« ForrigeFortsett »
Opinion of the Court.
KREIGER. v. KREIGER.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 371. Argued February 2–3, 1948–Decided June 7, 1948.
While both spouses were domiciled in New York, a wife obtained a decree of separation and alimony there. Later the husband obtained a Nevada divorce in a proceeding in which the wife was notified constructively and entered no appearance. He stopped paying alimony and the wife sued in New York for the amount in arrears. The husband appeared and defended on the ground of the Nevada divorce. The New York court granted the wife judgment for the arrears of alimony. The highest court of New York affirmed. Held: The New York judgment did not deny full faith and credit to the Nevada decree, since Nevada had no power to adjudicate the wife's rights in the New York decree of alimony. See Estin v. Estin, ante, p. 541. Pp. 556–557.
297 N. Y. 530, 74 N. E. 2d 468, affirmed.
Notwithstanding a divorce obtained by a husband in Nevada, a New York court gave the wife a judgment for arrears of alimony awarded under an earlier decree granted while both spouses were domiciled in New York. The Appellate Division affirmed. 271 N. Y. App. Div. 872, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 798. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 297 N. Y. 530, 74 N. E. 2d 468. This Court granted certiorari. 332 U.S. 829. Affirmed, p. 557.
James G. Purdy argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Abraham J. Nydick.
Charles Rothenberg argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE Douglas, announced by MR. JUSTICE REED.
This is a companion case to Estin v. Estin, ante, p. 541, also here on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York.
Opinion of the Court. 334 U. S.
The parties were married in New York in 1933 and lived there together until their separation in 1935. In 1940 respondent obtained a decree of separation in New York on grounds of abandonment. Petitioner appeared in the action; and respondent was awarded $60 a week alimony for the support of herself and their only child, whose custody she was given.
Petitioner thereafter went to Nevada where he continues to reside. He instituted divorce proceedings in that state in the fall of 1944. Constructive service was made on respondent who made no appearance in the Nevada proceedings. While they were pending, respondent obtained an order in New York purporting to enjoin petitioner from seeking a divorce and from remarrying. Petitioner was neither served with process in New York nor entered an appearance in the latter proceeding. The Nevada court, with knowledge of the injunction and the New York judgment for alimony, awarded petitioner an absolute divorce on grounds of three consecutive years of separation without cohabitation. The judgment made no provision for alimony. It did provide that petitioner was to support, maintain and educate the child, whose custody it purported to grant him, and as to which jurisdiction was reserved. Petitioner thereafter tendered $50 a month for the support of the child but ceased making payments under the New York decree.
Respondent thereupon brought suit on the New York judgment in a federal district court in Nevada. Without waiting the outcome of that litigation she obtained a judgment in New York for the amount of the arrears, petitioner appearing and unsuccessfully pleading his Nevada divorce as a defense. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division, two judges dissenting. 271 N. Y. App. Div. 872, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 798. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, 297 N. Y. 530, 74 N. E. 2d 468, but stated in its remittitur that its action was
based upon Estin v. Estin, 296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113. Respondent does not attack the bona fides of petitioner's Nevada domicile.
For the reasons stated in Estin v. Estin, ante, p. 541, we hold that Nevada had no power to adjudicate respondent's rights in the New York judgment and thus New York was not required to bow to that provision of the Nevada decree. It is therefore unnecessary to pass upon New York's attempt to enjoin petitioner from securing a divorce or to reach the question whether the New York judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in the Nevada proceedings. No issue as to the custody of the child was raised either in the court below or in this Court. The judgment is
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Estin v. Estin, ante, p. 549.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON dissents for the reasons set forth in his opinion in Estin v. Estin, ante, p. 553.
Opinion of the Court.
SAIA v. NEW YORK.
A city ordinance forbidding the use of sound amplification devices
in public places except with the permission of the Chief of Police and prescribing no standards for the exercise of his discretion is unconstitutional on its face, since it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pp. 558-562. 297 N. Y. 659, 76 N. E. 2d 323, reversed.
Appellant was convicted of violating a city ordinance forbidding the use of sound amplification devices except with the permission of the Chief of Police. The County Court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 297 N. Y. 659, 76 N. E. 2d 323. On appeal to this Court, reversed, p. 562.
Hayden C. Covington argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Alan V. Parker submitted on brief for appellee.
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE Douglas, announced by MR. JUSTICE Black.
This case presents the question of the validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of a penal ordinance of the City of Lockport, New York, which forbids the use of sound amplification devices except with permission of the Chief of Police.
1 The ordinance, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows: "Section 2. Radio devices, etc. It shall be unlawful for any person to maintain and operate in any building, or on any premises or on any automobile, motor truck or other motor vehicle, any radio device, mechanical device, or loud speaker or any device of any kind whereby the sound therefrom is cast directly upon the streets and public
Appellant is a minister of the religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses. He obtained from the Chief of Police permission to use sound equipment, mounted atop his car, to amplify lectures on religious subjects. The lectures were given at a fixed place in a public park on designated Sundays. When this permit expired, he applied for another one but was refused on the ground that complaints had been made. Appellant nevertheless used his equipment as planned on four occasions, but without a permit. He was tried in Police Court for violations of the ordinance. It was undisputed that he used his equipment to amplify speeches in the park and that they were on religious subjects. Some witnesses testified that they were annoyed by the sound, though not by the content of the addresses; others were not disturbed by either. The court upheld the ordinance against the contention that it violated appellant's rights of freedom of speech, assembly, and worship under the Federal Constitution. Fines and jail sentences were imposed. His convictions were affirmed without opinion by the County Court for Niagara County and by the New York Court of Appeals, 297 N. Y. 659, 76 N. E. 2d 323. The case is here on appeal.
We hold that § 3 of this ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the
places and where such device is maintained for advertising purposes or for the purpose of attracting the attention of the passing public, or which is so placed and operated that the sounds coming therefrom can be heard to the annoyance or inconvenience of travelers upon any street or public places or of persons in neighboring premises.
"Section 3. Exception. Public dissemination, through radio loudspeakers, of items of news and matters of public concern and athletic activities shall not be deemed a violation of this section provided that the same be done under permission obtained from the Chief of Police.”
Appellant's conduct was regarded throughout as falling within the types of activity enumerated in §3. We take the ordinance as construed by the State courts.