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THE TWO KINDS OF SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES.
Proposition CXVI. Immediate analytical Judgments
are in themselves universal
Proposition CXVII. Singular synthetical, or empirical,
Judgments cannot in any way become universal .
Proposition CXVIII. Particular empirical Judgments,
which are the foundation of legitimate induction, are
capable of assuming a sort of moral universality, not on
the strength of the induction, but by virtue of some
analytical Principle
CHAPTER III.
ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES.
Proposition CXIX. The Principle of causality (which may
be thus enunciated: Inceptive or contingent Being neces-
sarily supposes its efficient cause) is analytical. Hence,
the concept of an efficient cause is essentially contained
in the idea of change, or of the possible
DIFFICULTIES
6,7
8
8-10
11-18
19-28
The ultimate Principle in order of reduction :-Explanation
Proposition CXX. The Principle of identity, taken in
its obvious meaning, cannot be a Principle at all
Proposition CXXI. The Principle of identity, if under-
stood in a sense not tautological, cannot be the ultimate
Principle in order of reduction.
PAGE
28
28-31
31-37
37-42
Proposition CXXII. The Principle of equality cannot
be the ultimate Principle in order of reduction
Proposition CXXIII. The so-called Principle,-Being
creates existences,-is not the ultimate in order of re-
duction
42-46
46-49
Proposition CXXIV. The Principle of contradiction is
the ultimate in order of reduction
49-51
Proposition CXXV. The Judgment which may be thus
expressed :-Those material entities, which act, according
to the same physical law or under the same natural im-
pulsion will ordinarily under similar circumstances and
conditions produce similar effects;-is analytical
Proposition CXXVI. By virtue of the Principle of caus-
ality, as supplying a sufficient motive for the application
of the analytical Judgment, announced in the preceding
Thesis, to specified physical phenomena; certain empirical
Judgments assume a moral universality which makes them
physically certain, and are thereby elevated to the rank
of experimental axioms
65-77
77-85
85-89
CHAPTER V.
THE SYNTHETICAL À PRIORI JUDGMENTS OF KANT.
The philosophy of Descartes in its relation to the modern
critical philosophy
The philosophies of Locke and, more particularly, of
Hume, considered in their bearing on the subsequent
90-92
Proposition CXXVIII. Between the Principiant and
the Principiate there subsists a true relation
150
Proposition CXXIX. The Principiant and Principiate
are really distinguished from each other
Proposition CXXX. A Principiant has always a priority
of some sort over its Principiate
151-153
ARTICLE II. Cause.
3. Com-
Introduction. 1. Definition of Cause,-certain animad-
versions on Balmez. 2 States of Cause.
parison between Principiant and Cause. 4. The relation
of Cause to the Categories
A. What is the nature of a Cause considered with reference
to its Effect?
Proposition CXXXI. Between a Cause and its Effect
there exists a relation at least not mutual.
Proposition CXXXII. Not only is the relation of the
Cause really distinguished from the relation which is
in the Effect; but in like manner the absolute entity of
the Cause is really distinguished from the absolute entity
of the Effect
153-157
157
157, 15
158, 159
Proposition CXXXIII. A Cause is prior in order of
nature, but not necessarily in order of time, to its Effect 159-162
Proposition CXXXIV. A Cause in its second act is
simultaneous with its Effect
B. What is the determinate concept of an Effect?
C. What is precisely that which is called the influx, or
causality of the Cause?
Proposition CXXXV. Causality in the Cause is a certain.
reality whose existence is either absolutely or conditionally
necessary, as well as sufficient, for the existence of the
Effect
Proposition CXXXVI. Causal influx or causality, con-
sidered as something real in the Effect, is a mode of
imperfect existence or without intrinsic and absolute
necessity, which is called dependence; by virtue of which
an entity exists after such a manner that it could not
exist without the active influence of a Cause; but, that
influence of the Cause once given, it not only can, but
does actually exist.
Proposition CXXXVII. Causality in the Cause is really
distinct from the predicamental relation of the Cause to
its Effect; and, in like manner, passive causal influx is
162
162, 163
163
163-166
167