inseparable de potentia absoluta from its Subject; the meaning is, that it is so inseparable from its immediate Subject, i. e. quantity. For, seeing that it inheres in substance, only through the medium of quantity; if quantity is inseparable de potentia absoluta from substance, it will follow that quality is likewise separable from substance, although incapable of separation from quantity, its immediate Subject, or rather, because inseparable from the latter, it is separable from the former.

It is here affirmed, then, that it is absolutely impossible for qualities to be preserved in a state of separation from the quantity which they inform. For this assertion we have the plain authority of the Angelic Doctor. For, treating expressly of this question, he writes as if with a smile: The nature of whiteness by a miracle might be made to be without any quantity; nevertheless, such whiteness would not be the same as this,' (i. e. individual) sensible

whiteness, but would be a sort of intelligible Form, like those separate Forms that Plato invented;' that is to say, if anything real, an exemplar Idea in the Mind of God. But that this sensible individuated whiteness should exist without quantity, is impossible; although it is possible that individuated quantity should exist without substance 1.' If this be true, then actual inherence in its immediate Subject is of the essential nature of a quality. Therefore it follows that there is no real distinction between its actual entity and its inhesion. Its existence is in quantity and, through quantity, in the material substance.

NOTE.

The truth maintained in this Proposition is equally applicable, in its way, to the fourth Category,-viz. that of Relation; but it would not be possible to demonstrate this assertion without supposing on the part of the reader a knowledge touching relations, which it is intended to set before him in the seventh Book. Suffice it here to say, that it is impossible de potentia absoluta to separate either fatherhood, or the real foundation on which fatherhood rests, from the father of whom the relation is predicated.

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The primary and adequate effect of the formal causality of accidents is the accidental composite.

DECLARATION OF THE PROPOSITION.

It does not require many words to establish the truth of the above Enunciation; more particularly after our previous treatment of the parallel question touching the adequate effect of the substantial Form. Let the argument be put, then, in the following shape. That is the primary and adequate effect of a cause within the limits of a given causality, which is the adequate term of its natural operation or, in other words, the end of its essential energy. But

1 'Posset ergo fieri miraculo ut natura albedinis subsisteret absque omni quantitate; tamen illa albedo non esset sicut haec albedo sensibilis, sed esset quaedam forma intelligibilis ad modum formarum separatarum, quas Plato posuit. Sed quod haec albedo sensibilis individuata esset sine quantitate, fieri non posset, quamvis fieri possit quod quantitas individuata sit sine substantia.' Quol. L. vii, a. 10, c.

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the accidental composite is the adequate term of the natural operation, or essential energy, of the accidental Form within the limits of its formal causality. Therefore, etc. The Minor is thus declared. The accidental composite is the integral body, (in the instance of material substance), constituted by the substantial Subject together with its accident or accidents. Such are all existing substances, whether material or immaterial. If material substances), which are the main object of inquiry at present), were not thus constituted in conjunction with their accidents, they would neither be subject to sensile perception nor capable of their natural operation. For in the natural order all the interaction of substances in their various grades of excellence, by which the universal harmony and Divine meaning of the visible-to say nothing of the invisible-creation are realized, is effected through the instrumentality of accidents; so that, without them, the action of each material substance would be purely immanent. Accordingly, if material substances should be without quantity and qualities, they would be in solitary confinement,-in presence of one another, as though they were not, perfectly idle in the commonwealth of being. But the entity of accident is not Being, but Being of Being. It is the act of substance, as the substantial Form is the act of matter. It is that by which another has Being, rather than Being itself. In other words, all that it has and is, it has and is in, and for the sake of, substance. Hence it follows, that the term of its natural operation and of its essential energy is not the mere actuation of substance, but the perfecting of the latter in its operation by conjunction with it in one and the same composite. As, then, the adequate term of the formal causality of the substantial Form is the substantial composite; so the adequate term of the formal causality of the accidental Form is the accidental composite.

The same, servatis servandis, holds good in the instance of spiritual accidental Forms relatively to spiritual substance.

PROPOSITION CCXXX.

The formal and proximate effect of the causality of the accidental Form is the actuation of the accidental potentiality of its Subject.

PROLEGOMENON.

