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62 Opinion of the Court.

Corporation Commission for an order requiring Republic to take such gas from it "ratably"—that is, to take the same proportion of the natural flow of Peerless' well as Republic took of the natural flow of its own wells. After a hearing, the Commission found that the production of natural gas in the Hugoton field was in excess of the market demand; that Republic had qualified to do business in Oklahoma with full knowledge of the existing legislation requiring the ratable taking of natural gas; and that Republic was taking more than its ratable share

regulations for the determination of the natural flow of any such well or wells, and to regulate the taking of natural gas from any or all such common sources of supply within the state, so as to prevent waste, protect the interests of the public, and of all those having a right to produce therefrom, and to prevent unreasonable discrimination in favor of any one such common source of supply as against another.

"Section 5. That every person, firm or corporation, now or hereafter engaged in the business of purchasing and selling natural gas in this state, shall be a common purchaser thereof, and shall purchase all of the natural gas which may be offered for sale, and which may reasonably be reached by its trunk lines, or gathering lines without discrimination in favor of one producer as against another, or in favor of any one source of supply as against another save as authorized by the Corporation Commission after due notice and hearing; but if any such person, firm or corporation, shall be unable to purchase all the gas so offered, then it shall purchase natural gas from each producer ratably. It shall be unlawful for any such common purchaser to discriminate between like grades and pressures of natural gas, or in favor of its own production, or of production in which it may be directly or indirectly interested, either in whole or in part, but for the purpose of prorating the natural gas to be marketed, such production shall be treated in like manner as that of any other producer or person, and shall be taken only in the ratable proportion that such production bears to the total production available for marketing. The Corporation Commission shall have authority to make regulations for the delivery, metering and equitable purchasing and taking of all such gas and shall have authority to relieve any such common purchaser, after due notice and hearing, from the duty of purchasing gas of an inferior quality or grade."

Opinion of the Court. 334 U. S.

of gas from that portion of the field tapped both by its wells and that belonging to Peerless, thereby draining gas away from Peerless' tract and, in effect, taking property belonging to Peerless. The Commission ordered Republic:

“1. . . . to take gas ratably from applicant's [Peerless'] well . . ., and to make necessary connection as soon as applicant lays a line connecting said well with respondent's [Republic's] line, and to continue to do so until the further order of this Commission; provided that, applicant shall lay its line from its well to the lines of respondent at some point designated by the respondent, but in said Section 14 in which said well of Peerless Oil and Gas Company has been drilled; and said respondent is required to make said designation immediately and without unreasonable delay, and in event of failure of respondent so to do, respondent shall no longer be permitted to produce any of its wells located in the Hugoton Oklahoma Gas Field.

“2. The terms and conditions of such taking of natural gas by Republic Natural Gas Company from said Peerless Oil and Gas Company's well shall be determined and agreed upon by and between applicant and respondent; and in the event said parties are unable to agree, applicant and respondent are hereby granted the right to make further application to the Commission for an order fixing such terms and conditions; and the Commission retains jurisdiction hereof for said purpose.”

On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Republic, having been given leave to enter the State on the basis of the legislation governing natural gas production, might not challenge its validity, and that neither the order nor the legislation on which it is based 62 Opinion of the Court.

runs counter to asserted constitutional rights. 198 Okla. 350. The court interpreted the Commission's order as giving Republic "a choice between taking the gas from Peerless and paying therefor direct, or marketing the gas and accounting to Peerless therefor, or to shut in its own production from the same common source of supply." 198 Okla. at 356. Invoking both the Due Process and the Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Republic appealed to this Court.

This case raises thorny questions concerning the regulation of fugacious minerals, of moment both to States whose economy is especially involved and to the private enterprises which develop these natural resources. Cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55; Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, 311 U. S. 570. Before reaching these constitutional issues, we must determine whether or not we have jurisdiction to do so.

Ever since 1789, Congress has granted this Court the power of review in State litigation only after "the highest court of a State in which a decision in a suit could be had" has rendered a "final judgment or decree." § 237 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344, rephrasing § 25 of the Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85. Designed to avoid the evils of piecemeal review, this reflects a marked characteristic of the federal judicial system, unlike that of some of the States. This prerequisite for the exercise of the appellate powers of this Court is especially pertinent when a constitutional barrier is asserted against a State court's decision on matters peculiarly of local concern. Close observance of this limitation upon the Court is not regard for a strangling technicality. History bears ample testimony that it is an important factor in securing harmonious State-federal relations.

No self-enforcing formula defining when a judgment is "final" can be devised. Tests have been indicated

Opinion of the Court. 334 U. S.

which are helpful in giving direction and emphasis to decision from case to case. Thus, the requirement of finality has not been met merely because the major issues in a case have been decided and only a few loose ends remain to be tied up—for example, where liability has been determined and all that needs to be adjudicated is the amount of damages. Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18; Martinez v. International Banking Corp., 220 U. S. 214, 223; Mississippi Central R. Co. v. Smith, 295 U. S. 718. On the other hand, if nothing more than a ministerial act remains to be done, such as the entry of a judgment upon a mandate, the decree is regarded as concluding the case and is immediately reviewable. Board of Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108; Mower v. Fletcher, 114 U. S. 127. There have been instances where the Court has entertained an appeal of an order that otherwise might be deemed interlocutory, because the controversy had proceeded to a point where a losing party would be irreparably injured if review were unavailing. Cf. Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U. S. 545; and compare Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 204, with Barnard v. Gibson, 7 How. 650, 657. For related reasons, an order decreeing immediate transfer of possession of physical property is final for purposes of review even though an accounting for profits is to follow. In such cases the accounting is deemed a severed controversy and not part of the main case. Forgay v. Conrad, supra; Carondelet Canal Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362; Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120. But a decision that a taking by eminent domain is for a public use, where the amount of compensation has not been determined, is not deemed final, certainly where the property will not change hands until after the award of compensation. Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co., 243 U. S. 251; 62 Opinion of the Court.

cf. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337; Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229.2 One thing is clear. The considerations that determine finality are not abstractions but have reference to very real interests—not merely those of the immediate parties but, more particularly, those that pertain to the smooth functioning of our judicial system.

On which side of the line, however faint and faltering at times, dividing judgments that were deemed "final" from those found not to be so, does the judgment before us fall? The order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, as affirmed below, terminates some but not all issues in this proceeding. Republic is required to take ratably from Peerless, but it may do so in any one of three ways. If, as is most probable, Republic would choose not to close down its own wells, under the Commission's order it must allow Peerless to connect its well to Republic's pipeline. But there has been left open for later determination, in event of failure to reach agreement, the terms upon which Republic must take the gas, the rates which it must pay on purchase, or may charge if it sells as agent of Peerless. Does either its alternative character, or the fact that it leaves matters still open for determination, so qualify the order as to make it short of "final" for present review?

We turn first to the latter point. Certainly what remains to be done cannot be characterized as merely "ministerial." Whether or not the amount of gas to be taken by Republic from Peerless can be ascertained through application of a formula, the determination of the

2 In the Catlin case our decision was based on the general rule that condemnation orders prior to determination of just compensation are not appealable. The wartime statutes there involved were urged by the claimants as a reason for not applying the general rule. We rejected this contention.

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