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Opinion of the Court. 334 U. S.

of § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526,15 U. S. C. § 13.1 It accordingly issued a cease and desist order. 39 F. T. C. 35.2 Upon petition of the respondent the Circuit Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, set aside the Commission's findings and order, directed the Commission to dismiss its complaint against respondent, and denied a cross petition of the Commission for enforcement of its order. 162 F. 2d 949. The Court's judgment rested on its construction of the Act, its holding that crucial findings of the Commission were either not supported by evidence or were contrary to the evidence, and its conclusion that the Commission's order was too broad. Since questions of importance in the construction and administration of the Act were presented, we granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 850. Disposition of these questions requires only a brief narration of the facts.

Respondent manufactures several different brands of table salt3 and sells them directly to (1) wholesalers or

1 Section 2 (a) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives thp benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . ."

2 The original findings and order were modified by the Commission on its own motion. The controversy here deals only with the findings and order as modified.

3 Respondent also produces and sells other kinds of salt, but the trade practices here involved only relate to table salt.

37 Opinion of the Court.

jobbers, who in turn resell to the retail trade, and (2) large retailers, including chain store retailers. Respondent sells its finest brand of table salt, known as Blue Label, on what it terms a standard quantity discount system available to all customers. Under this system the purchasers pay a delivered price and the cost to both wholesale and retail purchasers of this brand differs according to the quantities bought. These prices are as follows, after making allowance for rebates and discounts:

Per case

Less-than-carload purchases $1.60

Carload purchases 1.50

5,000-case purchases in any consecutive 12 months... 1.40
50,000-case purchases in any consecutive 12 months.. 1.35

Only five companies have ever bought sufficient quantities of respondent's salt to obtain the $1.35 per case price. These companies could buy in such quantities because they operate large chains of retail stores in various parts of the country.4 As a result of this low price these five companies have been able to sell Blue Label salt at retail cheaper than wholesale purchasers from respondent could reasonably sell the same brand of salt to independently operated retail stores, many of whom competed with the local outlets of the five chain stores.

Respondent's table salts, other than Blue Label, are also sold under a quantity discount system differing slightly from that used in selling Blue Label. Sales of these other brands in less-than-carload lots are made at list price plus freight from plant to destination. Carload purchasers are granted approximately a 5 per cent discount; approximately a 10 per cent discount is granted to purchasers who buy as much as $50,000 worth of all brands of salt in any consecutive twelve-month period.

* These chain stores are American Stores Company, National Tea Company, Kroger Grocery Co., Safeway Stores, Inc., and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company.

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Respondent's quantity discounts on B'ue Label and on other table salts were enjoyed by certain wholesalers and retailers who competed with other wh.'.esalers and retailers to whom these discounts were refosed.

In addition to these standard quantity discounts, special allow&r.ces were zrar.-.ed certain favored customers who competed with other customers to whom they were denied-1

Ftrrf. Respondent's basic contention, which it argues this case hir.zes upon, is that its "standard quantity discounts, available to all on equal terms, as contrasted, for example, to hidden or special rebates, allowances, prices or discounts, are not discriminatory within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act." Theoretically, these discounts are equally available to all. but functionally they are not. For as the record indicates (if reference to it on this point were necessary) no single independent retail grocery store, and probably no single wholesaler, bought as many as 50,000 cases or as much as $50,000 worth of table salt in one year. Furthermore, the record shows that, while certain purchasers were enjoying one or more of respondent's standard quantity discounts, some of

* One such customer, a wholesaler, received a special discount of 7% cents per case on purchases of carload lots of Blue Label Salt. Respondent sold to this wholesaler at $1.42% per case, although competing wholesalers were required to pay $1.50 per case on carload lots. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that findings of the Commission on th»->w special allowances were supported by substantial evidence, that they were not maintained to meet lower prices of respondent's competitors, and that the allowances were discriminatory. It nevertheless set the findings aside on the ground that the Commission's finding of injury to competition from the discriminations engaged in by resfiondent was too general and had little evidence to support it. We think the finding and supporting evidence of injury to competition on account of these special allowances are similar to the finding and evidence with reference to the quantity discount system and need not be separately treated.

37 Opinion of the Court.

their competitors made purchases in such small quantities that they could not qualify for any of respondent's discounts, even those based on carload shipments. The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity purchasing ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer of such advantages except to the extent that a lower price could be justified by reason of a seller's diminished costs due to quantity manufacture, delivery or sale, or by reason of the seller's good faith effort to meet a competitor's equally low price.

Section 2 of the original Clayton Act had included a proviso that nothing contained in it should prevent "discrimination in price ... on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportation . . . ." That section has been construed as permitting quantity discounts, such as those here, without regard to the amount of the seller's actual savings in cost attributable to quantity sales or quantity deliveries. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 101 F. 2d 620. The House Committee Report on the Robinson-Patman Act considered that the Clayton Act's proviso allowing quantity discounts so weakened § 2 "as to render it inadequate, if not almost a nullity." 6 The Committee considered the present Robinson-Patman amendment to § 2 "of great importance." Its purpose was to limit "the use of quantity price differentials to the sphere of actual cost differences. Otherwise," the report continued, "such differentials would become instruments of favor and privilege and weapons of com

• H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7.

Opinion of the Court. 334U.S.

petitive oppression."7 The Senate Committee reporting the bill emphasized the same purpose.' as did the Congressman in charge of the Conference Report when explaining it to the House just before final passage.9 And it was in furtherance of this avowed purpose—to protect competition from all price differentials except those based in full on cost savings—that § 2 (a) of the amendment provided "That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered."

The foregoing references, without regard to others which could be mentioned, establish that respondent's standard quantity discounts are discriminatory within, the meaning of the Act, and are prohibited by it whenever they have the defined effect on competition. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Staley Co., 324 U. S. 746, 751.

Second. The Government interprets the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals as having held that in order to establish "discrimination in price" under the Act the burden rested on the Commission to prove that respondent's quantity discount differentials were not justified by its cost savings."' Respondent does not so understand the Court of Appeals decision, and furthermore admits that no such burden rests on the Commission. We agree that it does not. First, the general rule of statutory construction that the burden of proving justification or exemption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute

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"Son. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6. • 80 Cong. Rec. 9417.

10 See 42 III. L. Rev. 556-561; 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 384-391; 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1167-1169.

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