In the opinion of Suarez, the Subject cannot be allowed to be one of the effects of the accidental Form. Against the opposite opinion,

which is here maintained, he brings forward certain objections that will be considered in their place.

DECLARATION OF THE PROPOSITION.

(i) The constitution of the accidental composite cannot be the formal and proximate effect of the causality of an accidental Form; because the constituted accidental composite essentially includes the accident itself. But no Form, in strictness of speech, can be formal cause of itself. (ii) The formal effect of every Form is actuation, not constitution. For every Form is an act; and the correlative of act is actuated. The constitution of the composite follows as a consequence. Further: Since the constitution of the composite is by the actuation of the substance, not the actuation of the substance by the constitution of the composite; it follows that the actuation is the proximate effect. (iii) The accident, as Form, formally regards substance as Subject of its information, not as partner with it in the constitution of the accidental composite.

Such is the plain teaching of the Angelic Doctor. "The essential nature of accident,' he writes, 'is to inhere and depend, and to make composition with the Subject by way of consequence1?' And, though in other passages he corrects the former part of the same definition, forasmuch as it might seem to imply that actual inherence is of the essence of accident; yet he invariably retains the notion of aptitudinal inherence in, and of necessary dependence of its being on, the Subject, as of that which is of the essence of accident. Thus, he declares that 'It belongs to the quiddity or essence, of accident, to have being in the Subject 2.' So, again, he defines accident to be 'An entity whose due it is to have being in another; or, as in another place, 'An entity to whose nature it is due that it should have being in another 4.' Therefore, according to St. Thomas, its proximate and formal term of causality is the accidental actuation of the Subject by its inherence in it, and 'it makes composition with its Subject as a consequence.'

1 Ratio autem accidentis imperfectionem continet: quia esse accidentis est inesse et dependere, et compositionem facere cum subjecto per consequens.' 1 d. viii, Q. 4, a. 3, c.

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2 Quidditati autem, sive essentiae accidentis competit habere esse in subjecto.' 3a° lxxvii, 1, 2m.

3 Res cui debetur esse in alio.' 4 d. xii, Q. 1, a. I, q. 1, 2m.

Adhuc natura ejus remanet talis ut ei debeatur esse in alio.' Quol. L. IX, a. 5, 2m.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. If we admit that the Subject can be an effect of the formal causality of accident, it will consequently be necessary to admit a certain dependence of substance on accident. But this is impossible for the following reason. The adequate Subject of accident is substance. Therefore, substance is naturally prior to accident. Therefore it cannot depend on accident. The above argument is further confirmed as follows. The essence of the Subject is substantial. Therefore, it is incongruous to suppose its dependence anywise on the imperfect entities of other Categories. Accordingly, all are agreed that substance does not depend on accident as on a proper formal cause.

ANSWER. The Antecedent is granted; the Consequent denied. Now for the proofs adduced in support of the latter. It is undeniable that substance is the adequate Subject of accident; but that substance is naturally prior to accident, needs distinction. It is naturally prior to accident in its own substantial entity, that is to say, in its essential composition as constituted of matter and its substantial Form, -granted; it is naturally prior to accident in its real potentiality to the accidental Form,-a Subdistinction is necessary: It is naturally prior in order of genesis,―granted; it is naturally prior in the constitution of the accidental composite,-denied. To explain the above distinction: It is quite certain that substance, in its own essential nature, is incapable of any dependence upon an accidental Form; since it is integrally constituted prior, in order of nature, to its accidental information. But it is equally true that it has an accidental potentiality, or real subjective capacity and aptitude, for receiving accidents; and, though this potentiality is naturally prior in order of generation,-because it is, as it were, the immediate Subject, nevertheless, it is not prior in the constituted composite or in absolute nobility of Being. Consequently, in this respect substance admits of a dependence on its accidental Form for its completorial, not its essential, perfection. Thus, for instance, deprive material substance of its quantity, it would be most nearly represented, in its relation to sensile perception, by a mathematical point. Much the same may be said for the accidents by which a spiritual substance is perfected. Hence, the Angelic Doctor, referring to the soul of man, observes that even the created truth, which is in our intellect, is greater than the soul,-not simply but in

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