is highly desirable that the Bank should, as soon as possible, resume its payments in cash, immediately after the passing of the present act, measures should be taken by the Bank to enable them to resume such payments. His object," he said, "in proposing this amendment was, that the Bank should, in the fifteen months longer allowed them, lose no time in preparing to resume cash payments, and not consider this as a new lease of exemption from paying in specie."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, "he had no objection to the introduction of the first part of the amendment, which expressed the desire of a resumption of cash payments, as he himself felt a sincere wish for that event; but he would certainly object to the latter part, which required the adoption of immediate measures for that purpose." Mr. Horner consented to take only the first part of his amendment. He said "that his purpose in proposing the amendment was to record the difference in principle on this question. He agreed that the Bank could not commence cash payments till the market and Mint price of gold were the same; but then the Bank must take steps themselves to bring this about. He contended that the present amendment was perfectly consistent with the Report of the Bullion Committee. We had been already ten months at peace, and by the present bill fifteen months were added to the period of the restriction, which amounted to more than two years. The House might rest assured that unless Parliament interposed, payments in cash would never be resumed by the Bank of England, whatever might be the good wishes expressed by the directors in that House. He then altered his amendment to the following words:That it is highly desirable that the Bank of England should, as soon as possible, return to the

payment of its notes in cash.'" The amendment was agreed to.

LETTER CCXXXII. TO EARL GREY.

Dear Lord Grey,

Launceston, 28th March, 1815.

for

I cannot say how much I feel obliged to you, taking the trouble of writing to me so full and satisfactory an account of the sentiments of our different friends at the present moment: they seem all of them, upon the whole, more pacific than I was prepared to expect. The preservation of peace for any length of time is, I fear, a vain wish; considering the parties, on all sides, with whom it rests. But the manner of our renewing the war is a point of principle, upon which I dreaded more serious differences of opinion. These may be saved probably by the immediate course of events, or rather by the conduct of the single man who guides or drives the events of our time. But if he should, in the first instance, think it for his advantage, to hold out terms of peace and moderation, a schism would seem unavoidable; at least for the interval of such a discussion, between those who are for an immediate invasion of France, because Bonaparte is sure in the end to play his old part, and those who think that every thing is gained for the justice and popularity of the war throughout Europe, by forbearing to interfere in French affairs, till aggressions are again attempted. It affords me the greatest satisfaction to know, that the opinion I had formed, upon this turn of circumstances, coincides with that of your Lordship, in all points.

A war renewed now upon the footing of the Treaty of Paris, will be in truth a war for the restoration of the Bourbon family; coupled with a still more indefensible

principle, that of proscribing an individual to destruction. No successes would ever reconcile me to such a war; but by so recommencing it, we should multiply all the chances against us. The entrance of foreign troops upon French territory will give the Emperor, at once, all the strength of French national enthusiasm; certainly not weakened by having been suppressed for a year, nor by the insults which it has recently submitted to. If the Austrians march across the Rhine, I suppose they will detain the empress and the young boy as hostages; and that cannot fail to give Bonaparte an advantage in the war, both among his own people and foreigners, of all the interest and sympathy which such a circumstance must naturally inspire; and all this is to be done, with the hope of forcing upon France a family, who, in a year's possession of the throne, could not secure a dozen bayonets to keep them in it; and who were so utterly insignificant, that they were not molested in their flight. Believe me, my dear Lord,

Most truly yours,

FRA. HORNER.

LETTER CCXXXII.* TO J. A. MURRAY, ESQ.

My dear Murray,

Taunton, 3d April, 1815.

But

I am delighted to hear you are in Lincoln's Inn, and wish much it were less uncomfortable for you. I shall have a better bed for you in Great Russell Street, next time. I must contrive to be in town on Thursday, for I have undertaken to argue the first cause in the House of Lords on the following morning. For this, I give up Sessions. I hope you will remain a full month in London, and that in the course of it we shall contrive to pass a few days quietly somewhere together, to have

more leisure for conversation than London usually affords. God knows there is matter enough in public affairs for much anxious conversation. I begin to feel myself growing a mere fatalist about politics, we seem so much the victim and sport of uncontrollable events. I can bestow no thoughts at this moment upon the happiness of the French nation, as concerned in the last marvellous revolution of affairs; they are so sunk in my estimation, by their passive acquiescence under two such changes of government, that I feel no interest about their political or civil liberties. But the possible consequences to our own liberties, of the conduct that may be pursued by our government in the present new conjuncture, do incessantly disturb and burthen my mind. So many persons, in whose judgment and public spirit I have the best confidence, are for hurrying into immediate war, that I am afraid almost to inquire about your sentiments on that point, lest I should find them differing from my own. But my impression from the first moment was, that we ought to give the Emperor of France an opportunity of maintaining the treaty of Paris if he would, and throw upon him the unpopularity of being the first to make aggressions and to break the tranquillity of Europe. These impressions were not shaken by the authority of all the names subscribed to the manifesto from Vienna, and they have derived of course some addition of strength from the formal declarations now made by Napoleon, of his relinquishing all former schemes of a mastery over foreign nations, and founding a great empire. Not that I place much faith in these professions, for in forming a practical decision as to what is best to be done, I would look upon them as entitled to none at all; although I think it not impossible that reflections in exile, and older years, may have

given prudence some ascendancy in his plans, and not wholly out of his character that he should set his ambition as it were upon a new theory of greatness for its gratification. But in taking the practical determination, what I would be guided by is this, that if we are to open a new Iliad of war against the military power of France, it is of the last importance that we should so commence it, as to stamp upon it, in the opinion of the people of the continent, its true character of a war of defence merely against aggrandizement. By going to war now, we go to war for the Bourbons, to force that feeble wornout race upon the French; we go to war too upon a still more hopeless, and in my sentiments unjustifiable principle, that of proscribing an individual, and through him the nation which has adopted him, as incapable of peace or truce. It is obvious, that, proceeding in that manner, we do what we can to inspire into the French soldiery all the fire of enthusiasm, every feeling of pride for their national independence, and the utmost devotion for their great chief. The argument used on the other side, is, that in prudence it must be assumed that he will act over again his old part as soon as he has collected sufficient means, and that the interval should not be let slip of overbearing him while he is unprepared with the whole combined numbers of the allies. In this reasoning there are more assumptions than one, of which I doubt the correctness. It is taken for granted, that he could not now make head against such force as the allies could push into his territory; in which I apprehend those who reckon the strength of armies by the tale of numbers might be proved, by the issue of such an experiment, to have forgotten in their estimate, that moral force which must be breathed into troops by the romance and marvellous [prestige], that accompany this last enter