« ForrigeFortsett »
Jackson, J., dissenting in part. 334U.S.
influenced by his lowered costs which he can reflect in his retail prices.
I agree that these facts warrant a prima facie inference of discrimination and sustain a finding of discrimination unless the Company, which best knows why and how these discounts are arrived at and which possesses all the data as to costs, comes forward with a justification. I agree, too, that the results of this system on respondent's customer list is enough to warrant the inference that the effects "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."
Even applying the stricter test of probability, I think the inference of adverse effect on competition is warranted by the facts as to the quota discounts. It is not merely probable but I think it is almost inevitable that the further ten-cent or fifteen-cent per case differential in net price of salt between the large number of small merchants and the small number of very large merchants, accelerates the trend of the former towards extinction and of the latter towards monopoly.
However, a very different problem is presented by the differential of 10 cents per case when delivered in carload lots. This carload price applies to various small purchasers who pool their orders to make a carload shipment and to all who pick up their orders, no matter how small, at the company warehouses which are maintained in ten cities. The evidence is that less than 1/10 of 1% of the respondent's total salt business fail to get the benefit of this carload-lot discount.
It does not seem to me that one can fairly draw the inference that competition probably is affected by the carload-lot discount. Indeed, the discount is so small in proportion to price, salt is so small an item in wholesale or retail business and in the consumer's budget that I should think it farfetched even to find it reasonably pos
37 Jackson, J., dissenting in part.
sible that competition would be substantially affected. Hence, the discount, whether more or less than the exact savings in handling, would not fall under condemnation of the statute. The incidence of this discount on customers is not arbitrarily determined by the volume of their business but depends upon an obvious difference in handling and delivery costs.
The Commission has forbidden respondent to continue this carload-lot differential. The Commission has no power to prescribe prices, so that it can order only that the differential be eliminated. Unless competitive conditions make it impossible, the respondent's self-interest would dictate that it abolish the discount and maintain the higher base price, rather than make the discount universally applicable. The result would be to raise the price of salt 10 cents per case to 99.9% of respondent's customers because 1/10 of 1% were not in a position to accept carload shipments. This is a quite different effect than the elimination of the quota discount.
It seems to me that a discount which gives a lowered cost to so large a proportion of respondent's customers and is withheld only from those whose conditions of delivery obviously impose greater handling costs, does not permit the same inferences of effect on competition as the quota discounts which reduce costs to the few only and that on a basis which ultimately is their size.
The two types of discount involved here seem to me to fall under different purposes of the Act and to require different conclusions of fact as to effect on competition. Accordingly, I should sustain the court below insofar as it sets aside the cease and desist order as to carload-lot discounts.
Opinion of the Court. 334 U. S.
REPUBLIC NATURAL GAS CO. v.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA.
One of two producers of natural gas in the same Oklahoma field was ordered by the State Commission to take gas “ratably” from, and to connect its pipeline with the well of, the other, on terms and conditions to be agreed upon by the parties or to be fixed by the Commission if the parties were unable to agree. The validity under the Federal Constitution of the order and of the state law which authorized it were sustained by the State Supreme Court, which interpreted the order as giving the respondent the choice of taking and paying for the gas, marketing the gas and accounting therefor, or shutting down its own wells. Held: The judgment of the State Supreme Court was not “final” within the meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code, and this Court is therefore without jurisdiction of an appeal therefrom. Pp. 62–72.
198 Okla. 350, 180 P. 2d 1009, appeal dismissed.
An order of the State Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, directing the appellant to take gas ratably from another producer in the same field, was sustained by the State Supreme Court. 198 Okla. 350, 180 P. 2d 1009. An appeal to this Court is here dismissed for the want of a “final” judgment, p. 72.
Robert M. Rainey and John F. Eberhardt argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Robert C. Foulston was also of counsel.
Earl Pruet argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Floyd Green.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, arising from an order of the State 62 Opinion of the Court.
Corporation Commission which concerned the correlative rights of owners of natural gas drawn from a common source.
Since 1913, Oklahoma has regulated the extraction of natural gas, partly to prevent waste and partly to avoid excessive drainage as between producers sharing the same pool. The legislation provided that owners might take from a common source amounts of gas proportionate to the natural flow of their respective wells, but not more than 25% of that natural flow without the consent of the Corporation Commission; that any person taking gas away from a gas field, except for certain specified purposes, "shall take ratably from each owner of the gas in proportion to his interest in said gas"; and that such ratable taking was to be upon terms agreed upon by the various well owners, or, in the event of failure to agree, upon terms fixed by the Corporation Commission.1
The Hugoton Gas Field is one of the largest in the United States, covering a vast area in several States, including Oklahoma. It was discovered in 1924 or 1925,
1 L. 1913, c. 198, §§ 1-3 (Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 52, §§ 231-33): "Section 1. All natural gas under the surface of any land in this state is hereby declared to be and is the property of the owners, or gas lessees, of the surface under which gas is located in its original state.
"Section 2. Any owner, or oil and gas lessee, of the surface, having the right to drill for gas shall have the right to sink a well to the natural gas underneath the same and to take gas therefrom until the gas under such surface is exhausted. In case other parties, having the right to drill into the common reservoir of gas, drill a well or wells into the same, then the amount of gas each owner may take therefrom shall be proportionate to the natural flow of his well or wells to the natural flow of the well or wells of such other owners of the same common source of supply of gas, such natural flow to be determined by any standard measurement at the beginning of each calendar month; provided, that not more than twenty-five per cent of the natural flow of any well shall be taken, unless for good cause shown, and upon notice and hearing the Corporation Commission may, by Opinion of the Court. 334U.S.
but the Oklahoma portion was not developed until 1937. Republic, a Delaware corporation, obtained permission to do business in Oklahoma in 1938, purchased gas leases in this field and drilled wells, removing the gas in its own pipelines. In 1944, the Peerless Oil and Gas Company completed a well in a portion of the gas field otherwise tapped only by Republic. It had no market for the gas obtained from this well, nor means of transporting such gas to any market. It offered to sell the gas to Republic, which refused it. Peerless then applied to the
proper order, permit the taking of a greater amount. The drilling of a gas well or wells by any owner or lessee of the surface shall be regarded as reducing to possession his share of such gas as is shown by his well.
"Section 3. Any person, firm or corporation, taking gas from a gas field, except for purposes of developing a gas or oil field, and operating oil wells, and for the purpose of his own domestic use, shall take ratably from each owner of the gas in proportion to his interest in said gas, upon such terms as may be agreed upon between said owners and the party taking such, or in case they cannot agree at such a price and upon such terms as may be fixed by the Corporation Commission after notice and hearing; provided, that each owner shall be required to deliver his gas to a common point of delivery on or adjacent to the surface overlying such gas."
See also L. 1915, c. 197, §§ 4, 5 (Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 52, §§ 239, 240):
"Section 4. That whenever the full production from any common source of supply of natural gas in this state is in excess of the market demands, then any person, firm or corporation, having the right to drill into and produce gas from any such common source of supply, may take therefrom only such proportion of the natural gas that may be marketed without waste, as the natural flow of the well or wells owned or controlled by any such person, firm or corporation bears to the total natural flow of such common source of supply having due regard to the acreage drained by each well, so as to prevent any such person, firm or corporation securing any unfair proportion of the gas therefrom; provided, that the Corporation Commission may by proper order, permit the taking of a greater amount whenever it shall deem such taking reasonable or equitable. The said commission is authorized and directed to prescribe rules and