the Transportation Act, and although the survival of such State law does not interfere with the national interest as found by the agency selected by Congress for determining that interest. I would affirm the judgment. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BURTON join in this dissent. WOODS, HOUSING EXPEDITER, v. HILLS. ON CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT. No. 437. Argued January 14, 1948.-Decided May 10, 1948. Under § 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act, the Administrator brought an action based on an alleged overcharge of rent. The issue, by stipulation of the parties, was the validity of the second of two orders of the Rent Director reducing maximum rents on property of the defendant. The District Court entered judgment for the defendant in 1946. An appeal by the Administrator was not submitted in the Circuit Court of Appeals until September 10, 1947, and the Emergency Price Control Act expired by its terms on June 30, 1947. Held: 1. Section 204 (d) of the Emergency Price Control Act precluded the District Court in 1946 from determining the validity of the individual rent order, even though the defense to the action brought there was based on the alleged invalidity of the order, since exclusive jurisdiction to pass on the validity of a regulation or an order issued by the Administrator was vested in the Emergency Court of Appeals and in this Court upon review of judgments and orders of the Emergency Court. Pp. 211-214. 2. On remand, the District Court will not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the second rent order and should not be directed by the Circuit Court of Appeals to pass on the validity of the order. Pp. 211-212, 218. 3. Since responsibility for functions with respect to rent control was transferred by Executive Order 9841 to the Housing Expediter rather than to the Department of Commerce, the necessary effect of the amendment of § 204 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act 210 Opinion of the Court. by the Supplemental Appropriation Act of July 30, 1947, was to abrogate the statutory right the defendant in the present case previously had to apply to the District Court for leave to file a complaint in the Emergency Court of Appeals, wherefore the latter court no longer has jurisdiction pursuant to § 204 (e) over any complaint which defendant may desire to file with it to contest the validity of the second rent order. Pp. 215–216. 4. Under § 1 (b) of the Emergency Price Control Act, the Emergency Court of Appeals still has jurisdiction to review rent orders. issued under the Price Control Act, through the protest and complaint procedure prescribed by §§ 203 (a) and 204 (a) as amended, although a 1947 amendment expressly recognizes the right of the United States or any officer thereof to dismiss any protest under § 203 on the ground of laches. Pp. 216–218. Upon an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the defendant in an action by the Temporary Controls Administrator (succeeded by the Housing Expediter) under § 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act based on an alleged overcharge of rent, the Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to this Court which are here answered, pp. 212–213, 218. John R. Benney argued the cause for the Administrator. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Ed Dupree and Nathan Siegel. By special leave of Court, George D. Rathbun, pro hac vice, argued the cause and filed a brief for Hills. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has certified questions of law concerning which it asks instructions for the proper decision of the cause pending in that court. Judicial Code, § 239; 28 U. S. C. § 346. The certificate states that this is an action brought by the Administrator for treble damages and for an injunc Opinion of the Court. 334 U.S. tion under § 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act1 and under the Rent Regulation for Housing. Hills, the defendant below, remodeled apartments located in a Defense Rental Area, subject to the Rent Regulations, and duly registered them. Thereafter, on December 17, 1943, the maximum rents were reduced by the Area Rent Director pursuant to § 5 (c) of the Regulation; and on March 7, 1945, the Rent Director issued an order further reducing the maximum rents. On trial in the District Court without a jury, the parties stipulated that the only issue was the validity of the second order. The District Court entered judgment for the defendant on October 29, 1946, holding that the burden was on the Administrator to establish the validity of the second order and that he had failed to introduce proof establishing its validity. At the time the District Court entered its judgment, exclusive jurisdiction to pass on the validity of a regulation or order issued by the Administrator was vested in the Emergency Court of Appeals and in this Court upon review of judgments and orders of the Emergency Court. § 204 (d), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 924 (d). However, the appeal by the Administrator from the judgment of the District Court was not submitted in the Circuit Court of Appeals until September 10, 1947, and the Emergency Price Control Act expired by its terms on June 30, 1947. § 1 (b), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 901 (b). The questions certified are as follows: "(1) On remand, will the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, First Division, have jurisdiction to determine the validity of 1 As amended, 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§ 901, 925. 2 As amended, 8 Fed. Reg. 7322. 210 Opinion of the Court. the second rent order and should we direct the District Court to pass on the validity of such rent order? "(2) If the first question is answered in the negative, does the Emergency Court of Appeals still have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the second rent order? "(3) If the second question is answered in the affirmative, and this court remands the cause with directions to enter judgment as prayed for against Hills, may Hills, under Sec. 204 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended (50) U. S. C. A. App., Sec. 924 (e)), apply to the District Court for leave to file in the Emergency Court of Appeals a complaint against the Administrator, setting forth objections to the validity of the second rent order, and, upon proper petition and showing, obtain the relief provided for in Sec. 204 (e), and should we so direct on remand?" There can be no doubt that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Emergency Court of Appeals by § 204 (d)3 precluded the District Court in 1946 from de 366 The Emergency Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court upon review of judgments and orders of the Emergency Court of Appeals, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under section 2, of any price schedule effective in accordance with the provisions of section 206, and of any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule. Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to stay, restrain, enjoin, or set aside, in whole or in part, any provisions of this Act authorizing the issuance of such regulations or orders, or making effective any such price schedule, or any provision of any such regulation, order, or price schedule, or to restrain or enjoin the enforcement of any such provision." 56 Stat. 33. Opinion of the Court. 334 U.S. termining the validity of the individual rent order even though the defense to the action brought there was based on the alleged invalidity of the order.* The Emergency Price Control Act was to terminate on June 30, 1947. Section 1 (b), which fixed that date, expressly provides that "as to offenses committed, or rights or liabilities incurred, prior to such termination date, the provisions of this Act and such regulations, orders, price schedules, and requirements shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper suit, action, or prosecution with respect to any such right, liability, or offense." 56 Stat. 24. Since the offense complained of in the case at bar occurred before the termination date, § 1 (b) would apply and the Emergency Court of Appeals would still have exclusive jurisdiction to pass on the validity of the second rent order, if additional prerequisites set forth in § 204 (e) (1) of the statute were satisfied.5 Jurisdiction of the Emergency Court of Appeals over any complaint arises, pursuant to § 204 (e) (1), when the court in which a civil or criminal enforcement proceeding is pending has granted the defendant leave to file in the Emergency Court of Appeals a complaint setting forth objections to the validity of any provision which the defendant is alleged to have violated, and the defendant has duly filed such a complaint. Prior to a 1947 amendment, § 204 (e) (1) provided that "Within thirty days after arraignment, or such additional time as the court may allow for good cause shown, in any criminal proceed 4 See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 510-511, 521 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944). 5 Cf. 150 East 47th Street Corp. v. Porter, 156 F. 2d 541 (E. C. A., 1946). Moreover, the terms of a 1947 amendment, discussed infra, pp. 215-217, clearly show congressional recognition that this exclusive jurisdiction continued after the termination date. |