Your answer, left with Budd, or sent here, will very

much oblige

Your obedient servant,

W. COBBETT.

On the back of this letter, there is the following memorandum in Mr. Horner's handwriting:

"31st Dec. Said to Budd, I should send him a note."

I have given the report of Mr. Horner's speech on this great constitutional question, in full, in the Appendix. It is the only one of his speeches in parliament that he corrected, as far as I am aware, except a short one on the Scotch Judicature Bill in 1815. Mr. Cobbett says that his reporter had given "about a dozen or twenty lines" to the speech; it is evident, therefore, both from the length and the style of the report, that Mr. Horner must have written as full an account of what he had said as he could recollect, after an interval of a fortnight from the day of the debate.

LETTER CLXIV. TO FRANCIS JEFFREY, ESQ.

My dear Jeffrey,

Lincoln's Inn, 18th January, 1811.

I received Malthus's manuscript from you, and have since transmitted it to him, with such remarks as occurred to me in perusing it.

The Quarterly Review was sure to be right about depreciation; being under the command of Canning, who is under the command of Huskisson. I have heard it is George Ellis, who has set Sir John Sinclair upon his black ram. By the way, I wish you would take Sinclair's two pamphlets into your own hands, and make fun

of him, in a good-natured way. You would do me a peculiar service, if you will deal with his currency, as you did with his longevity. The inconsistency of his opinions at present, with those which he published in 1797, in a pamphlet against the Bank restriction, and which he repeated in the strongest terms in 1803, in the second volume of his History of the Revenue, is rather a matter of grave charge, for which he ought to be put upon the defensive. I am told that George Chalmer has put forth a volume against us, more extravagantly wrong than even Sinclair; perhaps you could contrive to put them side by side into one frame, and exhibit the pair of portraits, like Noodle and Doodle in their old tie and buckle, and in the full complacency of conscious wisdom.

The subject you suggest of the present state of commerce, with all its circumstances, and all the considerations, both retrospective and in prospect, that naturally belong to it, is a noble one, but of very difficult execution. I do not know what to say about peace: I should like, of all things, to have, for my own judgment, the benefit of the views which you could suggest; but for the sake of the public, I really think your opinion ought to be very deliberately weighed and confidently formed, before you give the sanction of your authority to sentiments and expectations, which, though remarkably dormant at present, may be raised any day among the people to an unmanageable size.

Upon the question of peace, I parted company with some of my best advisers, and you (I fear) among them, at the moment of the Spanish insurrection; thinking that the circumstances of that event recommended an extension of hostilities, upon the very same principle, which condemned the original hostilities on our part,

with which this long war commenced. However persons may differ, as to the policy of having acted upon this principle towards Spain, they must all, I apprehend, admit that we have bound ourselves by our treaty with the insurgents, and that we cannot, in good faith, abandon them, while they preserve any hopes. Besides this obligation of good faith, in respect of which there can be no difference between us, I have not yet myself relinquished such hopes, though you will probably regard me as somewhat enthusiastic in retaining them so long; but miserable as our disappointments have been, beyond all former estimates of the degradation to which a long course of despotism could reduce a great people, I do not yet see that the affairs of the insurgents in the peninsula are desperate. And I would have this country act upon the same views, and if possible with the same magnanimity, as Elizabeth showed to the rebels in the Netherlands, and persevered in at the lowest ebb of their fortunes. This is an immediate consideration, which would prevent me from acquiescing in any present proposal of peace, unaccompanied by a stipulation on the part of France to evacuate Spain. But it grows out of a principle, which carries me a great deal farther, and compels me almost to make up my mind to what you will call an indefinite prospect of war; a prospect never to be avowed, however, even when it appears most certain.

In the situation to which the continent of Europe is reduced, and in the situation which England commands, I cannot imagine a general peace of any duration; and without it, we can have no peace with France. I rest very little argument now, upon the personal character of Bonaparte; the direct effect of his name and genius, so prodigious for a certain period of time, is at length

almost sunk in that change of the state of the world which he has effected. I rest no argument at all upon his particular designs against this country, which is the grand reason with our vulgar for perpetual war; because, though to prevail over England must be the final scope and aim of his ambition, without which the absolute disposal of the whole Continent leaves his love of glory unsatisfied, and would be insufficient to transmit his name to posterity as equal to those conquerors of former ages who overcame all that was great and civilised in their own time, and all that was opposed to them; yet his personal passion for making a conquest of us cannot be a better reason for war, than the national design, pursued under all changes of government, which France has ever entertained against us, and which we have ever entertained against France. It is the natural condition and infirmity of powerful neighbours; which never can become a reason to either of them for refusing to make peace with the other, as long as they preserve any thing near an equality of force for the maintenance of war. My view of our situation is taken from other circumstances. What is likely to be the state of the Continent for many years to come? And in the probable condition of the Continent, what must be the conduct of England; which (whatever her interest might be, if it could be managed for years together with perfect wisdom) cannot but be impelled by the voice of the people, and by the ancient habits of political as well as commercial connexion? If the whole Continent were to be tranquillised into one empire, and should slumber for years in repose under a vigilant and well-organised despotism, no fate could be intended for us but annexation to the mass; nor could we devise any safety for ourselves, but by adopting public institutions,

and by fostering sentiments of individual ambition and conduct, of which defensive war and the most rigid prejudices of local patriotism were the constant objects. But it is seldom that human affairs fall into such a forced state. It seems infinitely more probable, that the new empire of France will be perpetually disturbed by efforts in one member or another to throw off the yoke; in the north of Germany, for instance, where military genius might win a fair kingdom, or in the hereditary states of Austria, where the natives cannot yet have despaired of recovering their ancient independence. Should such chances arise, even if the struggle of Spain were over, I conceive it would be the duty of this country, and I am sure it would be unavoidable at any rate, to contribute from our resources every aid and encouragement to the insurgents. It is idle to sigh for peace, if it cannot be had upon system, and for a period to be sure of; England forms a part of Europe, and must share its vicissitudes and agitations.

The point to be considered is, by what mode, and upon what principles the war may be conducted, so as to afford the best chance of contributing to the ultimate restoration of independence to some of those kingdoms, which never can be incorporated with France, from the diversity of race and languages. In my judgment, we have only to act upon the principles by which Elizabeth was guided, and afterwards King William; forbearing all little bye objects of gain and aggrandisement, and keeping steadily in view, through all fortunes and in the lowest depth of our despair, the ultimate partition of the Continent into independent states, and the revival of a public law in Europe. For such conduct, looking so far forward, much patience, and constancy, and public integrity, will be required; but it is a part